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 Of late a literature has developed with a more negative view of the role of 
religion in promoting citizenship.  This literature reflects three main themes.  First, 
concern about the spillover of illiberal values into public life due to socialization 
infused with patriarchy.  Second, a concern for individual autonomy due to uncritical 
adherence to inherited beliefs and minimal exposure to a broad range of alternative 
views.  Third, a concern for the cultivation of democratic values due to a kind of 
radical sectarianism that places them at risk.  Arguments that advance these themes 
have focused on religious groups that are fundamentalist and isolationist.  While most 
authors note that not all religious groups are like this, the overall effect of this 
literature has been to permit fundamentalist and isolationist groups to stand for 
religion generally via assumptions that they differ from other groups merely in being 
more extreme and via the failure to consider the educational implications of 
alternative religious orientations.   
  
 In this dissertation I argue the following claims regarding this negative view 
of the civic importance of religion: 1) it does not provide a convincing account of the 
relationship between private associations and civic virtue; 2) it ignores the broad 
acceptance of “free faith” by most religions (a commitment related to autonomy); 3) 
it ignores religious traditions that emphasize civic responsibility, tolerance and social 
justice as articles of faith (commitments related to democratic character and 
democratic governance).   
 This dissertation explores a religious orientation whose educational 
implications for civic virtue differ quite significantly from isolationists and 
fundamentalists: the prophetic Christian tradition.  I assert that the strand of faith 
encountered within the prophetic tradition necessarily implicates involvement within 
the political dimension of life in all its aspects – cultural, economic, and 
governmental; and that it sustains a vision of citizenship that constitutes a religious 
vocation for believers qua citizens that is broadly compatible with and supportive of 
central liberal democratic values – namely reciprocity, mutual respect, tolerance, and 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Education for citizenship1 poses a dilemma for liberal democratic societies.  
One horn of this dilemma involves the interest such societies have in socializing 
individuals for membership.  Liberal societies reproduce themselves by creating 
citizens capable of supporting liberal political values with a view toward the common 
good.  Despite the fact that some individuals may abstain from the practical 
responsibilities of citizenship – for example voting or democratic deliberation – or 
withdraw from the dominant political and social culture, state institutions like public 
schools must nevertheless attempt to cultivate the virtues and capacities that enable 
citizens to competently participate in and contribute to socio-political life.  The state’s 
responsibility to create liberal citizens becomes even more salient in the face of 
conflicting differences in citizens’ conceptions of the good.  Minimally, it is 
important that citizens develop a critical moral perspective on their own behavior 
considering its potential impact on the rights of others (Hlebowitsh, 2001, 51).  
The second horn of the dilemma regards the fact that liberal societies are also 
committed to providing the widest possible range of freedom for individuals and 
groups to live their lives as they see fit.  This commitment makes them hospitable to a 
broad scope of ideological diversity.  The citizenship demands placed upon liberal 
democratic citizens tend to be minimal because liberal societies promote a view of 
justice compatible with an assortment of views.  Citizens are granted the maximum 
                                                 
1 I will use the phrase ‘education for citizenship’ interchangeably with the terms ‘political education,’ 
‘political socialization,’ and ‘civic/citizenship education.’  For my purposes, the unifying theme that 
connects each is the intentional effort to cultivate a range of capacities and virtues deemed requisite for 




amount of feasible freedom to live a life of commitment to whatever beliefs are most 
compatible with their conscience (W. Galston, 1995).  Therefore, state legitimacy is 
constructed upon the uncoerced will of the people, and dissent or consent from 
citizens that pours forth from a free conscience greatly contributes to that legitimacy.   
These two commitments can easily conflict insofar as the liberal state must, to 
some degree, tolerate those groups whose views are not fully liberal.  In order to 
maintain legitimacy, liberal societies must achieve their aims for citizenship without 
compromising their defining principles and values – governmental neutrality, 
freedom of conscience, and fairness being among those in greatest need of constant 
consideration.  The tension produced by this dilemma is especially acute with respect 
to religion.   
Religion is afforded a high degree of protection in liberal democratic societies.  
For instance, the First Amendment of the United States Constitution forbids the 
government to establish a state religion as well as assures all citizens the free exercise 
of their personal beliefs.  Former Supreme Court justice Robert H. Jackson offers an 
explanation for religion’s peculiar status in liberal societies:    
 
"[T]he effect of the religious freedom Amendment to our Constitution was to 
take every form of  propagation of religion out of the realm of things which 
could directly or indirectly be made public business, and thereby be supported 
in whole or in part at taxpayers' expense. That is a difference which the 
Constitution sets up between religion and almost every other subject matter of 
legislation; a difference which goes to the very root of religious freedom….It 
was intended not only to keep the state’s hands out of religion, but to keep 
religion's hands off the state."2 
 
Jackson’s comments essentially suggest that regardless of whether fair democratic 
procedure resulted in the majority deciding to establish a particular doctrine as 
                                                 




orthodox in regard to public observance (or to eliminate the observance of one by a 
select group), the constitution unequivocally removes religious freedom and matters 
of the spirit outside of the scope of issues which the government or popular vote can 
tamper. In other words, religious liberty trumps democratic decision making.  
Religion is so integral to personal identity that to coerce belief, to bully conscience, is 
to in a sense violate the essence of the self.     
Justice Jackson’s comments also hint at another reason why religion and 
government are kept at a sufficient distance: to prevent state authority from becoming 
the puppet of religious caprice.  If liberal societies permitted unqualified 
entanglement between state authority and religion, then the stability of the political 
rights and democratic norms we now take for granted would continually be 
vulnerable to the commands of one of the many extant doctrines affirmed within our 
society.  Political liberalism would consequently morph into varying expressions of 
ethical liberalism wherein the political conception of justice would derive its 
legitimacy from a particular comprehensive doctrine, placing it at odds with a range 
of reasonable doctrines citizens endorse (Rawls, 1993).  Since the United States is, 
and has been, home to religious groups that endorse illiberal convictions and promote 
illiberal3 practices, the thought of the political conception of justice mirroring them is 
not a comforting one.  Such a political environment would oppress and exclude those 
individuals whose reason led them to reject the reigning doctrine.   
                                                 
3 There are at least two ways in which groups might be thought of as illiberal: (1) they can be illiberal 
with respect to practices within the group (although they may promote liberal values as political 
values); (2) groups can be illiberal with respect to the espousal of illiberal values as political values. 
An example of the former might be the Catholic Church’s refusal to admit women to the priesthood.  




Although citizens of liberal societies are unlikely to ever experience this sort 
of psychological oppression as an effect of de jure governmental establishment, many 
may experience it within parochial private associations and communities.  Therefore, 
despite the amount of protection the liberal state affords religion, it must nevertheless 
uphold the responsibility of protecting its citizens from private as well as public 
despotism and exploitation. This means that liberal societies must occasionally 
entertain the question of when to intervene in the affairs of religious groups in order 
to prevent them from oppressing individual members.  One illustration of this point 
concerns the education of children within illiberal groups; they who, effectively, are 
involuntary members.    
Isolationists and Fundamentalists4 represent two distinct religious orientations 
that tend to challenge the degree of forbearance and tolerance a liberal state would 
ideally seek to uphold with regard to balancing religious freedom against its interest 
in citizenship.  Generally speaking, isolationists seek separation from mainstream 
society in order to pursue a consecrated way of life that is absent corrupt worldly 
influences.  Fundamentalists are viewed as believers who hold a literal interpretation 
of the “fundamentals” of their faith’s doctrine, considering them to be inerrant.  One 
might consider believers who reflect these two orientations as expressing anxiety 
about how the escalating pluralism within modern societies threatens the continuance 
of their treasured values and ways of life.  Liberal societies are generally suspicious 
of isolationists and fundamentalists because in resisting the unsettling features of the 
pluralism they would rather not confront, such groups often deny their members 
                                                 
4 I use these two terms very generally because of the difficulty of defining such groups with any 




opportunities to freely consider a wide range of views about the good or to choose an 
alternative way of life that might better suit them.  Isolationism and fundamentalism 
signify characteristics that arouse significant concerns about religion’s influence on 
the development of civic virtue.  
One central concern liberal states have regarding citizenship and the believers 
of these orientations is more internal in nature.  It regards how little they appear to 
value critical reasoning and the life of the mind.  Theoretically, liberal democracies 
rest upon reasoned consensus that is the outgrowth of inclusive deliberation and 
individual choice.  Consequently, they require citizens that possess the capacity to 
adequately engage in this deliberative process.  Yet, isolationist groups, like the 
Amish for example, attempt to sustain a sectarian subculture in which their values can 
be taken for granted in isolation from others.  This usually requires tight social 
control over members, and often in ways that undermine their autonomy and capacity 
to reason critically because exposure to alternative beliefs is severely restricted and 
criticism of the group’s beliefs is prohibited.  Extreme forms of isolationism might 
breed psychological captivity.5 Similarly, because fundamentalists generally hold an 
inerrantist view about their religious beliefs, their hostility to doctrinal criticism tends 
to shield members from exposure to views that challenge the validity of those beliefs.  
A second central concern of liberal societies regarding the relationship 
between these two orientations and citizenship is more external in nature, and can be 
considered a possible consequence of the first.  It regards the impact of authoritarian 
attitudes and coercive practices on other citizens.  Fundamentalists generally share the 
                                                 
5 By this I mean members who are unable to avail themselves of any opportunity to exit the group 
because they lack adequate skills and capacities to thrive intellectually and emotionally independent of 




isolationist’s anxiety about their inability to preserve coveted values.  But rather than 
isolate themselves many instead seek avenues through which their religious beliefs 
can secure a dominant influence across the entire society.  A more benign means by 
which this is done is through lobbying for the enactment of laws.  The political 
activities of the right-leaning religious associations that comprise the Christian 
Coalition founded by Pat Robertson exemplify such efforts.  Among the more 
malevolent means these groups have used to secure the influence they seek have 
included harassment and terrorism.  Extremist groups like the Ku Klux Klan, 
traditionally advocates of cultural and racial discrimination, have burned crosses and 
murdered racial minorities as a means of imposing the influence of their quasi 
religious beliefs by creating a climate of fear.  In either case the groups remain 
integrated in society, but from a stance of moral contempt, begrudged tolerance, and 
authoritarianism.  These practices and beliefs are not only illiberal, but threaten to 
continually socialize the young to behaviors that spill over into public life.   
But lest we forget, spillover from religious beliefs has become an expected 
and welcomed occurrence in light of its historical contribution to civic virtue and 
political stability.  I imagine a faith-motivated obligation to show charity through 
service guides religiously affiliated private organizations such as The Salvation Army 
or The Red Cross, both of which have had a longstanding positive impact on poverty 
and public health domestically and internationally.  Similarly, what motivated many 
Abolitionists in their effort to dissolve the system of slavery was a deeply held 
religious conviction that the entire human family was created free and in God’s 




values and capacities beneficial to liberal democracy are not also present, and 
exerting a stable and dominant influence, within these and other types of religious 
groups.   
Membership in religious associations often serves to infuse meaning, purpose 
and hope in the lives of individuals by promoting values integral to good conduct and 
healthy interpersonal relationships; among them love, mutual respect, social 
responsibility, faithfulness and commitment.  “Groups informed by particularistic 
values are essential to human development.  They are the source of views about 
human flourishing as well as of love, belonging, and solidarity.  They are essential to 
the nurturance and education of children” (Strike, 2001a, 35).    
Religious groups also encourage serious thought about the good society and 
develop behaviors conducive to citizenship.  For example, the religious command to 
give alms to the poor, to render to political authorities what is owed, to live 
moderately, and to love one’s neighbor promote practices and virtues (like charity, 
law abidingness, sharing, sacrifice, and mutual respect) that mirror the ideals of 
liberal citizenship and that reasonable people desire to see spillover into civic life.  
Evidence of religion’s positive influence on civic virtue is apparent in Martin Luther 
King, Jr.’s “I Have A Dream” speech.  
“I have a dream that one day every valley shall be exalted, every hill and  
mountain shall be made low, the rough places will be made plain, and the  
crooked place will be made straight, and the glory of the Lord shall be  
revealed, and all flesh shall see it together….This will be the day when all of  
God’s children will be able to sing with a new meaning, “My country, ‘tis of  
thee, sweet land of liberty, of thee I sing.  Land where my fathers died, land of 
 the pilgrim’s pride, from every mountainside, let freedom ring”” 





Employing the particularistic language of his Judeo-Christian faith, King 
metaphorically projects a yet-to-be-realized vision of human society rooted in Old 
Testament prophecy.  This religious vision echoes, and more importantly places in 
sharp relief, the supposed solidarity and inclusiveness those entitled to mouth the 
words of the Star Spangled Banner – American citizens – should feel.  By juxtaposing 
his sectarian beliefs with a commonly known civic artifact like this song, King 
reveals religion’s (Christianity’s) compatibility with liberal values by implying their 
shared vision of justice.  Precisely because religious associations have demonstrated 
an abundance of “positive spillover” and the capacity to shape good liberal citizens, it 
is important that the liberal state not allow its very legitimate concern about the 
negative characteristics of a few religious groups to distort and unfairly stereotype all 
of religion.   
 Despite evidence of positive spillover, acknowledgment of the beneficial civic 
and social functions of religious associations is rarely found within the literature 
regarding religion and citizenship.  Consequently, religious associations are not 
readily viewed as providing a suitable context for preparing liberal citizens.  I would 
argue this perception is largely due to variations on the “correspondence argument” 
(Rosenblum, 1998).   
 The correspondence argument asserts that because liberal democratic 
character is more likely to be produced within groups whose views and practices 
compliment liberal principles, liberal societies have an interest in regulating the 
affairs of private associations.  Since there is no uniform respect for tolerance, 




all religious associations – and many aggressively and sometimes violently display 
the opposite – their overall “track record” is suspect regarding congruency with 
liberal principles.  More than likely the attention given to the beliefs and practices of 
overtly illiberal religious conservatives has overshadowed the peculiar theological 
and, perhaps, cultural attributes that might distinguish other types of religious 
believers who exhibit civic-like characteristics.              
 While suspect in its own right, a popular view of common schools6 is that they 
provide the best context for creating liberal citizens.  Ideally they provide a political 
education that promotes a view of citizenship consistent with liberal democratic 
virtue, and that emphasizes reciprocity, tolerance, social justice and a view of others 
as free and equal.  However, there is some empirical evidence that castes doubt on 
whether education for citizenship is seriously addressed in most public schools.   
 
“To be sure, enculturation is not limited to denominational schools.  
Enculturation occurs in public schools, even though they do not have religion 
classes or appear in their efforts to form a coherent social life.  For example, 
Philip Cusick and Christopher Wheeler report that ”reformed” high schools 
convey a distinct vision of a society in which individuals strive for personal 
success while pursuing their self-interest.  Institutional norms are competitive, 
individualistic, and materialistic.  Although the private visions of individual 
teachers may be broader and more humane, it is the institutional norms that 
are continually reinforced by daily school life….Such studies highlight 
education as a cultural enterprise and remind us that at the center of any 
culture are understandings about human nature and human relationships.  
Public education is not value-neutral; its values mirror our larger society.  The 
vision conveyed in the public school is one of homo economicus: rational men 
and women pursuing their self-interest, seeking material pleasures, guided 
toward individual success.  Without deliberate thought or serious debate, this 
vision of the individual and of the good life has been gradually adopted as the 
enculturation aim of public schools over the last half century” (Bryk et al., 
1993, 318-319).   
                                                 
6 “The term “common school” came to have a specific meaning: a school that was attended in common 
by all children and in which a common political and social ideology was taught,” in Spring, Joel, The 





This passage underlines a tension in public education between the market and the 
state.  The common school ideal of binding diverse citizens together along some 
sense of their common fate seems to have taken a backseat to the more market-
focused, consumerist orientation of public education in contemporary society.  K-12 
administrators and educators would do well to consistently appraise the degree to 
which the dominant cultural values that pervade public schools are compatible with 
the constitutional values it is assumed students internalize as a consequence of the 
political socialization offered by those schools.   
Devout believers are apt to be critical of the predominant influence of corrupt 
cultural values (e.g., consumerism, nationalism, violence, sex, individualism) within 
public education.  More specifically, they resist the oppressive and unjust effects of 
the hegemonic influence such values have on public life in general and on their ability 
to be faithful to a religious worldview that promotes an alternative conception of the 
good life.  The criticism religious parents levy against public schooling tends to 
bemoan how the staunchly secular ethos within public schools disparages, or at least 
trivializes, a sense of the transcendent in human life.  They generally critique 
curricula content and the educational aims and practices public schools deem 
sufficient to equip children for their interminable encounter with a convoluted and 
decadent modern world.  Most elect to withdraw their children in favor of the 
emphasis parochial religious schools tend to place on character.     
  Realistically, private associations have shared much of the burden of creating 
liberal democratic citizens and have done so in ways that state institutions simply 




purposes and concerns that their members value, but that are not expressly civic (or at 
least political) in character.  For example, religious associations tend to shape 
members by incorporating them into a network of traditions, practices, and 
commitments that sustain a vision of human flourishing and social harmony – albeit 
sometimes rooted in disturbing formulas for “winners” and “losers” – that often 
contrasts significantly with that of modern secular social reality.  The fulfillment of 
this vision contributes meaning and purpose to members’ personal lives.  Since these 
associations are not agencies of the state, their beliefs and practices are, 
understandably, less likely to explicitly cohere with liberal values.   
Yet, one should not presume that liberal principles are not at work throughout 
the associational life of these groups nor, in such cases, to a substantial degree.  One 
might argue that liberalism is a kind of secularized version of Protestantism – or at 
least is much influenced by it.  Given this, Christian as well as other doctrines quite 
possibly possess the moral capital that enable groups organized around them to be 
reliable contexts for cultivating the character appropriate for liberal citizenship.  
History has painstakingly demonstrated that creating liberal democratic citizens is, 
and has been, an ambiguous and contentious process, and one which is inexorably 
shared by the state at every level from the home to the government. 
 This dissertation is a philosophical analysis of the structure of faith which 
constitutes a Christian view of citizenship.  My purpose is to examine the stance that 
Christianity takes with respect to the political dimension in life.  Specifically, I mean 
a view of the world concerning society and human vocation.  I use the term political 




economic, as well as narrowly “political” relations.  It represents what people of faith 
might deem the secular dimension of life.  I have chosen to emphasize a particular 
structure of Judeo-Christian faith, the prophetic tradition, because the literature that 
addresses religion and citizenship mostly ignores it and strands similar to it.     
 I will introduce a theory of religion and citizenship by working out the 
educational implications of the theology of the prophetic tradition.  The roots of the 
prophetic Christian tradition are located in biblical portrayals of Old Testament 
prophets whose primary interest was critiquing oppressive institutionalized 
arrangements for the purpose of preserving human dignity.  In doing so, biblical 
prophets would also arouse the remembrance of a normative memory (i.e. a 
commonly understood morality).  This was done in the hope of revitalizing a 
community’s impetus to continually transform social reality such that it conformed to 
the standards of humaneness established in its sacred covenant with Yahweh, wherein 
the tradition derives its purpose. 
 My central task is to examine in what way, if at all, the prophetic strand of 
faith implicates involvement in the political dimension of life.  That is to say, is 
involvement in the political dimension of life an inextricable aspect of the religious 
life and, if so, in what sense might it constitute a religious vocation for believers qua 
citizens?  I assert that the structure of faith encountered within the prophetic Christian 
tradition necessarily implicates involvement within the political dimension of life in 
all its aspects – cultural, economic, and governmental.  I also assert that this structure 
of faith sustains a vision of citizenship consistent with liberal democratic values.  In 




the prophetic tradition within the theology and practices of the Protestant Black 
Church in the United States, but does not limit itself to it.     
 By developing a prophetic view of citizenship I hope to increase 
understanding regarding how religious training7 positively contributes to preparing 
liberal citizens, and simultaneously challenge prevailing views that perceive religion 
as having a negative influence on creating liberal citizens.  In recent years, various 
authors writing in the philosophy of education have expressed reservations 
concerning the relationship between religious training and education for liberal 
citizenship. They have claimed that autonomy and democratic character are essential 
to liberal citizenship and that religious training inhibits the development of both.  I 
would like to make two points regarding views consonant with this perception.  
 First, in making these arguments, these authors generally focus on religious 
groups that are either isolationist or fundamentalist.  I find it of little surprise that the 
religious orientation of fundamentalists and separatists evoke concerns about 
autonomy and democratic character.  When focus is restricted to groups whose beliefs 
and practices appear to be the most incongruent with liberal democratic values it 
produces an incomplete and therefore flawed notion of the relationship between 
religion and citizenship; and one which is capable of undermining much of what can 
be understood regarding how religious education might be a positive force in the 
socialization of liberal citizens.   
 Within the discipline two Supreme Court cases – Yoder v Wisconsin and 
Mozert v Hawkins – have strongly influenced how religion is understood.  They 
                                                 
7 I will use the terms “religious training” and “religious education” interchangeably.  Both are intended 
to suggest a conscious process of instruction in a doctrine with the purpose of instilling a partisan point 




involve religious believers who personify conservative beliefs.  These cases have 
shaped the contour of perceptions about religious believers in general and the 
obstacles they present regarding citizenship.  For example:   
  “Many religious conservatives do not want to encourage their members to 
express and foster their individuality….They do not want their members to 
examine their lives critically; they want their members to obey the dictates of 
their religion.  Religious conservatives want to insulate their members from 
others, to some degree at least, so they will not be tempted to leave the 
religion.  They frequently want their children to attend school with other 
believers; and they typically want to speak the language of faith among fellow 
believers, not a secular language accessible to all their fellow citizens.  They 
rarely believe in equality.  Rather, they often believe that men should be in 
charge, with women taking on subservient roles in their communities.  
Religious conservatives want to shield their members from the influence of 
nonbelievers.  By doing so, the community protects itself and the souls of its 
members”(Spinner-Halev, 2000b, 3). 
 
Hence, the isolationists and fundamentalists dominate the literature and are discussed 
as if they represent religion generally (Brighouse, 2000; Burtt, 1995; Callan, 1996; 
Gutmann, 1987; Weithman, 1997).   
 Second, while most authors at least note that not all religious groups are like 
fundamentalists and isolationists, the overall effect of the philosophy of education 
literature has been to permit these groups to stand for religion generally via 
assumptions that they differ from other groups only in being more extreme and via 
the failure to seriously consider other religious traditions.  This is an error which has 
not only led to a superficial understanding of religion, but even, I believe, of religious 
groups that hold controversial theological views.  Despite both being theologically 
conservative, the Amish and Hezbollah are very different!   
 In many instances when religious groups other than those highlighted by these 




virulent versions of these groups.  Consequently, the substance of alternative groups 
is trivialized and their potential relevance to citizenship is essentially overlooked.  
However, alternative religious orientations very likely represent differing 
implications concerning liberal citizenship.  The presence of a wide range of diverse 
religious groups complicates any simplistic characterization of religious belief and 
religious education.  Thus, the reputation of religious education should not be derived 
strictly from the traits of specific groups.         
Fortunately, the compass of moral intuition points most individuals toward 
moral principles compatible with the bedrock of liberal democratic virtue.8  John 
Rawls (1972) offers a theory regarding the development of a sense of justice that has 
a strong communitarian strain.  He believes private associations play a vital role in 
developing a sense of justice – a perception that could be interpreted as them having a 
positive influence on civic virtue.  This idea has some credence with respect to many 
religious associations insofar as social justice is among the sacred values advanced by 
their comprehensive doctrines.  Other virtues commonly shared among the major 
religions that contribute to civic virtue are compassion, reconciliation, forgiveness, 
redemption, charity, humility, and repentance – all instrumental toward wholesome 
cooperation, decency and social justice.   
Consequently, the religious training offered by many groups might actually 
represent one of the more reliable sources of character development that is congruent 
with the common aims of political socialization in liberal democratic societies.  Any 
                                                 
8 I use the term “liberal democratic virtue” very loosely because liberalism has no special claim to 
concepts such as tolerance, equality, freedom, justice or individual rights.  As a political doctrine 





attempt by state supported schools to foster the virtues listed above would likely be 
perceived as controversial by a secular audience (even if those means did not violate 
any criteria for religious establishment).  As a result, liberal religious groups may 
hold an advantage in creating citizens capable of enhancing the prevailing conception 
of justice in society given the moral resources they would bring to an overlapping 
consensus were they willing to contribute to one.     
The underlying point is that the liberal state need not allow its paranoia about 
constraining “fundamental-isms” to impair its ability to intelligently appraise diverse 
expressions of religious belief or to recognize the practical and instrumental 
significance of the spiritual and civic purposes religious private associations seek to 
fulfill.  For example, through the neo-scholasticism of Jacques Martain, post Vatican 
II Roman catholic religious education has embodied the personality of a prophetic 
church by predisposing the character of members toward virtues like love, social 
justice and critical reasoning in light of “the dispositions of mind and heart essential 
to the sustenance of a convivial democratic society” (Bryk et al., 1993, 35).  
Similarly, Quakers are generally in opposition to hierarchal structures, sacraments, 
and oath taking within their societies, believing that the “inner light” within all 
members provides access to divine revelation.  Quakers are also renowned for their 
pacifism and commitment to social justice, as evidenced in their past efforts to 
emancipate slaves.   
Ultimately, the more that can be understood about religious groups aligned 
more towards the political “left” or even the center of religious expression in our 




interests; and to perhaps entertain the possibilities religious training may provide for 
equipping individuals with the virtues befitting liberal citizens.  This study should be 
interpreted as concerning itself with the socialization received through religious 
education broadly speaking, and not just specifically through religious schools.      
In this dissertation I argue that the Judeo-Christian prophetic tradition implies 
a form of religious training that adequately equips citizens with the virtues and values 
befitting their role in public life.  The prophetic tradition emphasizes a concern for 
liberation and justice and its Christian expression can be traced to the Exodus account 
of the Israelite community in Egypt.  Prophetic believers express what they consider a 
biblical worldview, but one which also sustains an ideal of social justice that fosters 
political engagement.  They generally hold liberal political views and are not 
theocrats.  While the prophetic tradition has Jewish, Protestant and Catholic variants, 
I will emphasize its expression through the Black Church in the United States.  
I will argue three things about the prophetic tradition. First, I will claim that 
its central feature is its insistence on standing in judgment of state policy and secular 
cultural norms in the name of God and on behalf of the poor and oppressed, calling 
for justice and liberation from oppression.  The tradition expresses a prophetic 
message to the secular world – in the sense that adherents critique those who violate 
God’s prophetic values (e.g., love, justice, peace, freedom) – while requiring that its 
adherents remain integrated within that world.  Second, I will claim that the prophetic 
tradition poses no threat to either autonomy or democratic character.  Indeed, the 




democratic outlook.  Third, I will claim that the prophetic tradition advances virtues 
that contribute to the development of liberal citizens.  
There are two features of the prophetic tradition that may still be seen as 
problematic.  First, the prophetic tradition, as represented in the Old Testament, views 
the relationship between the Nation of Israel and God as a covenantal relationship. 
Old Testament prophets spoke to the Nation not only as spokespersons for God, but 
admonished the Nation to honor the terms of a covenant it had entered into with God.  
America is neither a covenantal community nor a theocracy.  How then should the 
civic implications of the prophetic traditions be articulated when one attempts to 
justify the exercise of political power to those who are subject to it?  Can adherents of 
the prophetic stance interpret the core norms it advances as consistent with liberal 
democratic principles?   
 Second, the prophetic tradition often brings religious language to the public 
square.  Dr. Martin Luther King’s “I Have a Dream” speech is a case in point.  It 
might be argued that both features are illiberal.  The first is essentially theocratic in 
character.  However, expressions of the prophetic tradition in the black church 
generally do not endorse a vision of a theocratic political society.  The second seems 
inconsistent with the expectation that the citizens of a liberal democracy will utilize a 
neutral public language in discussing civic matters.   
The fact that we might accept that open ethical dialogue about the common 
good should not be grounded in the authority of sectarian belief is heavily influenced 
by our understanding of two clauses in the Bill of Rights: the Establishment Clause 




between the so-called public and private spheres, and have historically informed legal 
deliberation in matters regarding a conflict of interest between religious believers and 
the state. The idea of a separation between spheres gives shape to the general focus of 
Chapter 2.  There I provide a discussion of the relationship between religion and 
public education in the American context and review attitudes about political 
education that have resulted.   
What is common about many of those attitudes is that they advance the idea 
that the values and principles that animate both private associational life and liberal 
democracy must be mutually supportive.  While the core of Protestantism historically 
dominated this outlook, more explicitly political values presently reign.  This 
‘correspondence’ argument basically suggests that liberal citizens are more likely to 
be produced by associations that conduct their internal affairs in a manner that 
advances liberal values, and that the state’s legitimate interest in producing liberal 
citizens may require it to regulate private associations.              
The formal content of education for citizenship in US public schools is 
influenced by the tenets of liberal and democratic theory.  The values they endorse 
are foundational to the vitality of the state.  Consequently, many proposals for 
political education offered by educational theorists in some form or another endorse 
critical reasoning (or personal autonomy) and the character and capacities necessary 
to ensure that the institutions of the state remain stable and just.  Due to the 
appearance of incongruence between liberal democratic values and the obligations of 
faith, the socialization and training that occurs within religious associations is often 




character in children.  Chapter 3 examines doubts about religious education from a 
liberal democratic perspective.     
Chapter 4 sketches a kind of typology of religious attitudes that have 
widespread expression in American society.  Many caricatures of religious believers 
exist within popular culture and, unfortunately, those that are the most threatening to 
a modern secular society are often exploited and come to stand for all religious 
believers and forms of religious expression generally.  I attempt to distinguish among 
types of religious believers by highlighting three broad expressions of religious belief 
identified by Nancy Rosenblum (2000) in her discussion of a political orientation she 
labels “integralism.”  Rosenblum describes integralism as a challenge to democratic 
government in the name of faith which results from attempts to honor the mandates of 
religious doctrine within a secular public culture.  I consider how these three general 
types of integralists might reconcile their identities as both believers and citizens.  In 
extreme cases this could mean that one of these identities is essentially abandoned.  I 
use the typology I create to locate, in a very general way, the political orientation of 
believers who fall within the prophetic Christian tradition.  I then discuss the origins 
of this tradition, its substantive concerns, and religious expressions in American 
society.     
In Chapter 5 I attempt to develop a view of citizenship from a prophetic 
Christian perspective.  In doing so I address the following: (1) how the Prophetic 
tradition shapes citizens; (2) the role of the citizen in the Prophetic tradition; (3) the 
issues concerning liberal democratic doubts about religious education raised in 




Prophetic tradition (e.g. the nature of the covenant and the use of religious speech in 
the public square).     
The prophetic tradition has been given religious expression in several groups: 
Quakers, “dissident” evangelical groups, Jewish traditions connected to Exodus and 
Passover, as well as Latin American (Roman Catholic) and African American 
(Protestant) Liberation Theology movements to name a few.  In Chapter 6 I will focus 
on expressions of the prophetic tradition within the Black Church and discuss its 
vision of citizenship as religious vocation.  I plan to examine: (1) the birth of the 
Black Church as a prophetic act through conscious departure from white Protestant 
cultural norms and racial presuppositions; (2) the Black Church as nurturer of 
prophetic imagination through sermons, hymns and spirituals; (3) citizenship as 
religious vocation: from appropriation of prophetic values to the transformation of 
America’s racist society.   
Chapter 7 will discuss general conclusions regarding my guiding research 
questions. 
Significance of the Problem 
Any argument regarding the relationship between religion and citizenship that 
is predicated upon a distortion of religious education is remiss.  The challenge though 
of attempting to persuade skeptics that all religious believers are not alike is evident 
in the likelihood that they’ll agree.  However, they are apt to suggest that while 
believers may differ in the degree to which they exhibit certain traits, they are all the 




convictions translate into conservative political agendas – or something analogous to 
this.  While your distinction pertains to essence, theirs probably hinges on type.     
Much of the literature on religion and citizenship seems to view religious 
education and the religiously devout with grave suspicion at best.  Fundamentalist- 
and isolationist-like characterizations are conspicuously present in the language 
various authors use to describe religious believers, as if these two orientations 
represent an archetype against which every believer and every group must be 
measured.  To be sure, groups of these two orientations have a history of exhibiting 
“illiberal” characteristics; therefore the skepticism is to some degree understandable.  
However, filtering our appraisal of all religion through the profile of some caricature 
thought to perfectly capture the essence of every believer or group seems a bit 
procrustean, if not irresponsible.  Religious groups whose traits are distinguishable 
from fundamentalists and isolationists are likely to differ not only in degree but also 
in kind; not merely qualitatively, but substantively.  Thus, for all intents and 
purposes, is it not reasonable to assume that the implications such groups have 
regarding citizenship will also differ substantively?   
But rarely is this line of reasoning persuasive.  It does not easily assuage 
images of children forced to make a permanent choice (but who seem psychologically 
ill equipped to do so) between the faith-strengthened bonds of their community and 
extrication to an alien modern world.  Nor does it easily assuage the perception that a 
21st century Christian “crusade” is in effect, led by right-leaning politicians, lobbyists, 
and “holy-rollers” who champion bills saturated with sectarian morality.  Or, lastly, 




forbidden (by men) to appear unveiled in public or with men who are non-relatives, 
as if they are the ones who most lack discipline and discretion.  The idea that people 
of faith are more or less “mild” to “extra spicy” variants of fanatics is easy to accept 
as truth.  
But conservative religious belief is not a 21st century phenomenon.  It’s been 
just as much a strand of the American fabric as voting.  America’s founders were not 
unmindful of the threat illiberal religious convictions posed to the common good.  
Though, contrary to many contemporary political leaders, it appears that they held 
more reverence for the sovereignty of conscience and the scope of liberty sufficient 
for reason to navigate its own way to truth and the good.  Although there is much 
disagreement on this point, from this author’s point of view the Founders’ 
understanding of the relationship between religion and the state held that although the 
public good was of extreme importance, the uninhibited conscience was of ultimate 
importance.   
Thomas Jefferson observed:  
 
“Our country has been the first to prove to the world two truths, the most 
salutary to human society, that man can govern himself, and that religious 
freedom is the most effective anodyne against religious dissension: the 
maxims of civil government being reversed in that of religion, where it’s true 
form is “divided we stand, united we fall”” (Hutson, 2005, 137).   
 
John Jay noted:  
 
“Adequate security is also given to the rights of conscience and private 
judgment.  They are by nature subject to no control but that of the Deity and 
in that free situation they are now left.  Every man is permitted to consider, to 
adore, to worship his Creator in the manner most agreeable to his conscience.  
No opinions are dictated, no rules of faith prescribed, no preference given to 
one sect to the prejudice of others.  The constitution, however, has wisely 
declared, that the “liberty of conscience thereby granted shall not be so 




with the peace or safety of the State.”  In a word, the convention by whom that 
constitution was formed were of the opinion that the gospel of Christ, like the 
ark of God, would not fall, though unsupported by the arm of flesh; and happy 
would it be for mankind if that opinion prevailed more generally” (Hutson, 
2005, 135).   
 
The Founders were well aware of illiberal religious groups and felt that when such 
groups violated constitutional laws that they should be punished.  Yet, during their 
time, the life of faith in and of itself was never culturally untenable; never broadly 
perceived as some exotic expression of irrationality.  In light of their historical 
experiences in Europe, the Founders wanted to play no part in permitting matters of 
the spirit to be at the mercy of government (or vice versa).  On the contrary, most of 
the Founders felt faith should be freely chosen and that they needed to provide the 
most feasible amount of liberty for religious exercise.   
 Here I have tried to make three basic points regarding a popular perception of 
religion in America.  One, extreme religious groups have been allowed to represent 
religion as a whole.  Two, all citizens of faith are subsequently viewed as if they are 
variations on the radicals whose religious training negatively impacts citizenship.  
Three, the educational implications of groups that differ from extremists therefore 
tend to get overlooked.  Taking this problem into account, I would like to offer what I 
consider to be two significant, yet less apparent, effects of permitting fundamentalists 
and isolationists to stand for religion generally.   
In the first place, doing so diminishes the instrumental importance of religious 
associations.  Membership in faith communities often serves to foster values integral 
to human flourishing and the common good.  Michael Walzer (1995) argues that 




deprivation, inferiority, alienation, and general insecurity that individuals experience 
in society in some form or another.  It is in these groups that loyalty, civility, 
cooperation, and social trust are cultivated.  “People are unlikely to treat their fellow 
citizens with justice or decency, they are unlikely to forge common bonds with them, 
unless their local culture forms and sustains such bonds cognitively and affectively” 
(Strike, 2001a, 42).   
While the state may possess a strong concern for the welfare of children, it 
primarily focuses on an aspect of the person that parental concern is less motivated 
by: their political self and the development of what John Rawls (1993) describes as a 
capacity for a sense of justice.  One might think of the state being principally 
motivated by the potential consequences if individuals are unreasonably or 
involuntarily attached to a particular culture or community at the expense of their 
identification with the broader society and its political norms for justice and social 
cooperation.  Conversely, one might consider religious parents being principally 
motivated by the potential consequences if their children are sufficiently unattached 
to their culture’s and/or religious community’s values when confronted by a 
kaleidoscope of ‘worldly’ and often abhorrent attitudes, customs and practices within 
the larger society that tempt youngsters and compete for their child’s servitude and 
devotion.   
The parental concerns of the devout need not be directed toward any specific 
doctrine, philosophy, or group.  There is something identifiable within the general 
ethos of the larger society (be it excessive materialism or an unhealthy 




And very few people, particularly parents, are willing to allow these psychological 
forces to have free reign on someone they feel responsible for.  Although state 
educational institutions tend to focus on remedying the most recalcitrant forces within 
society, they cannot substitute the role often played by religious associations, which 
do a good job of sparring with the more subtle and often negative forces that tend to 
assail one’s sense of significance and trivialize one’s conception of the good.  
 Secondly, to the extent that the general ethos of the larger society either tacitly 
or purposely promotes the belief that radicals stand for religion generally, this attitude 
is oppressive to religion – particularly reasonable9 groups – for at least two reasons.  
One, this kindles a prejudicial suspicion regarding believers’ allegiance to liberal 
political values.  For instance, religious malevolence, in contrast to religious 
munificence, is granted a superfluous amount of attention by the mass media.  I 
assume that such an imbalanced focus, particularly in an increasingly secular general 
public, decreases the probability that non-believing citizens will query beyond what 
they see and hear regarding citizens of faith.  Two, I also believe this partiality 
symbolically endorses a less refined view of reciprocity10: retributive backlashes, or 
(more colloquially) an “eye for an eye.”  In a sense, it legitimates a chain of 
reactionary deeds that inevitably prompt an equally reflexive and provincial response.  
In a society whose ethos funds the profiling of religion, what kind of reaction would 
one expect from the religiously devout (particularly the most extreme among them)?  
Within such an environment citizens of faith have to cope with the unlikelihood they 
                                                 
9 I use a Rawlsian notion of reasonableness (i.e. amenable to constitutional norms and political 
principles of justice). 
10 Here I refer to John Rawls’s idea of public reason, which pertains to how speech should be used in 




will be treated civilly by a general public unwilling to reconcile their true nature with 
a distorted conception of religion.  
 The failure to recognize reasonable religious groups is a form of silencing and 
oppression that diminishes the practical significance of religion in liberal democracy 
and undermines the ties of civic friendship so vital to reciprocity and tolerance.  It is a 
form of partisanship that in effect adds legitimacy to the implicit claim of religious 
fundamentalists that they represent the authentic voice of God and speak for all 
adherents of their respective faiths.    
 The significance of this dissertation is that it offers a response to this problem 
by illuminating the doctrine of one of the many extant reasonable religious traditions; 
and specifically, explores that which anchors its allegiance to constitutional norms 
and liberal democratic ideals of justice.  The prophetic tradition represents a 
venerable religious voice concerning matters of justice.  My hope is that by exposing 
how reasonable religious orientations like the prophetic tradition secure their 
adherents’ allegiance to political values – and, hence, strengthen liberal institutions – 
through the process of association as well as through doctrinal beliefs, they will 





Chapter 2: Background of the Study 
 
Due to the multifarious contexts in which moral development can occur, it 
seems that liberal democratic citizens are created not born.  Cultivating the virtues 
and capacities befitting members of such societies must, therefore, flow from 
deliberate action rather than from some form of osmotic, arbitrary acclimation.  
Liberal societies permit great diversity in the ideas individuals and private 
associations endorse.  Yet the correlation between character and citizenship suggests 
that private associations have a responsibility to refrain from cultivating illiberal 
convictions and practices regardless of the beliefs they affirm.  If not, their members 
might possibly commit oppressive acts towards other citizens.  Enculturation within 
the home, the mosque, and the neighborhood that is capable of invoking tolerance, 
thoughtfulness, respect and social justice helps toward ensuring that every citizen is 
able to enjoy the full benefits of free and equal citizenship, particularly those outside 
of a given group’s circle of exclusivity.  “It is thus political socialization that breaches 
the wall of separation between the public and private” (Strike, 1998).  The interest 
liberal democratic societies have in socializing their members to liberal democratic 
convictions extends to a concern for the socialization that occurs in private 
associations.       
Americans have generally sensed an important relationship between private 
associations, especially religious associations, and civic virtue.  Religion has largely 
been viewed as making a positive contribution.  On the whole, the founders of 
America valued religion’s influence on good conduct.  Many considered it a useful 




morality in such a manner that it becomes enmeshed in the hearts and minds of 
individuals.   
Although he advocated a high wall between church and state and endorsed a 
rationalized form of Christianity, even Thomas Jefferson believed religion was useful 
toward achieving civic virtue if citizens were to act in a moral and responsible fashion 
(Corbett & Hemeyer, 1999).  Benjamin Franklin was a tolerant deist who believed 
that ordinary people were weak and that they required religion to restrain their vice 
and to support virtue.  He asserted, “I believe in one God, Creator of the 
Universe….That he ought to be worshiped.  That the most acceptable service we 
render to him is doing good to his other children” (Corbett & Hemeyer, 1999, 67).  
Similarly, George Washington declared “[o]f all the dispositions and habits which 
lead to political prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable supports” 
(Rosenblum, 2000, 97).  Such attitudes influenced the course of political education in 
public schools.       
 Many early educational reformers, like Horace Mann, tended to view political 
education more from a civic republican or democratic perspective.  As secretary of 
the Massachusetts board of education, Mann was among the first group of individuals 
with the time and authority to consider the social functions of schooling and to dictate 
education policy.  Mann felt civic education was the key to creating the good society.  
Motivated by his interest in forming emotional bonds between citizens and the state, 
he strongly emphasized political instruction that promoted patriotism and instilled the 




Mann also believed that political education in common schools should include 
religious instruction based on a nonsectarian use of the Bible, “with the teaching of 
broad religious principles common to all Christian denominations” (Spring, 2001).  
To his credit Mann proposed that instruction avoid controversial political or religious 
ideas.  Instead, he suggested that teachers read texts (including the Bible) without 
commentary and evade contentious discussions in the classroom.  However, most 
common school reformers of his time viewed moral education as synonymous with 
training in Christian doctrine.  Consequently, this attitude grounded public virtue in 
sectarian belief and a political creed that unfairly privileged Protestant Anglo-
American cultural groups.   
In their efforts to create a distinct American identity 19th century educators 
found it difficult to keep education for citizenship free of religious bias and 
authoritarianism.  Some past approaches to political education, although presumably 
well intentioned, often resulted in policies and practices that were intolerant and 
parochial.11  
  
“Historically schools were justified as critical in bringing different peoples 
 together to participate in a common and shared identity, one in which every 
 person was recognizable to every other person as a citizen of the same nation.  
 Today the emphasis appears to have shifted, and what was once taken as an 
 important role of the schools – advancing a single common identity – is 
 sometimes viewed as advancing the interests of the dominant group over those 
 who are different and powerless”(Feinberg, 1998, 3). 
 
Thus, despite the positive educational role religion had come to play in public schools 
in regard to fostering civic virtue, political socialization quickly became corrupted 
                                                 




when schools established a Protestant hegemony which was oppressive to non-
Protestants.    
An example is the religious prejudice that led Catholics to opt for private 
schools.  Nineteenth century public schools in the United States were effectively 
aligned with Protestant religious values.  Some textbooks contained anti-Catholic 
sentiments, and a Protestant version of the bible was used for religious instruction.  
This reinforced a prejudice the Protestant majority already held towards Catholics and 
consequently forced Catholics to open their own schools as an alternative.  Catholic 
parents felt that the anti-Catholic curriculum and ethos within common schools 
stigmatized their children and threatened to foster a sense of contempt for their own 
culture (Spring, 2001).  Although public school administrators were principally 
concerned with creating a common American culture, morality, and political ideology 
in the face of an influx of immigrants, the practices they endorsed unreasonably 
intruded upon the rights of not only Catholics, but also other citizens considered 
socially unacceptable. 
This Protestant hegemony has been largely dismantled by the Supreme Court 
since World War II.  Decisions in three specific Supreme Court cases successfully 
unraveled the stitching binding religion and citizenship in public schools.  In Engel v 
Vitale (1962), the court declared government sponsored school prayer 
unconstitutional because it was inconsistent with the Establishment Clause.  As part 
of a program of “moral and spiritual training,” the State Board of Regents for New 
York public schools composed a nondenominational prayer that students were to 




student’s morality.  The court ruled against the state endorsed prayer recitation – 
despite it being voluntary – because it drew upon the theological influence of a 
particular religion.  In two other cases, Abington School District v Schempp (1963) & 
Murray v Curlett (1963), the Supreme Court forbade state approved reading of Bible 
passages and the recitation of the Lord’s Prayer.  As a result, a test was created to 
evaluate Establishment issues placed before the courts.12   
The central thrust of the establishment test suggests that the policy in question 
must have a secular purpose, and its primary effect must neither advance nor inhibit 
religion if it is to satisfy the scope of legislative power circumscribed by the 
Constitution.  The Supreme Court did not completely remove religion from the public 
schools.  Rather it determined how it should not be used.   
 In recent scholarship writers such as Robert Putnam (1993; 2000) have 
emphasized the importance of private associations for citizenship.  But while these 
associations include religious groups, the emphasis has tended to focus on how the 
process of association itself shapes character rather than on whatever substantive 
beliefs or ideas the private association promotes.  In Bowling Alone (2000) Putnam 
examines the correlation between civic engagement and social capital.   Putnam 
argues that the institutions that form civil society are crucial to sustaining democracy 
and ultimately the economic well-being of a society.  He feels voluntary associations 
contribute social capital (the collective value of all social networks and the 
inclinations that arise from these networks) to liberal democracy through their 
“external” effects on the public culture and their “internal” effects on the individuals 
participating in them.  The premise behind the concept of social capital is that social 
                                                 




networks have value because they instrumentally give rise to “social trust” and “civic 
virtue.”  These are thought to produce their most powerful effects when embedded in 
dense networks of reciprocal social relations. 
Other work on private associations has produced a more negative picture of 
the role of religion in shaping citizens.  Scholars have discussed how religious groups 
may undercut citizenship by noting negative aspects of religious groups, like their 
role in promoting patriarchy.  Some feminists evaluate this issue from a vantage point 
that goes beyond those that merely critique beliefs and practices that intentionally 
perpetuate gender inequality.  Their concern is the ubiquity of androcentrism.  They 
argue that it is inconspicuously expressed through patriarchy tacitly nourished within 
the institution of the family, which they contend socializes males into positions of 
privilege and relegates women into positions of subjugation (Okin, 1989).  As a 
broadly functioning cultural norm, patriarchy has, among other things, restricted 
women’s independence from the family on a global level.  Following the logic of this 
argument, children acquire their values and ideas in the family's sexist setting, then 
grow up to enact these ideas as adults.   
Some feminists believe that religious associations are particularly adroit at this 
form of enculturation and that they represent the most formidable stronghold with 
regard to the seedbeds of patriarchy in civil society.  “For the world’s major religions, 
in their actual human form, have not always been outstanding respecters of basic 
human rights or of the equal dignity and inviolability of persons.  Some, indeed, have 
gone so far as to create systems of law that deny the equal rights of persons and 




distinguish between a religion and the cultural traditions that surround it, the Hindu, 
Islamic, and Confucian traditions have all with some plausibility been accused of 
denigrating the value of female life in ways that have undermined women’s claim to 
basic goods of subsistence” (Nussbaum, 1997, 94;105).   
Key to their argument is what I will call the “correspondence principle.”  
Consistent with the logic of the correspondence principle these authors suggest that 
private associations may be regulated for the public good – i.e. for the sake of 
citizenship.  Private associations breach the distinction between the public and private 
sphere.     
 
The Correspondence Argument 
Parents have many practical alternatives to public education, with private, 
parochial (religious), and home schooling being the most common.  Because these 
options extend from private associations many presume that the enculturation 
children experience within them is influenced by illiberal values.  This is because 
private associations are free to organize their internal affairs according to whatever 
beliefs they so choose (within the limitations of law).   
The group’s beliefs have a public consequence to the extent that they 
influence the behavior of members in their role as citizens.  The public effects of 
associational life stem from the tendency that values and attitudes acquired in private 
associations spillover into the public sphere.  Private associations breach the public-




necessarily requires legitimate efforts to ensure that the internal organization and 
practices of private associations conform to public principles of justice.   
Arguments that more or less endorse state regulation of the affairs of private 
associations are an expression of the correspondence argument.  According to Nancy 
Rosenblum (1998) such arguments assert the idea that “the relation between our 
associational life and liberal democracy is, or must be, reciprocally supportive; that 
liberal democratic character and commitment must find their origin and vital 
compliment in an array of independent groups” (Rosenblum, 1998, 10).  Examples of 
the kinds of proposals put forth in the name of the correspondence argument include: 
1) policies some feminists advance to support the financial independence of women 
from the family; 2) tighter controls on the activities of hate groups; and 3) restrictions 
on private schools, home schooling, or exemptions from public schooling.  
Essentially, correspondence arguments accentuate political virtue and the stability of 
the democratic social structure.       
Kenneth Strike (1998) offers an interpretation of the correspondence argument 
that asserts both a normative premise and an empirical premise.  The normative 
premise he develops suggests that liberal societies have a legitimate interest in 
regulating both public and private associations in order to produce liberal citizens.  
His empirical premise suggests that liberal citizens are more likely to be produced by 
associations that hold liberal beliefs and that conduct their affairs and advance their 
views according to liberal principles (Strike, 1998, 346).  Yet despite the plausibility 




between the public and private sphere at the risk of compromising other liberal 
values.   
Unqualified, the correspondence argument places the state in tension with 
liberal values such as free speech, free press, free association, and religious liberty, as 
well as the principles of tolerance and liberal neutrality that characterize liberal 
democracies (Strike, 1998).  Additionally, it would permit the state to regulate the 
affairs of religious associations in a manner that would violate freedom of conscience 
and that would severely reduce the range of virtues fostered within civil society.  This 
is so because, unqualified, the correspondence argument seemingly presupposes that 
citizenship trumps conscience.  It could be argued, however, that even if political 
socialization trumps conscience in principle, it may not do so in cases that lack 
empirical proof that citizenship is at risk.  Presently, the judicial branch of the 
government attempts to honor competing liberal values by doing its best to balance 
them in situations where matters of conscience collide with the state’s interest in 
political socialization.  
In addition to these two points, there are more subtle problems with the 
correspondence argument.  I will discuss three: One, its view of how private 
associations function is suspect.  It presupposes an erroneous view regarding the 
spillover of beliefs and attitudes between the private and public sphere.  Two, even if 
its view of how associations work were correct, it presupposes a mistaken view of the 
substance of religion.  Three, it ignores cases of “positive spillover” with regard to 




Nancy Rosenblum challenges the logic of arguments that promote state 
regulation over the affairs of private associations as a means of satisfying an interest 
in producing liberal citizens.  She is particularly skeptical of the presupposition 
underpinning them. 
   
“Every variation on the congruence theme rests on the assumption that 
dispositions and practices shaped in one association spill over to other 
contexts.  This is a vulnerable point….For the logic of congruence does not 
come automatically equipped with a social or psychological dynamic to 
explain why dispositions cultivated in one association can be expected to be 
stable and transmitted to other spheres” (Rosenblum, 1998, 38). 
 
My sense is that Rosenblum’s skepticism has not so much to do with whether we can 
safely assume spill over is possible.  Rather it appears to concern an observable 
feature of our psychological constitution: environmental and cultural influences affect 
the behaviors humans are motivated to exhibit.  What she is questioning, essentially, 
is the premise upon which correspondence arguments justify state regulation of 
private associations (i.e. Kenneth Strike’s formulation of the empirical premise).  In 
other words, Rosenblum believes it is suspect.     
 Again, one reason might be because people tend to discriminate between the 
conduct they feel is appropriate in one social context as opposed to another and adjust 
their behavioral expectations.  Even in the public square one notices that the 
observance of liberal principles seems relaxed in certain settings and more intensified 
in others.  For instance, citizens understand that it is acceptable to be intolerant, 
irrational and belligerent at political party conventions during the Presidential election 
season, and unforgivable to be so while standing at Ground Zero or the Vietnam War 




respect to the priesthood, it does not endorse gender discrimination regarding public 
or civic matters.   
Rosenblum suggests that any given environment might supply an outlet for 
the expression of dispositions frowned upon in a separate context; that the character 
shaped in one experience of associational life may provide oppositional force to the 
formative effects of experiences in a second.  She adds that individuals possess an 
acute ability to bracket the behavioral expectations demanded of them in different 
spheres of social life.  “We have overwhelming evidence that individuals exercise 
capacities for discrimination and moral adaptation all the time, even among 
seemingly close situations.  This includes a refined capacity to resist spill over.  
Indeed, part of the “discipline of culture” is to discriminate among associations” 
(Rosenblum, 1998, 49).  Her comments hint that the view the correspondence 
argument presupposes of how private associations function is doubtful.  The 
implication of such doubt is that the state will not likely be any more successful 
creating liberal citizens by regulating the affairs of illiberal private associations than it 
has been by regulating the affairs of its own institutions.   
Rosenblum believes that excessive attention is directed toward the categories 
and formal character of groups in civil society, but not enough toward the social and 
psychological dynamics of membership – wherein she believes the insights of moral 
psychology rest.  “Social structure and phenomenology do not work independently, 
and neither should be considered alone” (Rosenblum, 1998, 47).  She provides some 
insight into the civic contribution of associational life through the philosophical 




offers a phenomenological explanation of why transfer might occur in cases where it 
appears to, and also indirectly challenges the empirical presupposition underpinning 
the correspondence argument (specifically, that dispositions and practices shaped in 
one association automatically spill over to other contexts).  Rather than place undue 
focus on liberal democratic beliefs and principles, Rawls concerns himself with the 
transformative effects of the experience of association on personal character, 
particularly within contexts where individuals feel affirmed and incorporated (Rawls, 
1972).     
The civic benefits that flow from the morality of association are predicated 
upon individuals willingly regulating their personal conduct in reference to the 
behavior and points of view of others.  Rosenblum explains that reciprocity operating 
through affective ties is what animates the morality of association.13  Within any 
given association, relational ties conform to a system of roles and rules that 
individuals come to understand through the inherent authority that rests within the 
approval and disapproval of other members.  Members learn the virtues appropriate to 
a particular role and its ideal expression.   “Now each particular ideal is presumably 
explained in the context of the aims and purposes of the association to which the role 
or position in question belongs.  In due course a person works out a conception of the 
whole system of cooperation that defines the association and the ends which it 
serves” (Rawls, 1972, 410). 
  Of central importance is that members detect evidence that the rules and 
arrangements of the association are just, thus causing them to feel assured that its 
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activities are beneficial to all involved.  “[M]embers come to appreciate that the 
group’s system of cooperation requires a variety of actions and points of view, and 
they learn to take on the perspectives of others” (Rosenblum, 1998, 50).  As a result 
of developing the capacity to take on the perspectives of others, members gain greater 
recognition of the willingness of others to do their fair share and the social trust this 
dynamic generates.  Rawls believes that the development of affective ties between 
members, and of a psychological attachment to this system of interaction, motivates 
individuals to comply with the obligations of membership.  Hence they willingly 
cooperate toward fulfilling the group’s purposes by satisfying the expectations of 
their position.   
 Rather than spill-over or transfer, Rawls expects that in their public roles as 
citizens individuals will eventually endorse liberal principles of justice because of 
psychological continuity.  By this he means they will detect similarity between the 
principles of justice regulating the basic structure of society and the schemes of 
cooperation regulating the various associations of which they are members.  Rawls 
suspects that moral and intellectual development becomes enhanced as individuals 
engage in increasingly expanding roles within more complex schemes of rights and 
duties, primarily because they are required to view reality from a greater multiplicity 
of perspectives.14  Therefore, his hope – what Rosenblum calls “liberal expectancy” – 
is that citizens will come to appreciate principles of justice because they come to care 
about the common good as a natural extension of the reciprocity, trust, and 
cooperation experienced through the affective ties of group life.  Rawls’s view has a 
                                                 




lot in common with Robert Putnam’s (1993; 2000) discussion of the importance of 
private associations for citizenship. 
     A second subtle problem with the correspondence argument is that even if its 
view of how associations function was more accurate on an empirical level, it 
presupposes a mistaken view of the substance of religion.  This point is also a critique 
of its empirical premise.  The nature of the critique it levies against private religious 
associations supports an image of religion that emphasizes the negative characteristics 
of certain religious groups while ignoring the positive characteristics of others.   
Despite the presence of what some might consider illiberal beliefs and 
attitudes, many mainline and even conservative religious groups cultivate values and 
skills that abet citizenship and sustain liberal democracy.  For example, they advance 
notions of equality, social justice and free faith.  They also promote values like 
benevolence, grace, forgiveness, reconciliation and redemption.  Each of these is 
instrumental toward reinforcing socially beneficial behavior.  Religion often fulfills a 
prophetic role in society insofar that it motivates adherents to stand in judgment of the 
state (through dissent if necessary) in efforts to ensure that it sufficiently honors its 
commitment to justice for all people.  In other words, instead of merely being 
concerned about whether religions promote patriarchy, it is equally important to take 
note of the fact that they promote a sense of justice or charity.  Incidentally, many of 
these values extend beyond a concern for justice.  Likewise most are difficult to 
transmit to students in any meaningful way in state supported public schools.  A third 




I draw two conclusions from the correspondence argument.  First, any 
reasonable view regarding the role of religion in preparing liberal democratic citizens 
must not amount to an argument that religion should reoccupy the center of political 
socialization in state supported public schools.  Rather it should be considered a view 
about the nature of private associations.  Second, the correspondence argument is not 
convincing because its presuppositions regarding how associations function are 
suspect and because it presupposes an erroneous image of the substance of religion.  
It presumes an image of religion that emphasizes the overly negative characteristics 
of certain religious groups while ignoring others and the positive kinds of 
socialization of a Rawlsian sort.     
 In the next chapter I substantiate this latter point by exploring arguments from 
within the philosophy of education literature that express a negative view of the role 












Chapter 3: Arguments Opposing Religious Education 
 
 The view of religion that dominates the discussion of the correspondence 
argument is more negative.  It interprets religion as a sponsor of patriarchy and 
authoritarianism.  In this chapter I will examine the views of three prominent theorists 
– Harry Brighouse, Amy Gutmann, and Eamonn Callan – who underscore some of 
the negative aspects of religion.  The selection of these particular authors is meant to 
be more illustrative rather than exhaustive of a range of similar perspectives available 
in the philosophy of education literature.  Thus, their views serve as exemplars of 
those that are critical of religious education.  However, these views do not explicitly 
address the prophetic tradition.  That tradition encourages active engagement in civic 
affairs and has roots in biblical portrayals of Old Testament prophets whose primary 
aim was to critique normalized instances of oppression and arouse the remembrance 
of broadly understood moral standards.  Rather, these thinkers appear to direct their 
opprobrium towards controversial religious groups of the fundamentalist and 
isolationist persuasion.  But this is not explicitly clear because they allude to believers 
of this sort as if their characteristics encapsulate religion as the whole.  
 These authors (with significant variations among them) tend to make two 
kinds of arguments.  The first argument regards religion as the enemy of democratic 
citizenship. It views religious believers as antagonistic and isolationist – as wanting to 
live apart and wanting to isolate children from all perspectives other than those in 
accord with their own.  The second kind of argument regards religion as the enemy of 
autonomy.  This view interprets religion as being harmful to children by denying 




they believe best suits them. These arguments are considered together because they 
are linked in that both require an education that exposes children to a wide range of 
views about the good life: democratic citizenship because it seeks to establish a 
deliberative democracy, and autonomy because it seeks to enable a kind of inward 
deliberation leading to autonomous choice. 
 By examining the views of these three theorists I hope to accomplish the 
following.  First, I will develop some criteria that I believe religious associations in 
liberal democratic societies should satisfy. These criteria concern autonomy and 
democratic citizenship.  They will be addressed in more detail in a later chapter when 
I apply them to the prophetic tradition and explain how it satisfies them.  Second, I 
will make some criticisms of the views of these theorists when the criteria that they 
use to judge religious associations are overly restrictive of religious liberty and 
freedom of conscience.  Third, I will note that when these theorists discuss religion 
they focus on the views of groups that are fundamentalist and isolationist and fail to 
address the views of other religious groups.  In doing so they allow groups of these 
orientations to become the default definition of religion and, furthermore, neglect the 
potential religion has to positively impact the development of liberal citizens.       
  Before examining the views of these thinkers I would first like to illumine the 
soil in which arguments of this sort have roots. 
Isolationists and Fundamentalists 
 Yoder v Wisconsin (1972) and Mozert v Hawkins County Board of Education 




symbolically than not, embody longstanding liberal fears about the caustic influence 
of religion on adherents; and, accordingly, about the stability of liberal democracy.   
Yoder involves members of the Old Order Amish who were convicted of 
violating Wisconsin’s compulsory school attendance law requiring school attendance 
until the year a child turned age sixteen.  The parents refused to send their children to 
any public or private high school after eighth grade graduation because they viewed 
such attendance as contrary to their religious beliefs.  Evidence revealed that the Old 
Order Amish provided informal vocational education consistent with their separate 
agrarian way of life in the rural settings of their communities.  These particular 
Amish hold strong religious beliefs regarding schooling, specifically that sending 
adolescents to high school endangers both their and their parent’s salvation.  The 
Supreme Court decided in favor of the parents and held that the interests of the 
individuals relative to the free exercise of religion clause of the First Amendment 
outweighed the interests of the state in requiring mandatory school attendance until 
the age of sixteen. 
Mozert involves the selection of a textbook series by the Tennessee school 
board for a character education curriculum aimed at developing higher order 
cognitive skills through “critical reading” in grades 1-8.  Fourteen devoutly religious 
parents found the reading series offensive because some passages included references 
to magic, evolution, secular humanism, and other material that did not affirm the truth 
of their religious beliefs.  The particular school their children attended agreed to 
honor the parent’s request for an alternate reading program.  However the school 




and require every student to participate in the established reading program using the 
adopted textbook series. The children of the families who objected to the series were 
either suspended, home-schooled, pulled out to attend religious schools, or transferred 
to other public schools.   
The Mozert parents responded by filing a law suit claiming that their right to 
the free exercise of religion had been violated.  A district court ruled in favor of the 
parents, but this decision was later reversed by the 6th circuit court which ruled 
against the parents’ appeal to protection under the Free Exercise Clause.  The court 
essentially claimed that the Holt reading series did not violate the Establishment 
Clause and was not a constitutional ‘burden’ on the parent’s religious exercise.  
“[S]chool boards may set curricula bounded only by the Establishment Clause, as the 
state contends.  Thus, contrary to the analogy plaintiffs suggest, pupils may indeed be 
expelled if they will not read from the King James Bible, so long as it is only used as 
literature, and not taught as religious truth.”15  The court found no evidence that the 
defendant school board sought to require students to accept any religious or anti-
religious beliefs. 
I would like to make two points regarding the religious believers highlighted 
in these two court cases.  First, these groups dominate much of the literature 
regarding religion and citizenship, literature that largely emphasizes the negative 
aspects of religious devotion.  Paul Weithman observes:   
 
“A formidable obstacle faces attempts to reconceive the standard view that 
 philosophical liberals think religion a threat to political stability.  That view 
 has become the standard one in part because so many philosophical liberals 
 seem to endorse it.  A cursory reading of contemporary liberal philosophers 
                                                 




 suggests that many of them are impressed by the disruptive character of 
 religion and the real possibility of religiously inspired political violence.  It 
 further suggests that they define themselves and their tradition by a 
 distinctively liberal strategy for averting that threat”(Weithman, 1997, 3).     
   
Second, these groups are atypical of most existing religious believers.  The 
Old Order Amish seek an existence distinct and separate from the modern secular 
world16 in order to promote a way of life devoid of idolatry to things that would place 
God in a subordinate position.  They are what Jeff Spinner-Halev calls “nominal 
citizens” – effectively disengaged from the dominant society.  While they have no 
interest in exercising their right to vote or engaging in civic deliberation, neither do 
they seek to use coercive state power to impose their religious convictions on others.  
The Amish represent a small agrarian, pacifist, law-abiding, religious minority that 
purposely shield themselves from the corrupt values and technology of the modern 
world.  They are exceptionally distinct from an overwhelming majority of religious 
groups in the United States.     
Conversely, the Mozert parents are radical fundamentalists.  They are radical 
insofar as they interpret the doctrine of their faith in a manner that exceeds the usual 
range of proscriptions and reservations that most so-called fundamentalists find 
objectionable: “Members of their church didn’t even agree with their stance.”17  The 
aspects of the school curriculum these parents objected to were grouped into 17 
categories which included mental telepathy, pacifism, and magic; but also “the 
feelings, attitudes and values of other students” that contradicted their religious 
                                                 
16 Their separation from the modern world is not completely void of interaction with it or general 
knowledge of it.  Because a small percentage of Amish children elect to defect to mainstream society, 
some Amish communities continually renegotiate their posture toward modern society’s most alluring 
aspects, namely technology.  Different Amish communities therefore demonstrate varying degrees of 
separation from the “English” world.          




views.  Just the mere fact that their children’s classmates – religious, atheist, agnostic 
or otherwise – expressed feelings and views that were contrary to these believers’ 
beliefs was thought to be problematic.  The parents in Mozert considered any aspect 
of the curriculum (including other students’ views on curriculum related topics) that 
did not affirm the absolute truth of their beliefs as offensive to their religious 
convictions.18  Their attitude is atypical of many religious believers, including the 
large number of so-called fundamentalists who generally concern themselves with 
such issues as prayer in school, the inclusion of creationism in the sciences, and 
maintaining the reference to God in the pledge of allegiance, but who otherwise 
remain relatively tolerant of the general curriculum.     
To erect an argument that religion is bad for citizenship by using the believers 
represented in these two court cases is to maximize the minimum and minimize the 
maximum.  Yet, despite this clear error, the Yoder and Mozert cases have nonetheless 
heavily influenced how people of faith are represented in the literature regarding 
religion and citizenship.  Among the reasons, perhaps, is because these groups 
embody the most virulent incongruence with liberal democratic values.  These 
religious groups not only endorse illiberal convictions (for example religious 
intolerance, and subordinate roles for women), they also severely restrict or outright 
deny any legitimate opportunity for members to revise their conception of the good or 
to sever ties with the group.  Another possible reason is because these cases expose a 
strand of faith very distinct from “safe” religious groups whose convictions so 
comfortably cohere with the modern secular world that they scarcely appear to be 
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religious.  More importantly (and unfortunately), though, it is a strand of faith that our 
thoroughly secularized popular culture views as outrageous yet emblematic of 
religion.   
While the prevailing examples of religion and religious education in the 
literature on religion and citizenship resemble the characteristic features of 
fundamentalism and isolationism, these orientations in no way define the whole of 
religion.  Not only are there other kinds of religious believers, those others have 
differing implications for citizenship.  Variations on the correspondence argument 
presuppose an overly hostile view of religion and fail to acknowledge the positive 
impact religion has on citizenship.  Consequently, the expectations some authors 
would have religious associations meet in order to satisfy congruence with public 
principles of justice often unnecessarily restrict religious liberty and freedom of 
conscience.   
 Now I will examine the arguments of three prominent thinkers that serve as 
exemplars of those who are critical of religious education and who permit, by default, 
radical religious groups to stand for religion by default.   
Harry Brighouse 
 In School Choice and Social Justice (2000) Harry Brighouse makes an 
instrumental argument for what he calls an autonomy facilitating education.  Absent 
any appeal to the intrinsic value of autonomy, the instrumental argument asserts that 
justice requires that each child has a significant and equal opportunity to live a life 
that is good for them: “[I]f someone has all the resources and liberties that justice 




opportunity to live well, she has not been treated justly” (Brighouse, 2000, 69).  The 
instrumental argument is not motivated by an interest in the public good or in 
cultivating capacities for citizenship because Brighouse believes that the state’s 
interest in creating citizens makes for an inferior educational aim in comparison to the 
developmental interests of children.19  Rather, he feels that providing children with a 
realistic opportunity to become autonomous adults is the fundamental value that 
should guide the design of educational policy.         
 
“The instrumentalist argument for teaching autonomy…starts with the 
obligation which adults have towards prospective adults, to provide them with 
certain kinds of opportunity to live well….The fundamental interest each 
person has in living well yields an obligation on all to provide prospective 
adults with an instrument for selecting well among ways of life.  Confidence 
that others have a real opportunity to live lives that are good for them is only 
possible if we provide the means to select one” (Brighouse, 2000, 71-72).   
 
Brighouse believes that an important function of providing the liberties that justice 
requires in a liberal democracy is enabling people to not only live well, but to live 
well by their own judgment.  By “living well” Brighouse means two things: the way 
of life must be good and the person living it must endorse it “from the inside.”20  He 
does not articulate the criteria against which ways of life are to be weighed as good or 
bad.  Nonetheless he claims one’s vital commitments, and the obligations that flow 
from them, are undertaken “from the inside” if the agent identifies with them. 
Brighouse contends that an autonomy facilitating education is character 
neutral (but not value-free because it values the opportunity to choose a good life).  
By character neutral he means that it does not aim to ensure that children employ 
autonomy in their lives, but merely aims to enable them to live autonomously should 
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they wish to.  The distinction between autonomy facilitating and autonomy per se as 
an educational goal is to permit individuals to choose a way of life that does not 
involve autonomy.                                 
 Brighouse asserts that the family falls into an area of life in which a wide 
range of choice and individual preference must be protected.  Because children are 
vulnerable persons in the making who cannot be thought capable of making the best 
choices for their own interests he acknowledges that parents possess a fundamental 
right to protect and raise them as they see fit.  But that right does not translate into 
unrestricted authority over children.  To tolerate all practices of parents – particularly 
practices of families that do not value, or outright reject autonomy – would be to 
absolutely ignore the interests of children’s prospective autonomy.   
Ideally Brighouse would limit the parental right to control their children’s 
education to a degree that parents would be prevented from denying children an 
education that facilitates autonomy.  Toward the end of developing children’s 
capacity for rational choice, Brighouse would, minimally, have them experience an 
education that teaches “how to distinguish between appeals to authority and appeals 
to evidence;…about a range of religious, non-religious, and anti-religious ethical 
views in some detail; about the kinds of reasoning deployed within those views; and 
the attitudes of proponents toward non-believers, heretics, and the secular world” 
(Brighouse, 2000, 75).              
Brighouse observes that it is the parents of children who live in tight-knit 
communities who typically limit exposure to alternative ways of life, and he 




he admits deeply religious ways of life can be lived well without being autonomously 
chosen, he feels that restrictive religious commitments tend to limit children’s 
opportunity to live well.  More often than not this stems from an incompatibility 
between a child’s internal constitution and the religious way of life passed down to 
her. “If what we might call constitution pluralism is true, and religious parents are 
permitted to exempt their children from autonomy-facilitating education, then some 
children will have few or no opportunities for living well” (Brighouse, 2000, 73).   
While Brighouse does not wish to breach parents’ freedom of conscience, he 
seems most deeply concerned for those children whose parents feel that their 
obligation to raise their children in their faith has sufficient force that it is violated if 
their children experience any skepticism about their faith or gain exposure to 
alternative views.  He feels that these attitudes, rather than a child’s conscious choice, 
create unequal life prospects.  Thus, an education is unjust, in his eyes, to the degree 
that it precludes wide exposure to alternative views – because such conservatism 
creates unequal opportunities for children to choose prospective ways of life.21  
Brighouse, then, would most likely argue that religious ways of life must survive 
without the benefit of educational practices that deny an autonomy-facilitating 
education to children.   
 One issue I would like to address is the language that Brighouse uses to 
describe religion.  He characterizes the devout as sharing a way of life.  Generally, 
religions are not usefully described as ways of life, although particular individuals or 
communities (for instance Tibetan Buddhist monks) may exhibit a distinctive way of 
life because of how they choose to honor commitments that flow from religious 
                                                 




convictions.22  My sense is that what Brighouse characterizes as a religious “way of 
life” would be more accurately described as a worldview.  “Ways of life” would seem 
to include a lot more than he describes.   
 Kenneth Strike (Strike, 2003) draws a helpful distinction between the two 
when he characterizes tribes and congregations.   
 
 “A Gemeinschaft community is one where there are deeply shared 
 understandings rooted in a common life together.  Paradigm cases are 
 medieval villages, clans, and tribes….Another image of a community is the 
 congregation.  Religious groups are, for the most part, partial communities in 
 that while their members may share a common creed, they do not share a 
 common life....Here I use the notion of a congregation to refer to groups that 
 are held together because they share what Rawls (1993) calls a comprehensive 
 or partially comprehensive doctrine”(Strike, 2003)    
  
When I played recreational soccer as boy in a league largely populated by families 
from upper middle class neighborhoods across town, I assumed that upon visiting the 
homes of my teammates for gatherings I would discover that their way of life was 
completely different than my own because of ethnic, racial and stark class 
differences.  I was wrong.  What did become clear was that I held a worldview 
different from many of them (I did not feel entitled to receive a new car on my 16th 
birthday), but we essentially shared the same way of life (like my own family they did 
not hunt on a daily basis to sustain their diet and after meals they gathered to watch 
television together).  Worldviews provide criteria people can apply to life style 
choices. 
Religions are a lot more like worldviews and tend to constrain very few 
choices regarding lifestyle, or what one might envision as the good life.  “Religions 
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have varying relationships to their cultures, but in ours, with a few notable 
exceptions, a religion is better viewed as a framework for appraising life’s choices 
than as a way of life” (Strike, 2003).  The adherents of most mainstream religions 
tend to have varying occupations, are members of different political parties, and 
participate in diverse recreational activities.  And because the majority of these folks 
are not isolationists, their children will live within and be exposed to pluralistic social 
contexts and be granted the liberty to continually expand from them as they mature 
into adulthood.  Therefore, in most cases mandating a faith tradition does not inhibit 
one’s autonomy to choose a way of life.  Rather choice is most likely to be 
constrained by normative considerations of goodness and evil, often expressed 
through the obligations religions place on people by virtue of their claim to be true.23  
The claim that religion amounts to a worldview more so than to a way of life is made 
to seem especially true by Christianity because it was intended to be able to travel 
across a culturally diverse empire.        
  This distinction between worldview and way of life is important for more 
than qualitative reasons.  It has implications on what Brighouse expects parents to 
expose their children to and why.  Brighouse desires that all children be provided a 
realistic opportunity to become autonomous adults.  What he has in mind is an 
individual who endorses his or her vital commitments and way of life from the inside; 
that is, chooses according to their own judgment.  With this in mind, it seems 
worthwhile to distinguish two forms of autonomy I believe are implied in Brighouse’s 
discussion.   
                                                 




The first regards the capacity to make a rational choice among options 
because they somehow fit.  Brighouse would have parents expose their children to a 
wide range of views, in part, for the sake of developing the capacity to select well 
among “ways of life.”  He believes doing so allows children to choose in accord with 
their internal constitution, rather than resigning themselves to reproducing the way of 
life they inherit.  However, exhibiting a capacity for choice according to internal fit 
can play itself out in several ways.  One might, for example, select among articles of 
clothing that best fit one’s personal sense of fashion.  Alternatively, one might select 
among cars to steal according to which models best match one’s tastes.24   
Developing this form of autonomy certainly seems dependent upon exposure, 
but potentially to vice (immoral standards and criteria for choosing).  Harry 
Brighouse does not explicitly address this, though I presume he would not endorse it.  
Perhaps the moral difference between these two choices speaks to what Brighouse 
means when he asserts that one criteria of “living well” is that the way of life must be 
good.  The idea of choosing according to fittingness is only meaningful against a 
backdrop of some set of standards for judging.  Theoretically, an illiberal moral 
framework leads to illiberal choices, and vice versa.  So, this form of autonomy 
seems influenced by capacities related to a second.       
A second form of autonomy regards the capacity to examine or appraise ideas, 
constructs, and moral or truth claims.  I have stated that religions are more akin to 
worldviews than to ways of life.  As such, they propose normative considerations that 
are used when making choices.  These norms are based upon doctrinal claims to truth 
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that often deny the validity of competing truth claims.  However, this is not always 
the case.  Regardless, developing this second form of autonomy seems dependent 
upon having an opportunity to examine the truth claims of one’s inherited tradition.  
This is an issue concerning the characteristics of the traditions into which children are 
initiated and the manner of their initiation (Strike, 2003).  To be denied this 
opportunity is to risk becoming enslaved to mistruths and negative values and 
standards; and, hence, bad reasoning and irrational choices.  Therefore, this is a form 
of autonomy that must be defended.  It is relevant to citizenship (although this is not 
Brighouse’s focus) in the sense that in their role as citizens individuals consider 
arguments for claims regarding the requirements of justice.   
Judging from Brighouse’s curricular expectations – exposure to “a range of 
religious, non-religious, and anti-religious ethical views and the reasoning deployed 
in those views” – and what I take him to actually mean by the term ‘ways of life,’ 
most religious communities will satisfy this educational expectation rather than 
undermine it.  Many religious groups encourage discourse about the theological 
content of their faith.  Much of the time this is so that members do not hold beliefs in 
the manner of a prejudice.  Christian congregations often withhold baptism and full-
membership until young adulthood when it is believed candidates are able to reason 
about the meaning of the rite.     
Some religious groups of course do not encourage reflection on moral and 
truth claims or provide exposure to competing views.  But Brighouse’s comments are 
mostly directed towards religious believers that are isolationists and/or 




groups.  However, he adds no discussion of groups with other characteristics that may 
positively affect the development of autonomy.   
A second issue I would like to address regards what seems like an excessive 
expectation for how exposure should occur.  Although Brighouse hopes to refrain 
from violating freedom of conscience, it seems his attempt fails.  When and how are 
parents able to exercise their obligation to conscientiously and responsibly raise their 
children in accordance with their conception of the good if at every turn they must 
qualify their perspectives/claims by alluding to the reasoning of other views on some 
matter?  How are children supposed to develop any serious views about anything?  
Parents have an interest in instantiating the structures of faith that have proven 
indispensable with regard to spiritual well being in their own lives.  However, 
Brighouse’s autonomy facilitating education would permit children to hear serious 
criticism of their religious views.  This is, in any case, what I assume to be an 
outcome of exposing children to a range of religious, non-religious, and anti-religious 
ethical views in some detail.  But children rarely possess an even adequate 
understanding of “the dialogical resources of traditions into which they have, as yet, 
only been partially inducted” (Callan, 2000, 61).   
The obvious worry here is that religious identity will be lost even before it is 
achieved.  Excessive openness may be debilitating to the capacity to adhere to a 
conception of the good.  William Galston suggests that “the greatest threat to children 
in modern liberal societies is…that they will believe in nothing very deeply at all.  
Even to achieve the kind of free self-reflection that many liberals prize, it is better to 




considers such exposure beneficial, the state should not make it mandatory.  Most 
religious groups might compensate for it by not constraining lifestyle choices or 
demanding isolation from the pluralistic secular modern world.  Perhaps Brighouse 
would allow for a period of religious education in which parents can single-mindedly 
secure an understanding of the foundations of their faith in their children.         
In summary, Brighouse rightly believes that tight-knit, deeply religious groups 
undermine an opportunity for children to live autonomously.  However, he only 
discusses the characteristics of groups similar to the families in Yoder and Mozert.  
Failure to acknowledge moderate or progressive religious groups undermines his 
arguments and perhaps constrains his ability to view autonomy facilitation as a 
reliable derivative of religious education.  It may well be that many religious 
traditions develop adherent’s capacity for rational choice by initiating them into 
dialogical practices that involve evaluating their own and other traditions according to 
criteria equivalent to liberal principles of justice.    
Amy Gutmann 
In Democratic Education (1987), Amy Gutmann discusses the interest that 
democratic states have in cultivating the skills and virtues that enable the conscious 
social reproduction of the society’s political norms.  She contends that the conscious 
social reproduction of a democracy requires the capacity to deliberate among 
alternative forms of personal and political life.  This capacity allows for an ongoing 
conversation between citizens about the type of education that will enable the society 




in liberal democratic societies must be the development of what she calls democratic 
character.    
Gutmann speculates about exactly who should determine the ends of 
education25 in a liberal democracy.  She rejects the idea that exclusive educational 
authority should rest in the hands of parents, which would permit them to predispose 
their children to choosing a way of life consistent with their own cultural heritage.26  
Gutmann does not believe that parents have a natural right to exclusive educational 
authority or that they can be relied upon to pursue interests that maximize the welfare 
of their children.  In spite of this, she nevertheless acknowledges the intrinsic 
significance of parental freedom to form children’s values, noting its importance in 
relationship to securing a moral and cultural foundation that enables children to 
deliberate among alternative ways of life.  This idea is mirrored in Bruce Ackerman’s 
(1980) notion of cultural coherence.  It posits that in order to have a sense of who we 
want to become we need to possess a sense of who we already are.27   
Gutmann recognizes, though, that the non-neutral education provided by the 
family places limits on the range of children’s future choices at the same time that it 
aids the capacity for rational choice.  The preferences, values, and traditions central to 
our cultural orientations essentially serve as an arbiter of what for us is to likely count 
as a choice-worthy lifestyle.  Indeed, Gutmann supports a significant degree of 
cultural coherence within families, but adds that cultural coherence generally fails to 
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capture the depth of the state’s interest in developing democratic citizens;28 
particularly citizens’ capacity to deliberate among competing conceptions of the good 
life and the good society.  Accordingly, Gutmann rejects any argument that would 
rest exclusive or even primary educational authority in the hands of parents.   
She provides an answer to her initial question regarding who should determine 
the ends of education by arguing that educational authority must be partially shared 
by the state, educational professionals, and the family.29  Her assumption is that 
absent state intercession and regulation of education parents cannot be counted upon 
to teach the value of mutual respect or to equip their children with the intellectual 
skills necessary to deliberate rationally among ways of life that differ from their own.   
 
 “History suggests that without state provision or regulation of education, 
 children will be taught neither mutual respect among persons nor rational 
 deliberation among ways of life.  To save their children from future pain, 
 especially the pain of eternal damnation, parents have historically shielded 
 their children from diverse associations, convinced them that all other ways of 
 life are sinful, and implicitly fostered (if not explicitly taught them) disrespect 
 for people who are different” (Gutmann, 1987, 31). 
 
Gutmann argues that the educational authority that parents are owed does not 
extend to a right to insulate their children from exposure to ways of life or reasoning 
that conflict with their own.  She appears to have especially low expectations 
regarding the ability of religious parents to overcome obstinacy with respect to their 
doctrine’s view of the truth.  Far from the mutual respect and deliberative capacities 
that characterize her view of democratic education, she conceives of sectarian 
religious training as tarnished by patriarchy, repression, and religious/racial 
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intolerance.  Gutmann uses the following depiction of religious groups to illustrate 
this point.                  
“Some parents, such as the Old Order Amish in America, are morally 
committed to shielding their children from all knowledge that might lead them 
to doubt and all worldly influences that might weaken their religious beliefs.  
Many other parents, less radical in their rejection of modern society, are 
committed to teaching their children religious and racial intolerance” 
(Gutmann, 1987, 29).  
 
Because of the hazards religious training purportedly poses to the development of 
civic virtue, Gutmann would have the state regulate the education of children.  
Considering her broad view of education, this would apparently include activities 
related to child rearing and religious training that occur within the sphere of the home 
and community. 
To support her interest in developing democratic character, Gutmann erects 
three principled limits that constrain the exercise of political and parental authority 
over education: non-repression, non-discrimination, and democratic deliberation.  The 
principle of non-repression prohibits the state, and any group within it, from 
proffering an education that does not engage in consideration of or deliberation about 
competing conceptions of the good life and the good society.30  Because conscious 
social reproduction is the primary aim of democratic education, adults must therefore 
be prevented from using their present deliberative freedom to undermine the future 
deliberative freedom of children.  The principle of non-discrimination prohibits the 
state, and all groups within it, from denying anyone an educational good on grounds 
irrelevant to the legitimate social purpose of that good.31  “Democratic education is 
bound to restrict pursuit, although not conscious consideration, of ways of life 
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dependent on the suppression of politically relevant knowledge.  Democratic 
education supports choice among those ways of life that are compatible with 
conscious social reproduction”(Gutmann, 1987, 46).   
Requiring families and private associations to provide an education that 
enables children to deliberate among alternative forms of reasoning and ways of life 
is, to Gutmann, instrumental for the conscious social reproduction of a democracy.  
Gutmann, however, faces a problem identical to the one faced by Brighouse with her 
use of the term “ways of life.”  It lacks specificity.  She uses the term in such a way 
that it conflates things that are qualitatively different.  Similarly, her usage of it would 
be better interpreted as worldviews or doctrines.       
Another apparent problem with Gutmann’s views is that she has created a 
conundrum. On the one hand she concedes the need for parents to bestow a moral and 
cultural foundation to their children in order to provide them with a framework from 
which to make rational choices.  Yet on the other hand she denies parents primary 
authority over the education of their children believing that the state’s interest in 
citizenship (e.g., democratic character) affords it the right to regulate children’s 
education in the private sphere as well.  What she does not express is whether (or 
how) state regulation would be balanced against the private interests families have in 
cultural reproduction, solidarity, and the conversational or dialogical development of 
their comprehensive doctrine in closed forums.  In fact, it is not apparent that 
Gutmann has any sense of citizens’ political rights that might either ground her 




She endorses a vision of political socialization that plausibly permits considerable 
interference with the affairs of private religious associations.  
Correspondingly, Gutmann advances a view of democratic education that 
basically amounts to instantiating a comprehensive doctrine in its own right.  Harry 
Brighouse concurs with this claim.   
“[S]he deploys a conception of justice that places too much weight on the 
 value of democratic participation.  It privileges democratic participation as 
 something which should be regarded not only as a fundamental right of all 
 citizens but as a political duty. This is controversial, and in my view 
 false”(Brighouse, 2000, 68).  
 
I believe schools should undertake the task of shaping certain values and providing 
opportunities that equip students with the knowledge and capacities that enable active 
participation in the political affairs of their society.  On the other hand, indoctrinating 
children with a kind of civic republicanism, through formal schooling or through the 
regulation of private associations, is not an appropriate function for the liberal state.  
Similar to John Dewey’s conception of democracy in Democracy and Education 
(1916), Gutmann’s orientation toward shaping democratic character is seemingly 
intent upon imposing democracy as a “way of life” (i.e. a conception of the good).   
  This is significant because Gutmann’s requirements for citizenship indirectly 
undermine the opportunity she wants for children to be liberated from proscriptive 
cultural forces.  She acknowledges the importance of children becoming autonomous 
choosers of their future lives and asserts that it is their interests that guide her 
institutional model for education.  But her focus on “the good of children” differs 
from that of Harry Brighouse who similarly claims that children’s interests drive his 




While he believes that the developmental interests of children, as opposed to 
the public good, should guide educational aims, Gutmann’s emphasis on the good of 
children is locked into instilling in them the obligation to actively participate in 
democratic deliberation rather than promote it as one view of a good life that offers 
communal and civic benefits.  The autonomy facilitating education of Harry 
Brighouse at least recognizes the possibility that a child’s autonomous reasoning 
might guide him or her to a view of the good life that excludes active democratic 
participation; and he values the right of individuals to act on the choice.  “A view of 
liberalism in which the socialization requirements of citizenship were so substantial 
as to preclude an adequate range of views of the good life would fail to do what 
liberalism chiefly intends to do: that is, to make it possible for people to live 
according to their own views of the good” (Strike, 1999a, 50).        
Lastly, Gutmann’s conception of religious training does not admit the 
empirical differences across religious groups with regard to their commitments and 
practices.  She discusses religious believers without any acknowledgment of religious 
diversity.  According to the characterization she presents of religious groups, the vast 
majority of them would be considered illiberal, specifically as a result of being unable 
or unwilling to foster democratic character (e.g., the promotion of mutual respect for 
the liberty and rights of other citizens; religious and racial tolerance; and deliberative 




Many religious groups in fact do an adequate job of satisfying her 
requirements for democratic character.32  With respect to her interest in developing 
deliberative capacities, Kenneth Strike (1999) suggests that comprehensive doctrines 
contribute argumentative resources to which adherents appeal when attempting to 
establish an overlapping consensus.  In Political Liberalism (1993) John Rawls 
suggests that an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines 
produces a political conception of justice that can win support from individuals on 
account of reasons internal to their comprehensive doctrine.  Rawls, though, 
advocates some degree of “looseness” regarding individuals’ attachment to them.  
However, Strike argues that real people look to their comprehensive doctrines for 
moral motivation when conceiving notions of justice because doctrines attach moral 
significance to values and how to prioritize them.  Hence, argues Strike, an 
overlapping consensus requires citizens to be adequately “fluent” in the theoretical 
and practical reasoning of their comprehensive doctrine (Strike, 1999b).      
Ultimately, what might safely be assumed is that a negative view of religion 
grounds Gutmann’s argument for state regulation of private associations.  Gutmann’s 
educational proposals result in too much influence shifting from private associational 
life.  Moreover, they also appear to subordinate the interests of the private sphere to 
those of the state.  Thus, freedom of conscience and the free exercise of religion are 
trumped by the requirements of democratic social reproduction.  While liberal 
societies have a vital interest in diminishing the negative effects of illiberal religious 
education, it is equally important that they draw a line in the sand that responsibly 
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forecloses a space wherein  religious education is allowed to anchor morality and 
shape views of the good life.  
The arguments Gutmann offers in objection to Yoder are a version of the 
correspondence argument, and unqualified they entitle the state to regulate the 
educational practices of private (religious) associations to a considerable degree.  In 
her effort to produce tolerant citizens capable of deliberating among alternative forms 
of personal and political life, Gutmann’s educational goals for public schooling cause 
the state to be partially “established” in its own right.  She does not take into 
consideration that religions might endorse their own visions of citizenship, that such 
visions might be compatible with liberal democratic virtue, and that when they are not 
(comprehensively) the group’s interests still should not be peremptorily trumped by 
the state’s interest in citizenship.   
Eamonn Callan 
In Political Liberalism and Political Education (1996) Eamonn Callan 
challenges the distinction John Rawls makes between political liberalism and ethical 
liberalism.  Callan does so by illuminating their convergent educational implications.  
He argues that the publicity and reasonableness that political liberalism depends upon 
is funded by reciprocity.  Reciprocity requires acceptance of the burdens of 
judgment,33 because apart from the burdens of judgment individuals are prone to view 
those who affirm competing beliefs as either malevolent or foolish. Therefore 
securing acceptance of the burdens of judgment must be a universal end of political 
education under political liberalism.  Callan warns, though, that securing acceptance 
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of the burdens develops habits of mind tantamount to autonomy, a comprehensive 
ethical doctrine.  This, he suggests, represents the point of convergence between the 
educational aims of political liberalism and that of ethical liberalism.   
In Political Liberalism (1993) John Rawls asserts that ethical liberalism must 
fail when the doctrine it privileges is advanced as the source of political legitimacy.  
Ethical liberalism grounds the political conception of justice in a comprehensive 
doctrine.  Under conditions of ethical pluralism this means that persons who reject 
that doctrine nevertheless have to abide by rules whose justification would appear 
illegitimate.34  Moreover, they would have to learn to adjust their public speech and 
behavior such that these were consistent with the reasoning of this doctrine.35  Ethical 
liberalism would eliminate many citizens’ ability to ascribe legitimacy to the basic 
structure of society (particularly its institutions) because the right answer to questions 
of justice and constitutional essentials would hinge upon the supposed truth of a 
doctrine many would reject.  These citizens would be no less than psychologically 
oppressed by the prevailing conception of justice.   
Rawls’s political liberalism, on the other hand, attempts to establish political 
legitimacy through reasoned moral consensus.  Theoretically, the conception of 
justice supporting the general structure of society would be compatible with the full 
range of reasonable values and doctrines citizens endorse.  It would also represent an 
overlapping consensus of values freestanding from the various doctrines citizens 
endorse privately.36  Citizens’ strongly held ethical beliefs would enter into an 
overlapping consensus justified by the use of public reasons – that is reasons 
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acceptable to all who participate.37  Under such conditions, no one is required to 
assent to an ideology they responsibly reject.   
Political liberalism promotes reasonableness in citizens through a political 
education that seeks to secure acceptance of the burdens of judgment.  The burdens 
represent the sources of disagreement that persist among individuals when factors that 
signify a failure to be reasonable are filtered out.38  According to Rawls, 
reasonableness requires two conditions: (1) a commitment to moral reciprocity: being 
willing to propose principles, listen to others’ proposals, and comply with others’ 
proposals that are intended to fix the terms of fair cooperation39; and (2) a willingness 
to recognize the burdens of judgment and accept their consequence of using public 
reason in regard to establishing the legitimate uses of political power.40  Acceptance 
of the burdens of judgment supports the reciprocity and mutual toleration that public 
reason must promote when citizens select the principles of justice that best satisfy the 
ambitions of political liberalism.  Unlike the educational implications of ethical 
liberalism – which would involve privileging a particular doctrine – political 
liberalism yields an education ostensibly hospitable to society’s ethical pluralism.   
Callan identifies a significant consequence of a political education that aims to 
secure acceptance of the burdens of judgment.  The relevance of the burdens of 
judgment are not limited to public reason during political deliberation, but must also 
be understood as having an impact on the values and convictions that shape the 
background culture.  Acceptance of the burdens of judgment invites citizens to 
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question the absolute truth of their comprehensive doctrines.41  An individual would 
have to acknowledge the irreconcilable disagreements that exist among existing 
doctrines, and come to terms with how reason could lead others to endorse views that 
compete and/or conflict with their own.  To the extent that citizens fail in this regard 
the society will not achieve the crucial condition of publicity in whatever principles 
of justice regulate its basic structure.  To argue for the use of political power on the 
basis that one’s doctrine is absolutely true would violate the conditions of 
reasonableness.   
Callan argues, then, that political liberalism yields an education that 
inadvertently promotes autonomy through the “back door,” thereby transforming it 
into a form of ethical liberalism.  Despite how this might unintentionally and 
unnecessarily sway individuals out of their religious convictions, Callan appears 
willing to assign personal conscience a subordinate status to the state’s interest in 
creating citizens capable of legitimizing the justificatory ideal of the liberal 
democratic tradition.  Consequently, public reasons become the currency of political 
deliberation because they are reasons refined by the reasonableness that results from 
acceptance of the burdens of judgment.   
Religious associations would find this form of political socialization uniquely 
troubling.  It would impair the ability of adherents to invest faith in the absolute truth 
of their doctrine.  Political liberalism requires that parents be willing to permit their 
children to entertain alternative views and to acknowledge that those who are not of 
their own faith are worthy of reciprocity.  Callan might argue that this form of 
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political socialization is permissible because it threatens the conscience only of those 
who are unreasonable in Rawls’s sense.  The need for religious tolerance would 
prevent believers from justifying the use of state power using controversial premises 
from their comprehensive doctrine due to the recognition that reason cannot produce 
a universally shared religion.   
Callan assumes that instead of appealing to public reasons, many religious and 
secular citizens will instead seek to justify the use of state power by appealing to 
ignorance, tribal animus, and the many other resources of manipulative politics.42  
Why?  Apparently he believes that extant religious traditions contain values that 
diverge from the aims of liberal democratic politics and political education.  Among 
the most worrisome is authoritarianism: that they value a sense of certainty or 
absolutism in light of competing traditions.   
“The culture of every extant liberal democracy contains powerful currents, 
 religious as well as secular, that pull hard against the constitutive ideals of 
 liberal democracy.  To ignore this is to eschew liberal aggressiveness by 
 embracing liberal complacency.  ’Think for yourself, though it need only be to 
 a modest extent’ might be an acceptable educational injunction in some better 
 world than ours.  It does not make good sense in ours” (Callan, 1996, 51).   
 
Presumably, Callan’s critique of religious education is that if securing acceptance of 
the burdens of judgment is not among its educational aims, then it fosters intolerance 
and undermines the autonomy and reciprocity required of citizenship generally, but 
especially during the dialogue leading to an overlapping consensus.   
 Eamonn Callan only notes the negative characteristics of religious believers.  
This raises two issues.  First, he implicitly suggests that these negative features are 
universal features of religion; that unreasonable views are paradigmatic of religious 
                                                 




views.  Second, his argument not only assumes that the burdens of judgment are a 
reason for tolerance but that they are necessary to tolerance.   
 With regard to the first issue, there is indeed a plethora of empirical evidence 
to support Callan’s characterization of illiberal ideological currents in pluralistic 
liberal societies with respect to religion.  However, comprehensive religious and 
philosophical doctrines are imbued with just as many (if not more) moral resources – 
values, principles, notions of community, fraternity, and justice – that mirror the aims 
and contribute to the interests of liberal democracy than elements that do not.  
Consider The Book of Confessions of the The Presbyterian Church (USA), which 
contains doctrinal statements pertaining to what the church believes.  A sub-section 
entitled Reconciliation in Society communicates the following elements of what I 
consider the denomination’s views on matters pertaining to justice.     
 “In each time and place there are particular problems and crises through which  
 God calls the church to act.  The church…seeks to discern the will of God and 
 learn how to obey in these concrete situations.  The following are particularly 
 urgent at the present time.   
a. The church is called to bring all men to receive and uphold one another as 
persons in all relationships of life: in employment, housing, education, 
leisure, marriage, family, church, and the exercise of political rights…. 
b. God’s reconciliation in Jesus Christ is the ground of the peace, justice, and 
freedom among nations which all powers of government are called to 
serve and defend.  The church, in its own life, is called to practice the 
forgiveness of enemies and to commend to the nations as practical politics 
the search for cooperation and peace….Although nations may serve God’s 
purposes in history, the church which identifies the sovereignty of any one 
nation or any one way of life with the cause of God denies the Lordship of 
Christ and betrays its calling. 
c. The reconciliation of man through Jesus Christ makes it plain that 
enslaving poverty in a world of abundance is an intolerable violation of 
God’s good creation….The church cannot condone poverty, whether it is 
the product of unjust social structures, exploitation of the defenseless, lack 
of national resources, absence of technological understanding, or rapid 
expansion of populations….A church that is indifferent to poverty, or 




only, or expects gratitude for its beneficence makes a mockery of 
reconciliation and offers no acceptable worship to God “(italics mine) 
(Presbyterian Church(USA), 2002). 
    
The PCUSA’s doctrinal beliefs exhibit congruence with “the constitutive ideals of 
liberal democracy.”  They reflect notions of social equality, justice, freedom, and 
charity that the devout are expected to uphold within the political culture seemingly 
as a marker of acceptable worship and faithfulness to God’s purposes.  Insofar as 
these views represent the normative considerations of a particular religion, they (a) 
challenge presuppositions that religion is inherently illiberal and (b) defy assumptions 
that religious beliefs of the illiberal sort are universal.    
 Callan’s pessimism regarding citizen’s ability or willingness to reconcile 
themselves to the fallibility of their deepest convictions, and consequently refrain 
from oppressing others, is what drives his efforts to narrow the scope of what is to 
count as a reasonable doctrine.  “Since when you think for yourself you might reason 
your way to vice, your unconstrained right to reason should be impaired” might be an 
acceptable educational injunction in some more ethically unambiguous world than 
ours.  It does not make good sense in a liberal democratic society composed of robust 
pluralism.  
 Callan’s vision of political education compliments the almost singular focus 
state institutions must place on justice so that citizens can live well together in spite 
of their differences.  However, this focus should not neglect the need citizens possess 
for a coherent conception of the good (at the very least, in order to anchor their 
motivation to treat fellow citizens justly), and the state’s responsibility to protect their 




Regarding the second issue, might there be reasons to doubt Callan’s 
assumption that acceptance of the burdens of judgment is the singular path to 
reciprocity; and that a religious group’s failure to encourage its members to accept the 
burdens fosters intolerance and undermines autonomy?  One reason is that his 
argument ignores the possibility that reciprocity, tolerance, the valuing of an 
autonomous existence, and the virtues required by dialogue might actually be viewed 
as religious commitments by many religious groups.  Unfortunately, the parents in 
Mozert firmly challenge the possibility this could be accurate.  However, groups that 
are not radical fundamentalists represent religious orientations that affirm values that 
contribute to the development of civic virtue.    
An example of which would be moderate or liberal religious groups that 
demonstrate respect for free faith (i.e. the belief that faith should be freely or 
voluntarily chosen) or that hold tolerance as an article of faith.  While there is no 
creed or central authority that speaks for Quakers (The Society of Friends), nor a 
description of beliefs that would be acceptable to all Friends, there exist some basic 
principles that most Quakers adhere to.  One is the belief that all humans are capable 
of direct, unmediated communion with the Divine.  A second is a commitment to 
living out the word of God in a manner that attests to this inward experience.  Outside 
of these principles various branches of the faith interpret the tradition differently.  Yet 
in their effort to “answer that of God in every one” each community, more or less, 
promotes non-coercion and tolerance as religious obligations.   
 “Divine revelation is not confined to the past…..Friends believe that, by the 
 Inner Light, God provides everyone with access to spiritual truth for 
 today….The absence of creeds does not mean that Friends feel that it does not 




 affect behavior.  Friends are people of strong religious views, but they are 
 quite clear that these views must be tested by the way in which they are 
 expressed in action. Many Friends have hesitations about the value of 
 theology, fearing that it too easily leads to speculation and argument. But all 
 would agree that humans, as rational  beings, must think about the nature of 
 their religious experiences. Friends are encouraged to seek for truth in all the 
 opportunities that life presents to them. They are further encouraged to seek 
 new light from whatever source it may arise. Their questing and open attitude 
 to life has certainly contributed to the tolerance with which Friends try to 
 approach people and problems of faith and conduct. This may make it easier 
 to understand how the Religious Society of Friends can accommodate such a 
 range of religious outlooks among its members”(Weening, 1997). 
 
My sense is that Callan associates the certainty an individual attaches to their 
religious beliefs with intolerance and authoritarianism, perhaps assuming that all 
religious beliefs are metaphysical or, if not, at least legitimated in the minds of 
believers singularly upon the authority of God.  He assumes that one’s commitment to 
religious beliefs must be proportionate to the degree of certainty (i.e. the truth value) 
regarding their premises.  But there is no necessary correlation between an 
individual’s commitment to the truth of a belief and authoritarianism.  For some, 
among the religious beliefs held to be certain is the conviction that everyone shares an 
inherent dignity and is deserving of respect.    
 The burdens of judgment only tell us what not to do when a person’s ideas or 
beliefs appear wrong: do not presume that they are stupid or malevolent, even when 
they express those ideas poorly or use abrasive language.43  On the other hand, 
acceptance of the burdens provides no instructions regarding what to do when one 
feels certain that a person is ignorant, malevolent, or obdurate.  The burdens do not 
advise on whether one should, perhaps, look beyond abrasive language or insolent 
attitudes and attempt to discern the possible presence of pain, fear, or some 
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unarticulated virtue another person might feel one’s view on a shared problem puts at 
stake.  To not secure acceptance of the burdens does not automatically result in 
intolerance.  On the other hand, to display tolerance does not mean that acceptance of 
the burdens has been secured.   
 Furthermore, mercy, grace, compassion, forgiveness, and striving for 
reconciliation are rarely mistaken as the aims of political education in public schools.  
They tend to be the harvest of religious training, specifically by groups that affirm the 
preeminence of religious moral values to secular cultural ones.  Does anyone honestly 
believe that religious groups that cultivate these virtues fall beyond the boundaries 
Callan establishes for reasonable pluralism?  I would want a view of reasonableness 
that was able to legitimate the virtue of these religious citizens despite the fact that 
certain of their beliefs could not acquiesce to the burdens of judgment – that is to say, 
to the possibility that reason might lead to an alternative conclusion that is equally as 
credible as their own on some matter.    
  I would like to make one final point and it regards the use of public speech.  
The legitimate use of coercive political power can be achieved when religious 
convictions such as those above have refined the attitudes of believers and inform 
their judgment regarding the proposals they contribute to the construction of an 
overlapping consensus (Rawls & Rawls, 1999; Wolterstorff, 1997).  John Rawls 
(1999) offers what he calls a wide view of public reason.  It focuses less on what 
premises are forbidden during public political discussion and more on honoring the 
duty of civility while communicating moral conceptions that are rooted in one’s 




the beliefs of reasonable doctrines into political discourse.  Among them are because 
(1) the roots of citizens’ allegiance to political values lie in their comprehensive 
doctrines; (2) citizens of faith often desire that their beliefs gain acceptance from a 
broader audience; (3) doing so strengthens ties of civic friendship by fostering a 
mutual granting of the benefit of the doubt, rather than a prejudicial suspicion, about 
one another’s allegiance to the democratic ideals of public reason.44   
Rawls therefore introduces an injunction for public political discussion45 that 
he calls the proviso, which requires that citizens offer one another doctrinal and 
political reasons for supporting whatever basic political values one’s doctrine is said 
to support.   
“Thus, the content of public reason is given by the principles and values of the 
 family of liberal conceptions of justice meeting these conditions. To engage in 
 public reason is to appeal to one of these political conceptions – to their ideals 
 and principles, standards and values – when debating fundamental political 
 questions. This requirement still allows us to introduce into political 
 discussions at any time our comprehensive doctrine, religious or non-religious 
 provided that in due course we give properly public reasons to support the 
 principles and policies our comprehensive doctrine is said to support. I refer to 
 this requirement as the proviso…”(Rawls & Rawls, 1999, 143). 
 
The proviso is to be satisfied during public dialogue about political matters and in 
good faith (with civility).  By this I take Rawls to mean that the speaker must 
communicate to the listener that she is doing her best to avoid coercion – in essence 
to display her allegiance to constitutional norms, despite the presentation of premises 
that cannot be widely accepted at face value.  He believes that doing so cultivates “a 
positive ground”46 for the ideal of public speech to take root.  Provided it is satisfied, 
                                                 
44 Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 153, 155. 
45 Rawls is careful to distinguish communication in the public political culture from that within the 
background culture, with its many forms of non-public reason.   




Rawls claims that the proviso does not compromise any previously established 
standards regarding justification for the use public reason. 
 
Criteria for Judging Religious Associations with respect to Citizenship 
 The discussions of Harry Brighouse, Amy Gutmann and Eamonn Callan allow 
religious groups that are characteristically isolationist and fundamentalist to represent 
the scope of religious devotion. They do so by default and less so through assertion. 
This is primarily because each commenter neglects to discuss cases of religious 
groups holding any other assumptions.   
 Nevertheless, there are several criteria implicit in the above discussions that I 
feel are acceptable, and that can be used to judge proposals for religious education 
with respect to its role in shaping citizens.  My arguments above that respond to these 
discussions are meant to suggest the importance of not formulating such criteria in 
ways that unreasonably suppress religious liberty and freedom of conscience.  But my 
intent has not been to deny that there is an underlying point in each case that must be 
respected.  Moreover, it is not my intent to develop in detail the criteria I will suggest 
below.  I will do this in chapter 5 when I apply them to the prophetic tradition and 
explain how its expression of religious training satisfies them. 
 One criterion that is implicit in these authors’ discussions is that religious 
groups must not attempt to completely shield their members from views that do not 
affirm the truth of their beliefs.47  While it may be reasonable to view parents and 
associations as having the right to be the first voice and the most impressionable 
                                                 
47 The term “completely” is significant here because groups have no special obligation to expose their 




voice in relation to a child’s education, the fact that children are independent beings 
ultimately means that they have a right to make meaningful choices concerning the 
beliefs they could hold and the ways of life they could adopt.  Therefore, views that 
effectively reduce children to being the moral captives of their parents or 
communities, and that reduce them to moral servitude, should be considered 
inadequate.    
 Of utmost concern to all three thinkers is the high probability that the children 
of conservative religious believers are denied fair and meaningful exposure to 
alternative perspectives and ways of life that differ from those of their parents.  Harry 
Brighouse considers this a matter of a priori injustice because it precludes the 
opportunity for children to choose ways of life that might best cohere with their 
internal constitutions.  Amy Gutmann argues that the absence of exposure to 
alternative views undermines the development of the critical reasoning necessary to 
appraise different ways of life and the mutual respect indispensable to democratic 
deliberation.  Children have the right to an education that includes plausible and 
respectful representations of views other than those of the adults who raise them and 
plausible and respectful representations of the reasons these views are held. 
A second criterion implied in the above discussions is that religious groups 
must respect the freedom of conscience of those who hold other religious views or 
who hold none; and therefore must not employ the apparatus of the state either to 
compel others to hold or practice their religion or to compel the state to enforce moral 
conceptions that cannot be justified apart from their religious convictions.  What is 




citizenship are the attitudes they hold with respect to persons who are non-believers.  
What status does their doctrine assign to those who are adherents of other faiths or no 
faith?  This question has much bearing on the degree to which religious believers will 
be willing to respect the political rights of fellow citizens.  This question also reflects 
Eamonn Callan’s focus on reciprocity as funded through acceptance of the burdens of 
judgment.  Religious associations must not shape or encourage an urge to use civil 
law as a means through which one might attempt to have their religious beliefs and 
values permeate every sphere of public and private life.    
A third criterion that I accept implicit in the discussions regards recognizing 
the freedom and equality all human beings share with respect to their status as 
citizens.  While citizenship is not the chief end of life and religious people may not be 
compelled to honor all values of citizenship before their religious convictions, the 
core values of citizenship (reciprocity, tolerance and mutual respect) must be 
honored. Religious people should not hold or act on the view that those who hold 
other convictions are unworthy of fair treatment or equal rights as citizens.   
Coincidentally, these are criteria I would use to judge any private association 
rooted in a comprehensive doctrine, religious or otherwise.  I make no special 
distinction – at least with respect to citizenship – between religious convictions and 
those of any other sort (philosophical, scientific, etc.) regarding how they influence 
behavior in the political dimension of life; more specifically, that dimension which 





 The argumentative thrust of this chapter does not seek to reject the values of 
democratic character or autonomy in any formulation.  Rather this chapter seeks to 
emphasize the importance of the following points.  First, the view of religion 
represented in each author’s discussion is based on examples that are atypical and 
radical.  While there are occasional caveats from these authors that suggest they 
recognize this, there is no discussion of alternative religious orientations holding 
other assumptions.  Consequently, isolationist and fundamentalist religious 
orientations, as embodied by the Old Order Amish and the fundamentalist parents 
represented in Mozert, are permitted to stand for religion by default.  Second, the 
educational proposals of these authors give insufficient weight to the importance of 
freedom of conscience.  Third, arguments that are able to show that religious 
education is inherently inconsistent with the development of democratic character and 
autonomy tend to assert “hard” interpretations of these values, which are themselves 
suspicious.  An example of this is Amy Gutmann’s view of democratic education, 
which seems to view democracy as a kind of comprehensive doctrine in its own right; 
one which has the potential to lead to the oppression and exclusion of religious 
groups.  A “hard” view of autonomy would be one that precluded any authorization 
on the part of parents favoring their own views in the socialization of their children.  
However, if we appeal to “softer” views of democracy and autonomy it becomes far 
less clear that democratic character and autonomy are inconsistent with any but the 




Few religious groups are isolationist as are the Amish.  Many practice 
congregational democracy in their churches.  Most have found reasons to support 
freedom of conscience and many associate this with intellectual openness, believing 
that God does not value faith that is coerced.  Many have theological traditions that 
are associated with the life of the mind (e.g. Thomistic, Aristotelianism).  Most 
importantly, many religious traditions speak eloquently in favor of justice and argue 
that God favors the poor and oppressed.   
There are arguments, based on a reinterpretation of John Rawls, which 
suggest that for very many people religion will be an essential component of their 
support for an overlapping consensus.  The function of these arguments is to 
encourage consideration of religious traditions or orientations that advance an 
alternative vision of citizenship.  My aim is not to restore an aggressive religiosity in 
public schools.  It is to restore respect for the positive contribution of religion in the 
minds of those whose views are biased by Yoder and Mozert; and to illuminate the 
importance of religious private associations in civic and moral education.   
The next few chapters engage in a critical exploration of the religious 
diversity that actually exists across American society and place special focus on one 
expression of it as represented in the prophetic Christian tradition.  The prophetic 
tradition advances a vision of citizenship distinct from that of isolationists and 







Chapter 4: Typology of Religious Belief 
The answer to the question “What implications does religious education have 
for political socialization?” is predicated on a kind of typology of religious belief.  
There is a great deal of diversity within traditions regarding adherents’ orientations 
toward citizenship, not to mention across them.  For example, Catholic, Presbyterian, 
Baptist, and Methodist Christian denominations comprise a broad array of groups; 
some theologically conservative and bordering on fundamentalism, and others whose 
beliefs and practices are so indistinguishably fused with secular culture they fail to 
appear even remotely “religious.”  Each denomination is comprised of groups that 
might represent distinctly different religious beliefs and, more specifically, 
approaches to religious training.  The bearing these varying religious beliefs and 
practices have on citizenship can in no way be generalized.  Nevertheless, I will 
attempt to shed some clarity on the question above by analyzing the attitudes of three 
broad categories of religious believers as they relate to the state.  I place exclusive 
focus on Christian groups as exemplars of these categories.       
Michael McConnell (2000) discusses a condition religious believers confront 
as they attempt to reconcile two identities: one being faithful devotee and the other 
being citizen.  The condition he calls citizenship ambiguity stems from the attempt to 
fulfill dual commitments to both a transcendent and a secular authority.48  McConnell 
believes, then, that religious belief can impact the development of a citizen identity 
                                                 
48 By secular authority I refer not so much to a particular individual per se, but rather to the office that 
vests authority to the individual.  In constitutional regimes the use of that authority is to be in 




due to the presence of conflict between the competing obligations and loyalties 
derived from each source of authority.   
In their role as citizen, religious believers are sometimes required to suppress 
their beliefs when these conflict with civil law or custom.  For example, the liberal 
democratic norm of using secular language when justifying the use of state power 
would view “…because the Bible says so!” as inappropriate justification for enacting 
the laws of the state.  Alternatively, in their role as faithful devotee, believers are 
often compelled to champion the truths of their faith such that those truths might win 
greater social influence in what they may view as a morally decadent and spiritually 
impoverished world.  Yet, it is not always clear how one is to interpret religious 
commands.  Under any unique social circumstances a believer may be left in a 
quandary about how to, for example, reconcile the religious commands to submit 
himself to the governing authorities – because “there is not authority except that 
which God has established” (Romans 13:1), and to obey God rather than man (Acts 
5:29).  Believers experience citizenship ambiguity precisely because they feel an 
obligation to be good citizens, albeit while being faithful to the theological tenets of 
their faith. 
McConnell implies that the tension that results from an attempt to balance 
religious and civic allegiances is by no means present in the psychological life of all 
believers.  He argues that this is because civil law and vast majority of religious 
commands do not necessarily conflict, but rather are often mutually reinforcing.  
 
“Much depends on the nature of the religion and of the state.  Religions that 
 place few nonspiritual demands on their adherents, or whose cultural and 




 will create relatively few conflicts.  Governments that confine themselves to 
 the few essential functions necessary to peace and good order will generate 
 fewer conflicts than governments active in the educational, cultural, and moral 
 lives of their citizens” (McConnell, 2000, 91-92). 
 
Basically, McConnell seems to be implying two things: one having to do with a 
doctrine’s compatibility with a society’s prevailing (and potentially morally corrupt) 
cultural values, and the other having to do with a doctrine’s congruency with the 
political principles (principles of justice) underpinning civic law.  He seems to be 
suggesting that citizenship ambiguity is avoided when a group’s religious 
commitments are aligned with the morality expressed through the prevailing values 
animating secular culture (e.g., materialism, individualism, competition, paternalism, 
consumption); or when liberal democratic governments resist any expression of de 
facto establishment.   
But if this is McConnell’s view it cannot be completely accurate.  Citizenship 
ambiguity can be faced by all but one type of believer: one who cannot reconcile his 
or her religious moral commitments with the political values and principles 
underpinning civil law.  This sort of believer would, in effect, lack the motivation to 
be a good citizen because he or she disavows the criteria by which good citizens are 
measured.  In America this amounts to liberal democratic virtue.   
Believers who are capable of reconciling their religious moral commitments 
with liberal democratic political principles might nevertheless face citizenship 
ambiguity in cases where their convictions conflict with dominant cultural values 
(despite the fact that cultural values cannot formally be considered requirements of 
liberal citizenship).  This is because the prevailing values of a given culture – its ethos 




an American is (which, coincidentally, is the stereotype that non-Americans around 
the globe, particularly the Muslim world, generally accept as accurate for all US 
citizens).  The conflating of this “American identity” (so much a reflection of 
dominant cultural values) with citizenship (most accurately defined by commitments 
that are “constitutional”) is, in essence, the source of the ambiguity for these 
believers.49  Furthermore, they find themselves surrounded by fellow citizens morally 
undisturbed by the degree to which many of the prevailing cultural values impair the 
pursuit for genuine justice.  Consequently, some religious believers find themselves 
in a quandary wondering just how, as a religious citizen, they might responsibly 
address such conditions in a manner that is faithful to both liberal principles as well 
as to their conscience.   
Consider also the emphasis many religions place on social justice.  Even 
thoroughly secularized believers, if they honor this value, must decide whether and to 
what degree dominant cultural values might oppress and enslave, and, consequently, 
how to respond when they do.  “[T]he problem for the religious person in liberal 
society is not to see if justice…is consistent with the picture of the good life taught by 
the faith.  It is rather to see whether liberal ideals such as respect for persons, the 
equal protection of the laws, and the separation of church and state provide suitable 
interpretations of views already held.  Sometimes the issue may be one of 
translatability” (Strike, 2001b).  
                                                 
49 I believe John F. Kennedy may have been addressing this very phenomenon when he once said, 
“War will exist until that distant day when the conscientious objector enjoys the same reputation and 
prestige that the warrior does today.”  The true meaning of citizenship is severely threatened when 
dissent is associated with disloyalty and unqualified devotion as the only acceptable expression of 




Ronald Thiemann (2000) coined the term “pilgrim citizen” in an attempt to 
capture the interaction between religious convictions and civic obligations.  He uses 
this term not so much to describe the experience of ambiguity, but rather to describe 
believers who have come to recognize the penultimate nature of the temporal world 
and their appointment as ambassadors of a ubiquitous kingdom that is both present 
and to come.  He argues that pilgrim citizens do not, however, endorse any divinely 
mandated political model of government.   
“Religious persons bring a set of fundamental convictions and orienting 
principles to public debate, but the application of the resources of faith can 
only be determined in each particular situation.  Religious convictions and 
principles may provide a basic framework within which policy reflection takes 
place for the believer, but those resources do not determine choices in the 
public realm.  People of faith, then, should function in a democratic society as 
“connected critics”” (Thiemann, 2000, 85). 
 
Although he feels that all believers should function as connected critics in society, 
clearly not all will.  However, connected critics are able to sustain their commitment 
to the state even in the midst of being critical of it.  It is very likely that believers of 
this sort indeed interpret liberal ideals as an acceptable instantiation of their religious 
ideals.  Therefore, in light of the orienting principles common to both the political 
conception of justice and their faith, the force of their critique “serves to call a 
community back to its better nature” while at the same time affirms what they view as 
God’s moral ideal (Thiemann, 2000).  Thiemann seems to think religious believers 
are quite certain about which authority claims their ultimate allegiance, just as they 
can be about in which areas their political attitudes are at odds with their religious 




 There are two main points I would like to extract from these author’s views.  
It would seem that citizenship ambiguity has little to do with any difficulty believers 
experience regarding where to place their loyalty or allegiance, but instead has to do 
with: (1) the perceived degree of compatibility between the dominant political and 
cultural values of secular society and those endorsed by the believer’s comprehensive 
doctrine; and (2) how believers translate (behaviorally) their theologically inspired 
obligation to rectify any gap they perceive between the two.50  Nancy Rosenblum 
provides a range of religious orientations that illustrate how believers negotiate these 
two tasks.   
Nancy Rosenblum (2000) highlights three broad expressions of religious 
belief by discussing a political orientation she calls “integralism.”  Rosenblum 
describes integralism as a challenge to democratic government in the name of faith.  
She argues that it is motivated by a sense of dualism religious believers experience, 
resulting from their attempt to honor the mandates of religious law and authority 
within a public culture that does not often mirror their faith.  “At its heart is a sense of 
alienation, or a falling off from unity, which comes from being “forced” to live what 
is described as the divided life of believer and citizen” (Rosenblum, 2000, 15).   
As defined, integralism incorporates both believers who have reconciled their 
beliefs with civil law as well as those who have not because they feel the two are 
incommensurable – either politically and/or culturally.  Each type feels a sense of 
alienation from the public culture insofar that the society, to varying degrees, is 
permissive of values that not only violate religious belief but places demands on them 
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of these groups towards secular culture and political engagement has to do with their distinct 




as citizens that are theologically unsettling.  For example, in light of their private 
religious convictions about homosexuality some believers express moral doubt about 
the legalization of gay marriage, even though politically they believe all citizens, 
being free and equal, are entitled to the right to marry who they love.   
  Integralism encompasses a broad range of religious attitudes that seek a 
religiously integrated existence.  A common feature is a preoccupation with repairing 
fragmentation and restoring personal moral and political wholeness.  Rosenblum lists 
a range of religious attitudes that circumscribe three principal groups.   
Religious integralists of at least one principal type desire to see their faith and 
values reflected in every sphere of public and private life.  They exhibit religious 
attitudes consistent with what has come to be associated with fundamentalism.  “We 
associate these demands of faith with desecularization, antimodernism, or a pervasive 
rejection of the profane world, and with the characterization of secular democracy as 
atheistic and nihilist” (Rosenblum, 2000, 15).  Rosenblum believes this attitude 
reflects the strongest form of integralism because it conflates discipleship and 
citizenship.  It does not seek to disassociate religious commands and state authority.  
Because these believers insist that “religious commands are the supreme law, cover 
every aspect of life, are binding on everyone in society,” (Rosenblum, 2000, 15) they 
likely reject concepts like free faith.51 
This conservative integralist attitude detects a severe degree of 
incommensurability between the values endorsed by their doctrine and those of 
secular culture (and perhaps even some of its civil laws).  Consequently, believers of 
this sort can become isolationists in an attempt to insulate themselves and their 
                                                 




children from corrupt “worldly” or secular forces.  Hence they risk autonomy and 
largely reject any sense of political solidarity with citizens not of their faith.  A 
plausible portrayal of these believers is expressed by Spinner-Halev when he 
discusses parents that object to their children’s exposure to the antagonistic elements 
of society:  
“Parents who object to this exposure, and who believe that the sacred 
permeates everything, and want their children taught accordingly, will not 
receive satisfaction in the public schools.  Their objection is not only to 
evolution, but to the idea of a secular education, even one that accommodates 
religion.  These parents, and not all religious conservatives are like these 
parents, have to turn to parochial schools or home-schooling to have their 
children taught as they would like” (Spinner-Halev, 2000a, 86).  
 
Mirroring Kymlicka’s (2000) “isolationist religious groups”, they generally avoid 
political participation.  But not all disavow responsibility for the larger society.  To 
the degree they are politically active they are to some extent allied with conservative 
political causes that reflect their theological conservatism.  Conservative integralists 
that feel a theological obligation to rectify the gap between secular and religious 
commitments often translate it in a manner that displays little respect for inclusivism.  
“This form of integralism encourages (though it does not entail) establishment” 
(Rosenblum, 2000, 20).      
A second principle type of religious integralist subscribes to beliefs less 
overtly entrenched in moral absoluteness or authoritarianism, however they do hold 
strong religious convictions.  Rosenblum suggests that these integralists seek moral 
regeneration through faith, and contend that religious associational life strengthens 
moral conduct and cultivates moral dispositions that advance the public welfare.  




calculations of individual self-interest with moral relations” (Rosenblum, 2000, 16).  
Believers whose principal interest is moral regeneration view religious tenets as 
intrinsically valuable, particularly with respect to solving social problems, because of 
their greater moral authority, vitality, and legitimacy.  Rosenblum explains: 
“Believers do not always insist that morality is impossible without religion, 
but they do insist that religious belief and association strengthen moral 
conduct and compensate for the failures of secular values, institutions, and 
authorities….For religion to provide meaning and moral guidance the sphere 
of religious authority over adherents must be broadened, and religious 
community and identity must be strengthened….The emphasis is on religious 
exceptionalism rather than functional equivalence to other social groups” 
(Rosenblum, 2000, 17).  
 
The stress this integralist attitude places on strengthening moral dispositions and on 
moral regeneration expresses a desire to fulfill more of a subsidiary role to the state 
by satisfying ethical needs that would make governmental institutions seem 
suspiciously biased if they sought to address them in like manner.  In fact, they might 
assume that the moral inferiority of secular values would make any attempt by the 
state largely futile.  These believers are likely to feel that their role is most effectively 
fulfilled by operating their own independent institutions (including schools in some 
cases), and by soliciting governmental support in the form of selective legal 
exemptions and subsidies. 
 This sort of integralist levies sharp critiques against the pervasiveness of 
individualistic, self-interested calculations in general moral relations.  Their desire to 
circumscribe the sphere of religious influence over their own adherents is evidence of 
a biblical worldview filtering their encounter with secular culture in a manner that 
clearly seeks to distinguish them from it.  Yet, this worldview encourages their 




rejuvenation on a micro level rather than state “conversion” on a macro societal level. 
The global evangelical ministry of Billy Graham epitomizes them quite well, given 
his apolitical agenda and emphasis on personal virtue.   
 Presumably, moral regenerators do not advance a radical offensive against the 
social institutions of society.  Their platform is more sublime and accommodating; 
providing individuals with moral resources that improve their character, but that may 
not necessarily de-familiarize their social context to the extent that they experience 
any arresting incommensurability between the moral values that buttress their 
theology and many of the political values buttressing civic law.  These believers view 
secular values, institutions, and authorities as failing society to a great degree because 
they lack the appropriate substance to effectively address the moral defects of society.  
Moral regenerators’ critique of secular values points more to the limitations of those 
values rather than to their corruptness.   
Secular theorists see these believers as “safe” largely because they view them 
as having accommodated their religious convictions to the modern world.  They have 
made scripture a series of metaphors for a liberal political outlook.  “Advocates of a 
publicly endorsed moralizing role for religion assume a felicitous congruence 
between religious and democratic values” (Rosenblum, 2000, 17).  Their primary 
approach to rectifying the gap between secular and religious values is through 
enhancing or enriching the quality of social relations “from below”, by cultivating 
moral dispositions that transfer to the civic arena and improve public welfare.                          
 The third integralist attitude is strikingly similar to the second insofar that it 




uniqueness of this attitude is evident in its lone inclination to, at the very least, 
encourage active engagement in civic affairs.  Rosenblum claims that these religious 
integralists assume a priority of responsibility over rights and entitlements, thereby 
envisioning a distinctly civic role for religion.  They oppose political passivity.  Their 
integralism is expressed through efforts to help citizens overcome the sense of 
intimidation that inhibits public involvement and to generate civic participation in 
ways that offset inequality of resources.  Such efforts are sustained on the basis of an 
appeal to their religious convictions.   
 
“[C]ivic integralists encourage political engagement, often via religious 
associations, on religious terms….They may or may not adhere to the strict 
norms of theorists of deliberative democracy for whom political beliefs rooted 
in religious doctrine should be expressed in ways that advance ‘ecumenical 
political dialogue’ and proceeds from common political 
principles….[R]eligious groups perform classic liberal democratic functions 
when they enter political arenas self-defensively to insure toleration, publicize 
and resist oppression, protect the weak against powerful elites, curb careless 
and arbitrary exercises of power.  They have always been vital checks on 
government” (Rosenblum, 2000, 19). 
 
Groups like the Society of Friends (Quakers) and the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference led by Martin Luther King, Jr. during the height of the Civil Rights 
Movement epitomize this type of civil integralist.  Similarly, the Liberation Theology 
movement, expressed in both African-American and Latin American contexts, 
articulates a distinct view of God’s orientation toward humankind and an 
interpretation of Christian theology in relation to political life through the perspective 
of the poor and oppressed. 
Their objective is political (ethical) wholeness.  In this sense their biblical 




and state authority (discipleship and citizenship).  At the same time their world view 
might be thought of as an expression of orthodoxy because it is sufficiently 
distinguishable from penultimate modern values, and because they view it as 
authoritative in the sense that the implications of its truth erect moral norms (usually 
justice centered) that they feel should be binding on everyone in society.  The 
worldview of civil integralists does not merely promote a communitarian vision of the 
moral order that is to exist within the faith community – values to be honored simply 
between members.  It is also a moral vision of social reality that promotes a vision of 
justice and civic virtue expressing ethical norms that are to govern social life in public 
and private.   
The emphasis Rosenblum claims civil integralists place on rights and 
entitlements, resisting oppression, asymmetrical power relationships, and the abuse of 
power seems to express an earnest, almost singular, commitment to a biblical view of 
social justice.  “The appeal of these churches is precisely their ability to eliminate the 
disjuncture between daily immersion in racism and conspiracism on the one side and 
typical Sunday services preaching unity on the other” (Rosenblum, 2000, 20).  Any 
incompatibility civil integralists perceive between their comprehensive doctrine and a 
society’s dominant cultural values would appear to have less to do with the content of 
a fair and reasonable political conception of justice (they seem capable of translating 
their religious moral beliefs in a ways that interpret secular moral values as roughly 
equivalent), but more to do with bias with regard to how the political conception of 
justice is interpreted and implemented in the public sphere.  Civil integralists view 




the gap between what the dominant society professes and what it practices by 
sustaining an active and engaged political voice that challenges conventional 
assumptions about social reality. 
 My primary concern is with this third group of religious believers and their 
posture toward the state.  Whether one calls them the “progressively orthodox” or 
“civil integralists” is of less importance than what, theologically, informs their 
particular orientation toward citizenship reconciliation and the educational 
implications of their beliefs with respect to the moral obligations of citizenship.   
 The prophetic tradition within the Judeo-Christian faith most resembles the 
characteristics Rosenblum attaches to the third type of religious integralists.  This 
tradition is not isolationist.  Although it seeks engagement with the secular world, it 
also seeks to be prophetic in the sense that it has a message to announce that stands in 
judgment of the world.  This message has at least three components: (1) the demand 
for social justice; (2) an emphasis on the decadent values of modern societies; and (3) 
a call to repentance.          
The Prophetic Tradition in Christianity 
“For too long now we have been satisfied with a very unprophetic, popular 
interpretation of the Bible that has comforted the comfortable and left the 
oppressed to their oppressors….The Bible, however, is a document that stands 
solidly on the side of evenhanded justice and equality” (Hanson, 1996, 1).  
 
The oppression and exploitation produced by social hierarchy, and generously 
supported by the rigid legalism of the Jewish aristocracy, were the primary targets of 
the ministry of the biblical Jesus.  During his time, like our own, the lower one’s 




likely one would be deprived of the sustenance necessary for basic physical, 
psychological, and spiritual survival.  His concern was human wholeness, and he 
sought to provide an opportunity for redemption to those who the religious and 
political elite overlooked; an opportunity that would not depend upon an evaluation of 
one’s social status.  This has been described as his “preferential option for the poor.”   
To the biblical Jesus, the ethical mandates of Hebrew law provided a 
sufficient response to these concerns and his means of implementing that response 
was by reinvigorating a radical conception of equality and social justice.  His 
orientation provided a model for the early Christian church, and one that connected to 
a political orientation already present within Judaism.  The “prophetic” (Mosaic) and 
the “royal” (Davidic) traditions represent two discernable political orientations in the 
Hebrew bible that reflect a tension within ancient Israelite theology.  The primary 
difference between the two orientations rests upon how each understands Yahweh’s 
relationship to humanity as a whole. 
The prophetic tradition views Yahweh as liberator of the poor and oppressed, 
and as expressing a paramount concern for social justice.  Its origins are located in the 
exilic experiences of the Hebrew people as characterized in the book of Exodus.  The 
understanding of Yahweh as liberator is derived from biblical portrayals of his 
liberating acts directed toward those enslaved in Egypt and the subsequent covenantal 
relationship Yahweh establishes with that community.  “[E]arly Yahwistic tradition 
recalled a historical drama in which Yahweh, in defiance of earthly potentates, 
embraced the cause of the most lowly of the earth and of them made a nation chosen 




period of exile, Yahweh’s prophets not only attack physical bondage but also the 
existence of idolatry within any culture whose allegiance to a foreign deity and whose 
perception of reality undermined the freedom of Yahweh’s chosen people.  “This 
divine partiality does not mean a lack of love for other people, but a concern to 
overcome social injustice and thus bring about a society in which all people are 
equally respected as bearer’s of God’s image” (De Gruchy, 1995, 11).      
Conversely, the royal tradition developed concurrently with the Davidic 
monarchy in Jerusalem.  According to this tradition, Yahweh upholds a privileged, 
quasi-deified leader from a chosen nation for the sake of maintaining earthly 
kingship.  The social hierarchy this structure established was interpreted as a divinely 
justified monarchical structure appropriate for the larger society.  “Basically, the 
system from which the Hebrews had been liberated and which their descendants saw 
reimplanting itself in Israel was a social pyramid with the deity at the top, followed 
by the divine king, and then in a progressive descent moving through the social 
classes to the slaves at the bottom” (Hanson, 1996, 7).  What is important to note is 
that the centralized structures of the monarchy were strategically beneficial to the 
Israelites with respect to external threats from enemy nations and for responding to 
the sinfulness of the people (Hanson, 1996).  However, a history of self-aggrandizing 
and arrogant kings clearly revealed that all forms of government and societal 
institutions, even the monarchy, are flawed, particularly when they do not grant 
justice and dignity equitably to all people regardless of status.        
The prophetic tradition adamantly rejects any monarchical structure.  Instead, 




social ideal.  In contrast to the royal tradition in which access to political authority is 
determined by birth, the prophetic tradition insists that communities elect their ruler 
by way of God’s guidance, which is slightly different from God delineating a specific 
pool of potential candidates.  This orientation places more emphasis on persona over 
pedigree.  The elected ruler would not regard himself as being intrinsically superior to 
his followers (Deuteronomy 17:14-20) – in essence, denying any hereditary claims to 
kingship – but would instead regard all humans as created in the image of God.   
Foundational to Christianity is a metaphysical conception of the person which 
suggests that humanity is created in the likeness of God, or in God’s image (Genesis 
1:27).  The Latin term imago dei defines this idea.  The term signifies a fundamental 
commonness humanity shares at the moment of creation; suggesting that on some 
basic level all humans are equal.  “The fact that humanity is created in the image of 
God is widely regarded as establishing the original uprightness and dignity of human 
nature” (McGrath, 2001).  Despite the evident diversity across humanity with respect 
to ability and status, from a Christian perspective all persons are the object of God’s 
redemptive grace because every person is considered equally worthy.  Specifically 
from a prophetic stance, the scope of God’s salvation incorporates everyone, and no 
one community is especially favored or excluded.  This notion of human equality and 
human dignity has given rise to a fervent egalitarian impulse within the prophetic 
tradition.     
This egalitarian impulse in the prophetic tradition is reflected in what is called 




by priests influenced by the prophetic tradition.52  The code places primary focus on 
the significance of the covenant established by God with the Israelite community at 
Sinai (as it preserves ancient customs from the days before the monarchy) as well as 
King Josiah’s religious and political reforms.   
“Central to the Deuteronomic reforms were economic concerns.  Under the 
monarchy, the egalitarian social ideals of the prophets were continually 
threatened, not least through burdensome taxation and the confiscation of land 
in lieu of the repayment of debts.  Thus the Deuteronomic code called on 
Israel to emulate Yahweh’s concern for the poor, oppressed, widows, orphans, 
and other victims of society….Tsedādah, social righteousness or justice, was 
‘the barometer of the health of society’….Laws and their administration were 
subject to the higher law of social righteousness, which meant, in effect, 
ensuring that the structures of society were themselves just” (Italics mine) (De 
Gruchy, 1995, 43-44).   
 
Deuteronomy seeks to make God’s covenanting kingdom concrete.   
Walter Brueggemann (1987) considers Deuteronomy not simply the 
legislation of Israel’s economic and political concerns.  He argues that it represents 
the social imagination of a wilderness inhabiting liberated community governed by 
Yahweh rather than the gods of Canaan.  It is an alternative shaping of human life in 
new modes; faithful to the experience of Exodus and according to the will of 
Yahweh, Lord of the covenant.53  Obedience to the requirements of the covenant 
assured God’s benevolence and favor.  Moreover, fulfilling the commitments of the 
code entailed the incorporation of political concerns.  Of them, the just treatment of 
all persons, despite their lineage and economic status, was critical.   
                                                 
52 On this point Michael Walzer writes: “The precise relation of Deuteronomy to the prophetic 
movement is a subject of ongoing scholarly debate.  Did the prophets influence the Deuteronomic 
writers, or the writers the prophets?  It seems likely that influence worked in both directions and in 
ways that we shall never wholly understand” (Walzer, 1996, 25).    




One of the chief effects of the Deuteronomic code was to provoke the 
community to initiate an ongoing appraisal of social injustice and oppression, 
although the Israelites did not always honor the terms of the code.  The prevalence of 
the hierarchical and paternalistic customs endorsed by supporters of the royal 
orientation placed the Jewish prophetic tradition in the position of underdog with 
respect to exerting much social influence.  The prophetic orientation represents a 
strand of Judaism expressly concerned about political and social issues, including 
those external to the faith community, because of its emphasis on oppression and 
social justice.       
The concern for social justice and the hope for a transformed world expressed 
in the prophetic tradition undoubtedly affected the New Testament.  The ministry of 
the biblical Jesus, and the subsequent religious movement that developed after him, 
must be located within the prophetic tradition.  Within the biblical narrative one 
discovers Jesus fixing his focus toward the needs of the oppressed, considering 
wealth a danger to the soul, and opposing the Jewish priestly aristocracy who 
represented the dominant ecclesiastical forces of his day (De Gruchy, 1995).   
Following Jesus’ death early primitive Christians co-opted the term ekklēsia 
from common parlance and transformed its meaning to reflect their identity as gadfly 
to the larger society.  The term was commonly used to describe an association of 
citizens formed to execute some particular civic responsibility.  It therefore tended to 
be a political term applicable to a range of associations within civil society.   
Hellenistic Christians wanted it to signify them as God’s chosen people.  They 




of other voluntary private groups that restricted membership only to those of similar 
social status.  The Christian ekklēsia, in contrast, considered itself a universal 
community of equals comprised of local congregations of converts drawn from all 
segments of society.  The infant Christian church was likely diversified by ethnicity 
as well as by class.  “For Hellenistic Christians it would have suggested an analogy to 
the secular assembly of citizens, with the implication that Christians had a 
responsibility to ensure not only that their own community, but also wider society 
was well governed (I Corinthians 6:2)” (De Gruchy, 1995, 51).  A commitment to 
conscience and to a higher moral law demanded civic engagement and, ultimately, 
dissent in situations where public culture was thought to be in violation of God’s 
moral order.  Due to its growth and public influence the ekklēsia “was increasingly 
perceived as a rival socio-political institution, another centre of power, which made 
absolute and universal claims in the name of God” (De Gruchy, 1995, 51).     
Having located the source of the prophetic tradition, it will be easier to 
understand the primary function of prophecy and the social criticism expressed 
through prophetic Christian witness within both the biblical narrative and present 
modern society.  In Prophecy and Social Criticism (1996) Michael Walzer attempts 
to understand the function of prophecy as a social practice.  He essentially argues that 
prophecy is a unique form of inspired communication that arouses remembrance of 
some commonly understood morality.  The traditional method by which the prophet 
fulfills this function is through some form of contextual social criticism of the 
particular practices of a particular group.  Walzer adds that the primary aim of 




behavior are often communicated) but rather sustaining the moral health of a 
covenantal community as an organic whole.           
Walzer argues that the efficacy of the prophet’s message depends upon the 
background of a common moral theology.  He posits that a strong, disinterested lay 
religiosity within a community – synonymous with a covenantal doctrine, or political 
values expressed through a social contract in a secular constitutional regime – 
sustains a culture of faith and argument upon which the prophet’s message is 
comprehensible.  Walzer describes this doctrinal background as a “normative account 
of the informal and unpriestly culture of prayer and argument” (Walzer, 1996, 25).  In 
Israel’s covenant theology, the source of that doctrine is found in Deuteronomic 
writings.  Whatever its source in a given community, the principles endorsed through 
this common moral theology are an engrained element of ordinary discourse; 
something against which the prophet takes for granted his words can be immediately 
understood and accepted (Lindblom, 1962).   
However, it is important to remember the historical position of the prophetic 
tradition within ancient Israel.  The prophet represented a minority voice in a social 
world that largely identified with an opposing set of values and institutions.  
Furthermore, the royal ideology of kingship often held sway.  As Paul Hanson states, 
gemeinschaft and gesellschaft were coextensive (Hanson, 1996).  Located within a 
distinct sphere of power yet integrated in society, Old Testament prophets stood 
outside the sphere of mainstream authority and issued harsh critiques from a 




worldview.  Although their perspective was a cultural and political underdog, it was 
still widely known and understood. 
For this reason, the message of the prophets is fundamentally pragmatic.  In 
many ways, Walzer argues, the prophetic message communicates nothing radically 
new but instead builds upon previous messages that fund obedience to a morality 
contrary to the present ordering of social reality.  Walzer uses the prophet Amos as a 
paradigmatic example of a “peripheral” prophet54 who, in his critique, invokes a 
particular moral law against religious customs and social norms.  Because the 
prophets were also members of the societies they addressed, they translated and 
revised the vision so that it was sensitive to the dynamic conditions of their particular 
contexts.  But the authenticity of the original covenantal doctrine was never lost.  
Hanson suggests that prophecy is ontologically grounded, which forces it to make 
pronouncements within concrete and often ambiguous situations.55  Walzer explains 
further: 
“First, there is no prophetic utopia, no account…of the “best” political or 
religious regime, a regime free from history, located anywhere and 
nowhere….They are not religious adepts or mystics; they never advocate 
asceticism or world-rejection….Utopian speculation and world-rejection are 
two forms of escape from particularism….The prophetic argument, by 
contrast, is that this people must live in this way” (Walzer, 1996, 29). 
 
The prophets endorse no final or universal version of their vision.  The prophet need 
only show the people their own hearts and judge their attitudes and dealings with one 
                                                 
54 One outside the dominant political structure and critical of its interests and institutions (Hanson, 
1996). 
55 This is the primary reason that civil integralists (Rosenblum, 2000) are not isolationists.  They desire 
to remain integrated and engaged in secular society in order to develop adequate responses to its 




another.  Their audience already knows the commandments – those principles of the 
background common moral theology.   
Given that the prophet’s audience is already aware of the moral standards 
being defended, what exactly is the content of the prophetic message?  What is the 
central target of its criticism?  The intersection between human and divine authority, 
and consequently, the shaping of social reality, is the focus of the prophetic message.   
As was stated earlier, the primary aim of prophecy is sustaining the moral 
health of the covenantal community as an organic whole.  Any deficiency in the 
functioning of one organ threatens the health of the entire body.  Prophetic voices 
focus on social injustice and the welfare of the poor and oppressed – those whose 
marginalized status has come to be viewed as justified and is acceptable to greater 
society.  Prophetic social criticism then, continuing the example set by Yahweh 
during Israel’s exile, seeks to preserve the intrinsic value of every person regardless 
of their social status.  The prophet begins by assessing the condition of those John 
Dominic Crossan describes as being deliberately squeezed out as human junk from 
the social system’s own evil operations (Crossan, 1994).  But the prophet also 
understands that a defective and unhealthy ethos indirectly oppresses the privileged as 
well.     
Walzer explains how prophecy attempts to make a distinction between piety 
and doing what is “right” by suggesting that ritual observance alone falls short of 
what God requires. 
 
“[T]he power of a prophet…derives from his ability to say what oppression 
means, how it is experienced, in this time and place, and to explain how it is 




to make about oppression and religious observance, and it is one of his chief 
arguments: that it is entirely possible to trample upon the poor and to observe 
the Sabbath.  And from this he concludes that the laws against oppression take 
precedence over the Sabbath laws” (Italics mine) (Walzer, 1996, 34).   
 
 
Additionally, the prophet Micah wrote:  
 
“Will the LORD be pleased with thousands of rams,  
with ten thousand rivers of oil?   
Shall I offer my firstborn for my transgression,  
the fruit of my body for the sin of my soul? 
 
 He has showed you, O man, what is good. 
And what does the LORD require of you? 
To act justly and to love mercy 
 and to walk humbly with your God. (Micah 5:7,8) 
 
In oblique, systemic, and structural conditions of oppression, injustice often wears a 
mask of acceptability, normalcy, or even necessity (Crossan, 1994).  The prophet’s 
central critique is that the prevailing cultural values of a given society cause many to 
suffer unnecessarily within a system that views their fate as appropriate.  This is not 
merely the result of illegitimate hierarchies that estrange humans from one another, 
but it is also due to erroneously elevating the letter of the law above the spirit of it.   
 A rigid legalism regarding rules and regulations abets oppression and injustice 
as effectively as social inequalities rooted in class, culture, race, and gender.  Upon 
being chastised for gathering food on the Jewish day of rest, Jesus reminds the 
Pharisees that the Sabbath was made for man, and not man for the Sabbath (Mark 
2:27).  Legalism against love, or judgment against reconciliation, seems to be the 
obscured source of error for the prevailing culture of most societies.  Shrewdly 




The legitimating powers controlling social reality communicate to some that 
they are inferior and insignificant and effectively deny their humanity.  This 
oppression violates Yahweh’s covenantal standards, which convey that all are created 
free, equal and in God’s image.  The prophetic orientation enables one to perceive 
subtle yet systematic assaults against human dignity that stem from hegemonic 
expressions of illegitimate authority a given society views as normal.  “If that purpose 
(to remind the people of their moral commitments) is not served, then the ceremonies 
are of no use; less than no use.  For they generate among rich and avaricious Israelites 
a false sense of security – as if they were safe from divine wrath” (Walzer, 1996, 32).   
 The prophetic Christian tradition is a tradition of attitudes and practices that 
evoke the remembrance of a set of (covenantal) values and standards.  It also reveals 
how, by neglect or intent, a person or community violates that standard, often despite 
the appearance of faithful adherence to it.  The prophetic Christian message, in fact, 
has two principle foci.  One is the axis of temporal power that governs the shaping of 
social reality in human institutions (and the residual oppression which results when 
such structures are illegitimate).  A second is the rigid enforcement of the law.   
 The tradition is rooted in a radical conception of life and personhood that is 
buttressed by an egalitarian impulse.  That egalitarian impulse advances a belief in the 
“absolute equality of people that denies the validity of any discrimination between 
them and negates the necessity of any hierarchy among them” (Crossan, 1994, 71).  
The radical conception of life, or worldview, it endorses is critical of oppressive 




Ultimately the tradition seeks to reconcile the gap between a society’s prevailing 












Chapter 5:  Christianity, the Political Dimension, and 
Citizenship 
  
 While some critiques of religion turn on the assumption that a strong 
commitment to one’s religious beliefs equates to authoritarian behavior, what this 
particular view overlooks is the possibility that mainline and left-leaning believers 
possess a sense of responsibility for the health of the greater society and for fulfilling 
the obligations of citizenship as a function of their religious convictions.  I will 
illuminate a few doctrinal sources of this type of conviction within Christianity and 
then discuss the implications the prophetic tradition has with respect to citizenship.  
The Bible is the most popular source to which Christians appeal for guidance 
on political issues, especially regarding a suitable posture toward worldly affairs and, 
specifically, whether believers should forsake some or all civic obligations.  
However, exegetical disparity precludes any consensus among Christians on these 
concerns.  There is no more of a consensus within Christendom concerning the 
interpretation of scripture with respect to the civic demands of faith than there is 
among political theorists concerning the interpretation of the Constitution with 
respect to religious accommodation.  One theologian notes, “There are in fact 
different Christianities, and different ways in which the gospel is understood and 
related to the world.  Confessional and denominational differences clearly affect the 
ways in which churches participate in the political arena” (De Gruchy, 1995, 10).  
According to Nancy Rosenblum, ongoing internal appraisal of religious traditions 
within faith communities is the cause of “divergent interpretations of religious 




militant to passive to rebellious….Christianity and the church are a complex 
phenomena.  It is important, therefore, not to indulge in sweeping generalizations, nor 
to assume that there is Christian unanimity on the issues at hand”(Rosenblum, 2000, 
8).   
Much of what the bible offers relative to influencing believers’ deference to 
secular rulers or their participation in secular affairs amounts to isolated verses that 
basically acknowledge the importance of both.  What I will do in the following 
paragraphs is discuss three random, though popular, biblical verses that I feel hang 
together relatively well to help illuminate these points.     
To begin, an often cited verse concerning the church and the state is found in 
the New Testament gospels.  It is Jesus’s famous admonition to “give to the emperor 
the things that are the emperor’s, and to God the things that are God’s.”56  In this 
verse Jesus is responding to antagonists attempting to entrap him into expressing open 
contempt for Caesar.  Of note is the fact that they are concerned with an issue that 
still troubles some believers in our time: whether and how one ought to balance 
deference to political authorities and give honor God (who most believers consider 
the focal point of ultimate allegiance).  Jesus’s response in no way addresses all of the 
peculiar “muddles” confronting believers who attempt to honor the obligations of 
citizenship and the demands of faith.  However, it does provide ample room and 
encouragement for believers to satisfy the duties that comprise citizenship.  At the 
same time, by directing believers to also give to God what is God’s (which I suppose 
includes one’s commitment to sacred moral mandates), Jesus’s response erects 
boundaries regarding what believers may consider impermissible according to 
                                                 




conscience.  Ultimately, I assume few churches struggle with communicating to their 
members that God should be granted their ultimate allegiance and that government 
laws do not trump God’s laws.   
Second, the Old Testament book of Jeremiah includes a letter attributed to the 
prophet that is addressed to Jews exiled in Babylon – a foreign culture and 
community.  God, through Jeremiah, tells the Jews to seek the welfare of the city into 
which they have been exiled and to pray in its behalf.57  The explanation provided in 
the verse is fairly straightforward: there is a reciprocal relationship between the 
welfare of the city – its ethical, economic, and physical state – and the prosperity of 
the faithful.         
Third, in the book of Romans one finds more specific statements regarding 
civic duty (citizenship) than those credited to Jesus above in the gospels.  In fact these 
statements can be viewed as extending the remarks in Luke chapter 20 and also 
complimenting the theme of interrelated fate shared between believers and the secular 
society that is expressed in Jeremiah.  The book of Romans is actually a letter to the 
community of faith in Rome.  It is attributed to the Apostle Paul, and in it he 
comments on civil authorities: that is, how to interpret their station and authority, and 
also what obligations believers owe them.     
“Let every person be subject to the governing authorities; for there is no 
authority except from God, and those authorities that exist have been 
instituted by God.  Therefore whoever resists authority resists what God has 
appointed, and those who resist will incur judgment….Therefore one must be 
subject, not only because of wrath but also because of conscience.  For the 
same reason you also pay taxes, for the authorities are God’s servants, busy 
with this very thing.  Pay to all what is due them – taxes to whom taxes are 
                                                 




due, revenue to whom revenue is due, respect to whom respect is due, honor 
to whom honor is due.”58 
 
It is easy to interpret Paul’s words literally and presume that he is conflating 
civil and religious authority.  In fact some Christians hold to this view, and it guides 
their desire for a self-confessing “born again” Christian as head of state.  An 
alternative view might suggest that Paul is simply making a statement about God’s 
divine providence.   
“The Church has never accepted the divine right of kings, the view, based on a 
 literal interpretation of St. Paul’s letter to the Romans, that political rulers 
 were personally chosen by God to rule over their subjects.  The Church’s view 
 might be better described this way: God created people as social beings 
 naturally inclined to form communities.  Part of community life is the 
 establishment of authority to act in the name of the community.  Thus, God 
 wills that there be political authority” (Argan).   
 
In this sense, the social welfare of believers and non-believers is connected because 
all inevitably remain members of some larger civic community.  Even socially 
isolated believers are indirectly affected by the personal and corporate decisions of 
political authorities and fellow citizens. 
If it is reasonable to infer from these obligations expectations of believers qua 
citizens, then being a believer-citizen does not necessarily involve developing a 
psychological bracket between a duty to obey secular authorities and a duty to obey 
God.  Jesus’s remarks in Luke 20 would appear to support such a view.  Likewise, 
one can interpret Paul as suggesting that out of fidelity to certain ethical standards 
believers are to issue the same degree of respect to non-believers and Christians alike.  
This point is relevant in light of how some Old Testament prophets assert various 
norms of religious purity and justice that appear to only hold within the Jewish 
                                                 




community and not between other communities, seemingly shaping a kind of 
communitarian (intra-community) ethic.  In addition, St. Paul’s comments represent 
two things: 1) what believers might appeal to for accepting an overlapping consensus 
concerning the scope of justice and 2) the presence of practical and moral reasoning 
within the Christian comprehensive doctrine.       
At most, my random survey of scripture illuminates the ingredients of a 
popular or conventional Christian view of citizenship.  Given the central concerns of 
the tradition, a specifically prophetic Christian stance concerning the expectations of 
citizens would likely resemble what has been highlighted above but would probably 
have more to say about at least two things: (a) dissent through acts of constructive 
civil disobedience in the face of corrupt civil authorities and unjust social policy; and 
(b) a prohibition against conflating civil and divine authority in any literal sense.   
Like Rosenblum’s civic integralists, the aim of prophetic voices is political 
ethical wholeness rather than having religious commands comprehensively enforced 
across the educational, cultural, and moral lives of their fellow citizens.  In order to 
more accurately envision a prophetic Christian view of citizenship, it might be helpful 
to explore the possible role of the citizen in the prophetic tradition, which I will 
attempt to construct later in the chapter.  But first I will discuss the manner in which 
the prophetic tradition shapes citizens.  How a religious tradition shapes the 
disposition of an individual has some bearing on their behavior and the role(s) they 




How the Prophetic Tradition Shapes Citizens 
Before analyzing how the structure of faith within the prophetic Christian 
tradition shapes citizens I want to first bring attention to one of its unique features: its 
implicit understanding of citizenship as religious vocation.  I believe doing so will 
provide context and meaning to the subsequent discussion of the distinctive manner in 
which the prophetic tradition shapes citizens.  That discussion will draw upon the 
dimensions of Israel’s process of disjunctive faith transformation, hence citizen 
shaping, as articulated by Walter Brueggemann in Hope Within History (1987).   
The prophetic tradition does not hold socializing individuals for participation 
in liberal democracy as an interest of its stance toward citizenship.  Based upon the 
discussion in the preceding section the interests the prophetic tradition connects to 
citizenship evidently differ from the state’s interests regarding the same.  The Exodus 
narrative, as one instrument for shaping the prophetic identity, doesn’t necessarily 
strive to equip individuals with the knowledge and capacities that assists their 
enculturation into society.  In an effort, for instance, to either secure believers’ 
obedience to secular rulers or to inspire them to seek the welfare of a given 
community, the prophetic Christian tradition associates such behavior to religious 
devotion and fidelity to a biblical worldview.   
Alternatively, the state does not conflate citizenship and discipleship, nor 
should it.  Its primary concern is political stability and social reproduction of the 
political and social norms that sustain it.  Considering this, the values, capacities, and 
virtues the state seeks to cultivate will largely be political in character and free-




associations like churches need not follow this course.  “Israel’s narrative is never, 
and never intends to be, substantively neutral, for Israel’s faith is characteristically 
passionate in its partisan claims that concern both religious matters and social reality” 
(Brueggemann, 1987, 7).  Therefore, citizen shaping, from a prophetic stance, is not 
so much a process of ‘political socialization’ or ‘political education,’ but is rather a 
process that entails the appropriation of a worldview.   
The worldview endorsed by the prophetic tradition is critical of the political 
culture depending upon how congruent those values that shape social reality are with 
core prophetic values.  A prophetic worldview is most critical of the political culture 
of a given society when it reflects the two following scenarios.  First, when the state 
violates its own norms of justice and these norms are congruent with the core values 
of the prophetic tradition.  Under this scenario, the prophetic tradition advocates 
speaking in opposition to the hypocrisy of the state but not in opposition to the state’s 
core values – since the state is in violation of its own core values.  Second, when the 
state acts in concert with its core values and its values are corrupt (so far as the 
prophetic tradition is concerned).  Under this scenario, the prophetic tradition 
advocates speaking in opposition to the state in a more fundamental way, and the 
prophetic Christian believers cannot at the same time fully be good citizens 
(according to the standards for citizenship held by the state).  The role of the 
prophetic Christian believer under this second scenario is to call the state to a higher 
standard – the standards of morality congruent with the prophetic worldview – albeit 




Prophetic Christians must be prepared for active participation in a liberal 
democracy, yet possess a peculiar consciousness that energizes their criticism and 
delegitimization of any prevailing myths and corrupt values that might masquerade as 
absolutes.  If prophetic believers fail to continually revitalize this peculiar 
consciousness they will fail to fulfill their function in society as “connected critics” 
(Thiemann, 2000): those remedying the gap between dominant social realities and 
God’s moral standards.  Thus the character of the Exodus narrative is actually 
deconstructive rather than assimilative; aiming to disorient, assault, impinge upon, 
and shatter conventional descriptions of reality59 so that believers may adequately 
discern and critique them.  The prophetic tradition, then, represents an 
epistemological critique of social reality.   
Nevertheless, doesn’t this process still constitute a form of socialization?  My 
answer is no.  The distinction I make between socialization and appropriation may 
seem merely semantic.  However, I believe the difference is substantive.  
Socialization is a process of adaptation relative to a particular context or social 
environment (home, community, school or society).  Socialization then involves some 
degree of establishing a fittingness or suitableness for something or somewhere.  
Walter Brueggemann (1987) claims that development, growth, or socialization are not 
among those ends Israel’s normative narrative in Exodus is interested in.  He instead 
argues that its intention is to evoke and generate transformation in each new moment 
of its hearing.  
 “The Exodus narrative is not interested in development, but characteristically 
 jars, assaults, and disorients so that development and growth are not adequate 
 ways of speaking about the changes that are wrought through discontinuity, 
                                                 




 displacement, and disjunction….Whereas development may yield 
 classification,  transformation resists such thematization”  
(Brueggemann, 1987, 8).  
 
This resistance is attributable to the fact that, on an individual level, disjuncture with 
prevailing beliefs will not occur in any predictable way.   
Conversely, to appropriate is to lay claim to or make use of for a particular 
purpose.  Israel’s narrative emphasizes a historical memory and alternative paradigm 
that represents an ideal conception of social life and personhood.  The alternative 
paradigm evokes a vision that permits a new reality to emerge and generates hope in 
something that is to come.  Israel’s narrative, therefore, possesses the capacity to 
disrupt enculturation, resulting in the opposite of socialization; ensuring that a 
particular vision is not lost, especially if it is under threat of being domesticated by a 
culture that may be hostile to it.   
Brueggemann contends that “the church will not have power to act or believe 
until it recovers its tradition of faith and permits that tradition to be the primal way 
out of enculturation….[T]he church has no business more pressing than the 
reappropriation of its memory in its full power and authenticity” (Brueggemann, 
2001, 2).  Rather than socializing for a particular context, the moral standards and 
social interests of the Exodus narrative sustain an imaginative vision and alternative 
consciousness, which in turn energizes prophetic thought regardless of the context or 




 So far I have consistently referred to the function of the Exodus narrative in 
Israel’s transformative faith formation.60  A great deal of focus is given to the Exodus 
narrative (particularly by Jewish communities) because it symbolizes a prototypical 
prophet and a basic understanding of prophecy in the character Moses.  The narrative 
also exemplifies the impact of a community’s criticism of and subsequent 
delegitimization of an empire.  Brueggemann refers to Israel’s formative process of 
appropriating its normative memory and governing metaphors from this narrative as 
“liturgical,” signifying sustained performance by a community.  Through this 
sustained process Israel is, in effect, “constructing its own life and identity and 
permitting each new generation to appropriate it and to participate in its peculiar 
angle of vision” (Brueggemann, 1987, 10). 
     Brueggemann argues that Israel’s use of the normative narrative of Exodus 
is to enhance faith formation in a conflictual, disjunctive way.   He claims this is 
because the Exodus narrative is not interested in “stages” of faith development but 
instead on the wrenching transitions between them.61 
“The Exodus literature mounts an argument that individual personhood is 
always a communal enterprise.  Therefore the stages are never merely about 
interiority and yet are always about interaction in which the person is evoked, 
assaulted, and impinged upon in formative and transformative ways, 
depending on the other parties to the interaction….The struggle to embrace 
covenantal modes of life is the story of faith development in Israel” 
(Brueggemann, 1987, 9). 
 
Israel’s liturgical process of faith formation aims to arouse a search for new and 
different meaning by training believers to consciously evaluate the norms and 
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prevailing myths that play a dominant role in shaping social reality.  The community 
comes to understand that being able to become awake to pain is a very important 
dimension of what makes liberation and redemption possible – particularly seeing 
one’s own pain.  To lack an awareness of how wrong things are means that nothing 
ever changes.   
 Prophetic communities presuppose that transformational action only results 
from a transformed consciousness.  Therefore, Israel’s retelling of the story of the 
Exodus appears to have multiple purposes:  
(1) to inspire compassion – a “feeling with” the characters in the story in such 
a way to emphasize an experience and an idea (liberation). 
(2) to inspire questions/inquiry – because questioning is a path to freedom and 
inquiry is a way of “opening things up” so that individuals will ask more 
questions (otherwise everyone becomes the system, not so much by 
consciously accepting a role but rather by unconsciously becoming their role).  
(3) to propagate new ideas – the feeling that one is capable of giving birth to 
possibility.  Those who have to be liberated (and who must serve as liberators) 
must achieve in themselves some sense of agency and control over the 
possibility of change. 
(4) to form and reform an alternative community.     
 
 Brueggemann contends that there are three dimensions to Israel’s 
transformative redescription of life and personhood.  He names them the critique of 
ideology, the public processing of pain, and the release of social imagination.  I will 
describe each in an attempt to explain how religious associations of a prophetic 
orientation affect the transformation of social reality through disjunctive faith 
formation.   
Critique of Ideology 
 This dimension of faith formation focuses on the prevailing myths that shape 




arrangements legitimated by what Brueggemann calls “imperial ideology” (i.e. the 
prevailing cultural consciousness: values, norms, myths) is to subvert the absolute 
shaping of reality.  What the Exodus narrative conveys is the notion that every 
Israelite initially defines life and comprehends their self-identity within the contrived 
world of the dominant culture of Egypt.  Thus the impact of Egypt’s hegemonic ethos 
must be eliminated and Israel’s despairing conformity to this ethos must be 
transformed.    
The Exodus narrative is fundamentally critical of the social reality in which 
Israel is inevitably enmeshed.  Pharaoh’s all-encompassing empire sustains life and 
controls meanings in a stable and efficient manner.  Consequently, Israel knows no 
innocence, and has no innocence, outside of this social reality.62  The community’s 
existence is colored by a world in which oppression and pain are pillars of public 
reality.   “From the beginning, personal life is experienced as participation in and 
appropriation of the public realities of oppression and pain.  Those realities are not 
just historically present; they are also given symbolic maximization through the 
liturgy which is person-shaping” (Brueggemann, 1987, 11).   
Although Israel concedes the hegemonic power of the empire the community 
does not accept its authority as proper or normative.  “[O]ne knows without being 
told that we do not belong to Pharaoh’s world.  That is an alien world and one must 
not be seduced by it” (Brueggemann, 1987, 11).  The oppressed Israelites have not 
been enculturated to the degree that all are unable to recognize that the legitimated 
social contrivance is organized against justice, freedom, and humaneness.  
                                                 




Consequently, Israel practices a liturgy that intends to enhance their capacity to 
discern modes of oppressive ideology, critique them, and act apart from them.                                        
 An important ingredient in Israel’s method of critiquing ideology is that it 
provides theological motivation for transformation.   According to Brueggemann, 
Israel’s narrative recital reinforces the belief that Yahweh is ultimately responsible 
for dismantling the contrived reality.  Every generation is taught that freedom and 
justice are concerns of God, and that He is a reliable ally with sufficient power to 
guarantee the deconstruction of any hegemonic empire.  This message develops a 
posture of refusal within believers that is invigorated by the alternative paradigm of 
social reality expressed throughout the text.  “Each new generation, as it participates 
in this narrative, learns how to make and engages in this social criticism of 
established power.  The capacity and the freedom for such criticism are central to 
faith maturation in Israel’s self-understanding” (Brueggemann, 1987, 14).  
Brueggemann believes that the Jewish community understands that a proper retelling 
of the Exodus narrative will dismantle the dominant ideology by evoking a memory 
of “who we are” and by inspiring concrete acts of refusal and freedom.       
Public Processing of Pain 
 Social criticism arouses consciousness and creates a basis for concrete acts of 
disengagement.  Brueggemann warns, however, that mere insight never liberated 
anyone.  An embrace of the source of our pain is necessary in order to be liberated 




criticism because it means that the community acknowledges the pain caused by a 
false myth – a broken promise.63 
Brueggemann defines public processing as an intentional and communal act 
that expresses grief and generates social power.  “Bringing hurt to public expression 
is an important first step in the dismantling criticism that permits a new reality, 
theological and social, to emerge” (Brueggemann, 2001, 12).  When the oppressed 
assemble publicly to articulate their pain, their collective social anger gets 
concentrated.  Be it through political meetings of protest, formal protests in court, or 
acts of stylized assault,64 each constitutes an expression of civil disobedience on the 
part of the disinherented and indicates that they will no longer be in denial about how 
incompatible the imperial ideology is with their personal longings for life and 
personhood.  A public outcry from the oppressed based upon their alternative 
perception of reality serves as an act of criticism that initiates the formation of a 
counter-community.65   
Reciting the Exodus narrative reminds the Israelites that Yahweh hears their 
cries and desires to relieve their pain.  The community recognizes that the empire 
cannot nurture their hope because it never actually hears their cries.66  Consequently, 
they learn to not expect anything from the empire, that they owe nothing to it, and 
that its promises are ineffectual.  Faith formation, then, ultimately rests upon “faith in 
this God evoked in this community which lies outside the system….Faith formation 
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means to convey the uniqueness of Yahweh and hence the distinctiveness of Israel” 
(Brueggemann, 1987, 18).   
Being an Israelite implicates being able to recognize the legitimacy of pain in 
human existence, and that the public processing of such pain permits and calls forth a 
kind of social redescription of reality that creates opportunities for newness.  Israel’s 
narrative enactment invites each new generation of believers to view the 
deconstruction of oppressive empires and the redefinition of their identity as 
normative.  This liturgical process effectively “permits no ideology to cover over the 
pain which is judged to be the crucial element in the reality of the community and, 
indeed, in the reality of the person” (Brueggemann, 1987, 20).  Embracing pain is, in 
itself, an acknowledgement that the myths and alleged absoluteness of the dominant 
ideology is fraudulent.        
Release of Social Imagination 
 Brueggemann explains that the social aspect of releasing imagination is the 
collective process of discovering new ways to shape the identity of the community.67  
Ritual defiance (for example celebratory singing and dancing)68 usually occurs before 
there is any public defiance.  Then public outcry that often follows unleashes Israel’s 
stifled imagination and quenched hope, thus renewing courage and the will to design 
and implement alternative visions of social reality.   
Brueggemann considers three examples in which the Exodus narrative 
articulates the release of social imagination.  The first he labels a liturgic enactment 
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of a changed social situation and transformed sense of reality.  This behavior is 
evidenced insofar as Israel tells an alternative story, enacts an alternative reality, and 
envisions a different shaping of reality.69   
He labels the second example a political act wherein Israel changes “gods.”  
“Faith formation is a process of choosing gods….In choosing this new God…the 
peasant community always found it had also chosen a new mode of social existence 
along with the new God.  This God may not be chosen apart from a particular social 
existence” (Brueggemann, 1987, 26).  By affirming the kingship of Yahweh Israel is 
in effect forming a new political entity that provides a foundation for rejecting the 
former political realities of Pharaoh.70  This political act represents an allegiance to a 
core metaphor for social imagination that is present in the Old and New Testaments: 
the notion of the Kingdom of God.  The kingdom of God metaphorically symbolizes 
“a social construction of reality that judges and critiques every other social 
construction of power and authority” (Brueggemann, 1987, 22).  But it is not a 
utopian template for social life.  It is more akin to a vision of God’s reign as a 
spiritual reality in a contextual political dimension.71  The prophet adapts this vision 
to particular contexts: “No prophet ever sees things under the aspect of eternity.  It is 
always partisan theology, always for the moment…satisfied to see only a piece of it 
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all and to speak out of that risk of contradicting the rest of it” (Brueggemann, 2001, 
16).   
Brueggeman labels a third example of social imagination within Israel’s 
narrative as a legislative act.  Acts of this sort translate Israel’s alternative conception 
of reality into concrete economic and political social criteria.  “One example of such 
social imagination which seeks to make God’s covenanting kingdom concrete is the 
tradition of Deuteronomy….Deuteronomy, however, makes the extraordinary 
venturesome suggestion: the fertile land does not need to be ordered in Canaanite 
ways.  The land can be ordered in covenantal ways according to the rule of Yahweh 
and Lord of the covenant” (Brueggemann, 1987, 23).  The primordial hope of 
prophecy is that imaginative social transformation is ongoing and that the purposes of 
the tradition do not become domesticated and do not succumb to hopelessness.    
Although specifically drawn from Israel’s liturgic use of the Exodus text, 
these three dimensions of faith formation – the critique of ideology, the public 
processing of pain, and the release of social imagination – can be viewed as three 
general (rather than orthodox) types of attitudes and practices prophetic religious 
communities rehearse in their own unique way from generation to generation for the 
purpose of shaping citizens.  However, Brueggemann explains, “…these texts hold 
that every process of transformation and genuine faith, in whatever social 
context…moves in this fashion.  This is Israel’s reading of all reality, not only its 
own” (Brueggemann, 1987, 26).  Although the narrative and methods may vary 
among prophetic religious communities, the substance of this process of disjunctive 




is the essential ingredient because of the importance of internalizing the truth that 
God represents an active agent in the quest for liberation.   
In summary, a primary objective of prophetic faith formation, and hence 
citizen shaping, is to develop believer’s capacity to appraise and if need be reject the 
prevailing reality-shaping ideology; and, subsequently, to make a bold move of 
disengagement – “a denial of the theodicy sponsored by the system” (Brueggemann, 
1987, 17).  Israel’s liturgical process does this by issuing both an epistemological and 
sociological critique of social reality.  The structures of faith underpinning the 
prophetic strand of Christianity implicate involvement in the political dimension of 
life with a concern for social justice, liberation from oppression and political ethical 
wholeness.  By facilitating the appropriation of a normative memory and a set of 
governing metaphors, the prophetic tradition invites citizens to embrace a religious 
vocation that involves critiquing established power and imaginatively reconciling 
society with a radical vision of personhood and social intercourse.   
The Role of the Citizen in the Prophetic Tradition 
Let me summarize the claims I have made concerning the prophetic tradition.  
I have said that it is undergirded by a conception of personhood that views every 
human as created in the image of God.  This conception of personhood supports an 
egalitarian social ideal that seeks to affirm the dignity of all persons regardless of 
social status.  The establishment of a covenantal relationship between Yahweh and 
humanity form the tradition’s roots in the Old Testament.  In that covenantal 
relationship Yahweh displays partiality to the poor and oppressed and serves as an 




concern for equality, freedom and social justice.  I have said that the axis of temporal 
power and the rigid enforcement of the law are the foci of the tradition.  The critique 
of dominant cultural and political norms not only serves to eliminate the gap between 
social circumstances and covenantal standards of humaneness, but also to arouse the 
remembrance of a commonly known moral framework.  I explained that prophecy 
ultimately does not endorse a prophetic utopia (i.e., an account of an absolute, ideal 
version of its vision that is free from history).  Instead, the prophetic stance is more 
pragmatic in that the object is to proclaim that a concrete community or political 
regime must operate in a particular way.  Finally, I have said that the prophetic 
tradition invigorates a liturgical process of transformative faith formation that 
involves: appropriating a normative memory and governing metaphors; dismantling, 
through critique, a taken-for-granted ethos that assists enculturation; igniting a public 
embrace of pain that consequently funds obedience to an alternative consciousness; 
and energizing hope through activating social imagination.   
That being said, how might these concerns and objectives translate into a 
specifically prophetic role for religious citizens in a liberal democratic society 
(especially given the conscience-raising influence of a normative narrative rife with 
criticism of dominant cultural values and cynicism toward political authority)?  
Should liberal societies expect religious absolutism accompanied by abrasive 
crusading in the name of God from believers who adhere to the prophetic tradition?  
Or might the opprobrium offered by contemporary prophetic religious voices have a 





 Given the traditional confrontational model of prophecy as “prophet versus 
established power” in the Old Testament, and the claims I make above, the role of 
citizen in the prophetic tradition might seem fairly obvious.  One could consider the 
ultimate focus of prophetic criticism to merely be the repugnant and sordid abuses of 
power, violations of law, or transgressions of social etiquette that have historically 
lead to boycotts, rallies, speeches and marches decrying injustice or advancing some 
social cause.  If so, the role of prophetic citizens would simply be to confront corrupt 
political norms and aggressively overhaul overtly unjust social policies and practices 
that provide license for socially unacceptable behavior.   
However, if the focus of the prophetic tradition includes not merely overtly 
unjust public policies and practices but also acceptable attitudes and cultural values 
that are, upon close inspection, as repugnant and sordid as many of the political 
norms they probably give rise to, then the vocation of citizen in the prophetic 
tradition may be more wide-ranging than the aforementioned conclusion.   
Old Testament prophets generally attribute the root cause of the many and 
varied concrete instances of injustice to some expression of idolatry and what I will 
call obdurateness.72  Walter Brueggemann contends that each distinct and concrete 
political crisis is perhaps evidence of an enduring and resilient dominant crisis:  
“[T]he dominant crisis…of having our alternative vocation co-opted and 
 domesticated.  It may be, of course, that this enduring crisis manifests itself in 
 any given time around concrete issues, but it concerns the enduring crisis that 
 runs from concrete issue to concrete issue” (Brueggemann, 2001, 3).   
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How, then, might the prophetic vocation itself – represented in the concerns and 
objectives I summarized above – become co-opted and domesticated?  One common 
means is when the mainline church becomes enculturated.   
 In The Prophetic Imagination (2001) Brueggemann notes that mainline 
churches have increasingly become decentered and disenfranchised in the United 
States during the last quarter of the 20th century.  Among other causes, he feels the 
long-term and penetrating force of secularization has helped marginalize these church 
communities away from the cultural center of contemporary liberal society.  
Consequently, the social clout of mainline churches has deteriorated.  Therefore, 
instead of participating in the public life of the dominant community from a 
perspective of tension, mainline congregations are, for the most part, comfortably 
integrated within the dominant culture.  Speaking about the Sanctified Holiness 
Church and its tradition of sustaining a socially conscious and profoundly spiritual 
Christian witness, Cheryl Sanders (1996) expresses concern about how this tradition 
is possibly being undermined by the seduction from larger cultural forces: “The future 
of the tradition seems imperiled by the drift toward the acceptance of elitist 
patriarchal values, the rejection of ancestral identity and worship practices, and the 
failure to sustain a creative evangelistic outreach in the face of the host of nihilistic 
encroachments of despair – homelessness, poverty, drug abuse, crime, family 




In fact, Brueggemann despairingly suggests that the contemporary church is 
so largely enculturated to the dominant American ethos of consumerism that it has 
little power left to believe or to act.73  Cornel West reiterates this view:  
“The rewards and respectability of the American empire that tempt Christians 
 of all colors cannot be overlooked.  The free-market fundamentalism that 
 makes an idol of money and a fetish of wealth seduces too many Christians.  
 And when the major example of prophetic Christianity – the black church 
 tradition – succumbs to this temptation and seduction, the very future of 
 American democracy is in peril”(West, 2004, 158-159).    
 
Assimilation allows churches to be co-opted by the political powers of the day and 
reshaped by profane elements of the dominant secular culture instead of the other way 
around.  This “domestication” of the church’s vocation by “imperial” or popular 
culture inevitably corrupts the intent and diminishes the efficacy of the methods it 
might employ to fulfill its prophetic vocation.   
Brueggemann insists that the task of prophetic ministry is to nurture, nourish, 
and evoke a consciousness and perception alternative to the consciousness and 
perception of the dominant culture.74  The pull toward conforming to the dominant 
culture and accepting its myths is central to the “dominant crisis” of domestication.  
Prophetic ministry targets how this process of enculturation inconspicuously and 
efficiently persuades individuals to not merely accept, but to become the system.  
Therefore, to answer my guiding question, I argue that the concerns and objectives of 
the prophetic tradition translate into a specifically civic role for its adherents in that 
they have a responsibility to resist enculturation and contest the effects of 
obdurateness.        
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Enculturation is the process by which the supremacy of a dominant ideology 
grants it sufficient influence to shape social reality and assimilate individuals such 
that they perpetuate its values and practices.  Brueggemann hints at this supremacy 
when he observes (in reference to the critique of ideology) that Israel knew no 
innocence outside of Egypt’s social reality, and that every Israelite initially defined 
life and understood their self-identity within the contrived world of Egypt’s dominant 
culture.75   
It is worth saying that because an ideology possesses dominance over other 
extant doctrines does not, in itself, make it unreasonable; only more influential.  My 
guess is that the prophetic tradition would welcome such widespread influence with 
respect to God’s covenantal values and principles inexorably buttressing the norms of 
social intercourse.  However, the prophetic tradition is not an ideology, nor does it 
advance a particular way of life into which individuals could be enculturated.  At 
most it might be considered a vision of justice, but one compatible with ideological 
pluralism.  What makes an ideology unreasonable is not necessarily dominance but 
authoritarianism: if it aims to stifle the viability and flourishing of competing 
ideologies.   
Authoritarianism is not singularly manifested through the words and deeds of 
an autocratic pharaoh.  The most dangerous sort tends to operate beneath the 
threshold of conscious perception.  By using words like “contrived” and “imperial” 
Brueggemann intends to focus attention on a particular kind of enculturation: one that 
assimilates according to a provincial ideology.  Such adjectives insinuate acts of 
                                                 




manipulation on the part of an authority or regime with the intent to deceive.  Yet, the 
use of this subliminal coercion in service of an imperial ideology rarely betrays the 
inaccuracy of the governing myths and symbols the ideology promotes.  Conduct of 
this sort on the part of a state would violate the notion of voluntarism76 so integral to 
liberal democratic societies.   
Similar to the political methods used in fascist regimes, the promotion of an 
overarching view of the good life can effectively fix social reality in free societies as 
well.  Recall that the “dominant crisis”77 that occurs as a result of the enculturation 
that results from an imperial ideology is less discernable and not manifestly illiberal.  
Michael Walzer interprets an argument made by the prophet Amos about oppression 
and religious observance in a manner that highlights the dangers of subtle forms of 
enculturation: “It is entirely possible to trample upon the poor and to observe the 
Sabbath” (Walzer, 1996, 34).  In other words, although a given society might 
faithfully perpetuate certain socially acceptable cultural beliefs and practices 
believing that they cohere with their cherished ethical standards, it is very possible 
that at some level this assumption is in error.  Moreover, some of the most oppressive 
forms of enculturation become normative within a society’s dominant public culture 
precisely because they do not violate any laws.  For instance, the view that it is 
morally acceptable to redefine the notion of family and the institution of marriage in a 
manner that would effectively deny civil privileges to certain citizens.   
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Walter Brueggemann’s suggestion that contemporary prophetic action become 
more nuanced and cunning than the old confrontational model is more than likely a 
response to the fact that current systems of enculturation and domestication are 
nuanced and cunning.78  For example, “political correctness” and the “spinning” of 
views on social issues have effectively masked much of the vitriol that once flowed 
unabated in society.  Consequently, some people will candidly claim that certain 
illiberal attitudes (like racism) no longer even exist.  Such views may sound laughable 
to some, but under conditions of imperial enculturation they are quite believable.  The 
masses simply learn to rationalize and tolerate injustice partially because it is 
concealed in socially acceptable packaging.  The prophetic tradition views such 
conditioned indifference as a transgression, and promotes creative, contextual 
elimination of those forces that cultivate it.  “Prophetic witness consists of human acts 
of justice and kindness that attend to the unjust sources of human hurt and misery…It 
highlights personal and institutional evil, including especially the evil of being 
indifferent to personal and institutional evil”(West, 2004, 17). 
The institutions that most impact the shaping of America’s dominant culture 
(like the media) promulgate consumption, materialism, individualism, sexual 
aggrandizement, and competition as the paths to personal well being.  Two effects of 
this domineering posture toward the good life are that alternative conceptions of the 
good that seem at odds with the popular versions lose their appeal, and also the 
gradual reduction in reflection about alternative conceptions by the general public.  
Kenneth Strike echoes this point.  
                                                 




“Our society has a default ethic.  It’s the one taught on television and via the 
popular culture.  It has a firm grip on educational policy.  Its basic tenant is 
that the good life consists in things such as material possessions, status, and 
the admiration from others for the possession of such characteristics as wealth, 
beauty, and power.  It leads to an educational philosophy that says, ‘Get an 
education, to get a good job, to get stuff.’  The chief danger is that children 
come to believe this without ever articulating it to themselves, and without 
ever recognizing that there are alternatives. Schools, I think, are more likely to 
promote this than to critique it.”79  
 
In some sense this prevailing myth – including the things that serve as a means to its 
fulfillment – can be considered a contemporary idol.   
Idolatry is a feature and consequence of imperial enculturation.  For my 
purposes, idolatry translates into an immoderate attachment or devotion to something.  
Throughout the period of exile, Yahweh’s prophets not only attack physical bondage 
but also the seduction by idols of “pagan” cultures.  “The deadly charge of idolatry, 
which is the preeminent weapon in the prophetic arsenal against injustice, whether 
that idolatry is the worship of power or money, sits at the center of prophetic 
resistance to imperial nations”(West, 2004, 18).   
One cause of Israel’s oppression was that Egypt’s mode of existence was 
connected to foreign gods; and “foreign gods” need not merely be the transcendental 
sort.  Brueggemann points out that faith formation is a process of choosing gods “that 
may not be chosen apart from a particular mode of social existence” (Brueggemann, 
2001, 26).  As Israel’s liturgical process makes clear, systems of language and 
rhetoric, prevailing myths, and dominant claims of truth that shape personhood can 
also become the object of idolatry.  The objective of an imperial ideology is securing 
mass devotion to the illusion that something is absolute and given, thereby arresting 
inquiry and critique: “Numbness does not hurt like torture, but in a quite parallel way, 
                                                 




numbness robs us of our capability for humanity” (Brueggemann, 2001, xx).  Doing 
so legitimates the imperial ideology and causes individuals to become numb to the 
internal pain and discomfort that signals a need for alteration.   
 Seriously contesting the subconscious numbness that is the result of 
enculturation by an imperial ideology is a major responsibility of prophetic believers 
in their role as citizens.  Prophetic citizens can fulfill this role by awakening fellow 
citizens to its presence and helping to delegitimate the pain caused by its prevailing 
myths. 
Contest the Effects of Obdurateness 
To be obdurate is to refuse to give in to persuasion or become hardened 
against moral influence.  This concept suggests an unwillingness to open oneself up 
to an alternative reality.  For example, the Exodus narrative reports that Pharaoh’s 
heart was hardened and he, consequently, refuses Moses’ command to “let the people 
go.”80  One could argue that Pharaoh was incapable of imagining reality without the 
slaves.  Still, it is not just Pharaoh that suffers from this condition.  Later in the 
narrative, the Israelites perhaps reflect obdurateness by complaining about their 
ambiguous status in the wilderness and pining for the familiarity of their oppressive 
former reality.   
One is susceptible to obdurateness whether one has been enculturated by a 
provincial ideology or not.  Even prophetic imagination itself is not immune to it.  
Walter Brueggemann notes that Israel’s process of faith formation is ongoing in its 
dynamic because “old forms of social imagination tend to become new modes of 
                                                 




oppressive ideology in need of critique” (Brueggemann, 1987, 24).  He believes that 
continually returning to the primal texts (Exodus) and its root metaphors (covenant, 
kingdom) enables believers to remain receptive to new realities and new hopes.   
What, therefore, might be the source of obdurateness?  Enculturation can abet 
obdurateness (by promoting narrow-mindedness).  Whether this occurs or not seems 
dependent upon the ideology at its core.  For example, some past approaches to 
political socialization, like those mentioned in chapter two, were inhospitable toward 
ethnic, cultural and religious minorities.  These expressions of enculturation reflect 
obdurateness insofar as they represent a refusal to adjust to changing social realities 
(e.g., expanding religious and ethnic pluralism).  In this sense, they were “imperial” 
and intentionally oppressive towards those families whose reason refused to stomach 
the sectarian beliefs imposed through the enculturation.  Moreover, though, such 
provincial approaches to enculturation deliberately enslaved those students who likely 
unquestioningly accepted their truths.  Those students’ sense of truth was shaped in a 
manner that their capacity to entertain alternative truths was greatly diminished.             
Another source of obdurateness is an absence of self critique and social 
imagination.  The failure to sustain an ongoing critique of personal behavior as well 
as public and private social arrangements in light of one’s moral ideals usually results 
in an unconscious settlement with what social convention and popular opinion 
understands to be right and true.  That settlement consequently cultivates 
obdurateness because human preferences and expectations preserve social reality 
according to an imperial ideology.  It is those that are or have become “comfortable,” 




the role of the prophetic citizen is to disturb the most tragic form of comfort: the kind 
that is impervious to injustice and the suffering of those who are most disturbed and 
oppressed by it.  To neglect this responsibility is to undermine society’s capacity and 
willingness to cultivate social imagination.  And in a liberal society based upon free 
citizenship, and in which political legitimacy is achieved through deliberative 
processes, the inability to entertain alternative social realities would seem to create a 
formidable obstacle to the exercise of reciprocity and tolerance in social interactions. 
How then might prophetic citizens contest obdurateness?  Walter 
Brueggemann insists that within prophetic communities their liturgical recital is 
ongoing, meaning transformation is continually revitalized.  His exposition of the 
three dimensions of Israel’s process of transformative faith formation serves as an 
example of how private (religious) associations might shape attitudes and practices 
that adequately contest obdurateness.  Prophetic citizens could then employ the 
confrontational “prophet versus king” model of political protest, as exemplified in the 
Old Testament, in the public sphere.  There is a rich tradition of public protest in 
America, from oral methods like Billy Graham’s and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s 
public addresses to more demonstrative confrontational methods like those mentioned 
earlier: boycotts, picketing, and public marches.  These examples of protest and 
resistance strategically “defamiliarize” what is ordinarily obscured by the everyday 






These are very general and intuitive observations concerning a vision of 
citizenship consistent with the prophetic tradition.  By no means do they exhaust the 
responsibilities, concerns, and objectives of the tradition.  However these two general 
roles represent the fundamental commitments of the prophetic vocation.  Prophetic 
citizens must address enculturation and obdurateness while also engaging in social 
action that creatively confronts oppressive and unjust social policies, norms, and 
practices.   
Dominant secular culture does not always or often reflect sacred prophetic 
values, particularly with respect to how the least advantaged in society are viewed 
and treated.  As a result, we are all susceptible to tacitly contributing to forms of 
oppression.  The prophetic tradition aims to contest idolatry and obdurateness through 
disruptive faith formation.  Walter Brueggemann’s discussion of Israel’s 
transformative liturgical process is one example.  It involves the appropriation of a 
normative memory and governing metaphors through the use of a historical narrative. 
Brueggemann insists that the alternative consciousness that is so important for 
prophetic ministries to cultivate and nourish has two functions: to criticize and to 
energize.  The criticizing function attempts to dismantle the dominant consciousness 
by delegitimizing and rejecting the present ordering of social reality; while the 
energizing function serves to stimulate hope and fervent anticipation for God’s 
promise of the newness of another time and situation toward which the faith 
community can move.81  He notes: “The task of prophetic ministry is to hold together 
                                                 




criticism and energizing, for I should urge that either by itself is not faithful to our 
best tradition.  Our faith tradition understands that it is precisely the dialectic of 
criticizing and energizing that can let us be seriously faithful to God” (Brueggemann, 
2001, 4).   
The prophetic tradition focuses on ideological oppression that denies a lively 
communal imagination and resists newness.  Prophetic citizens are to be custodians of 
an alternative consciousness and a paradigm of social reality, ensuring that the 
dominant culture and consciousness does not marginalize belief in the fact that things 
can change and that social reality is not fixed because God, the central figure of faith 
formation, remains dynamic and active.   
 
The Prophetic Tradition and Liberal Democratic Suspicions 
 In chapter 3 I analyzed arguments that underscored the negative aspects of 
religion and that served as exemplars of those that are critical of religious education.  
Harry Brighouse argues that justice requires that each child has a significant and 
equal opportunity to live a life that is good for them.  Therefore, he believes that 
providing children with a realistic opportunity to become autonomous adults is the 
fundamental value that should guide the design of education policy.  Accordingly, the 
criterion he uses to judge religious associations (not necessarily with respect to 
citizenship) is their ability to facilitate autonomy.  In other words, their willingness 
and capacity to explore alternative doctrines or views and the reasoning deployed 
within those views, and in so doing provide prospective adults a wide range of 




 Amy Gutmann argues that democratic societies have a strong interest in 
cultivating the skills and virtues that enable the conscious social reproduction of their 
political norms.  According to Gutmann, the most significant of those skills is the 
capacity to deliberate among alternative forms of personal and political life, and the 
most indispensable virtue is mutual respect – for the liberty and rights of other 
citizens.  Therefore, an inevitable function of education in liberal democratic societies 
is to develop the intellectual and moral capacity necessary to deliberate rationally 
among competing views (something she calls democratic character).  Consequently, 
the criteria she uses to judge religious associations with respect to citizenship are their 
ability to foster mutual respect by exposing members to alternative views and 
reasoning that conflict with their own, and their ability to cultivate deliberative 
capacities in their members.      
 Lastly, Eamonn Callan asserts that the reasonableness (reasoned moral 
consensus needed to establish a vision of justice) that political liberalism depends 
upon is funded by reciprocity.  Acceptance of the burdens of judgment supports the 
reciprocity and mutual toleration that public reason must promote when citizens 
select the principles of justice that undergird society.  Therefore, political liberalism 
yields an education that invites citizens to question the absolute truth of their 
comprehensive doctrine and inadvertently promotes autonomy.  As a result, the 
criterion he uses to judge religious associations with respect to citizenship is whether 
they foster reciprocity by securing acceptance of the burdens of judgment; and to a 
lesser extent whether they foster deliberative capacities in light of members’ need to 




 I have stated that in their effort to reveal how religion or religious education is 
inherently inconsistent with the development of democratic character and autonomy, 
the critiques of these authors: 1) present a vision of religion based on radical or 
extreme religious groups; 2) give insufficient weight to the importance of freedom of 
conscience; and 3) tend to assert “hard” interpretations of autonomy and citizenship.  
Based on their discussions, I established three criteria that I believe are fair in judging 
religious associations in light of liberal citizenship.  These criteria concern autonomy 
and democratic citizenship. They are:  
 (1) religious groups must not attempt to completely shield their members from 
 views that do not affirm the supposed truth of their beliefs;  
 (2) religious groups must respect the freedom of conscience and religious 
 liberty of those who hold other religious views or who hold none; and 
 therefore must not employ the apparatus of the state either to compel others to 
 hold or practice their religion or to compel the state to enforce moral 
 conceptions that cannot be justified apart from their religious convictions;  
 (3) religious groups must honor the core values of citizenship (reciprocity, 
 tolerance and mutual respect), and religious people should not hold or act on 
 the view that those who hold alternative moral or religious convictions are 
 unworthy of fair treatment or equal rights as citizens.   
 Now I will apply these criteria to the prophetic Christian tradition and explain 
how it satisfies them.  In doing so I will also demonstrate how the prophetic tradition 




express a negative view of the role religion might play in shaping character and 
socializing good liberal democratic citizens.    
I. Does socialization within groups that adhere to the prophetic tradition 
completely shield members of those groups from views that do not 
affirm the truth of their beliefs? 
 
In defending the prophetic tradition against this criterion, it is important to note two 
things about it.  First it is not isolationist.  Second, it is not sectarian.  These two 
characteristics effectively protect it from charges that it somehow shields adherents 
from competing views.  The fact that it is not isolationist means that it is not afraid of 
the world.  Instead, it demands engagement with society and intends for those who 
adhere to it to be critically aware of the competing values and ideologies shaping 
social reality.  By saying that it is not sectarian I mean to suggest that it advances no 
particular doctrine.  While it demands justice, it seems to lack any detailed 
prescriptions that precisely define or establish the substance of justice and how it is 
best achieved.  The prophetic tradition does not represent one way of life or 
conception of the good among others.  Neither does it present itself as one view, 
among many, for consideration or choice.  It does not advance a view about the 
authority of scripture.  In as much, it cannot be interpreted as sectarian although its 
adherents find support for it from within various sectarian doctrines. 
 Rather, it is much closer to a vision of justice that can be held by people of 
different theological persuasions about a range of issues.  It functions to identify 
injustice and oppression through critique from within particular historical 
circumstances.  For instance, it criticizes those who might attempt to transform 




justice.  But because the prophetic tradition is not locked into a doctrine or does not 
express a theory of justice, per se, this suggests that its adherents are willing to be 
enlightened about the substance of justice. 
 Because of the attention it focuses on critiquing prevailing ideologies and 
social arrangements, the prophetic tradition perhaps can be viewed as instrumental 
towards developing one form of autonomy.   That form of autonomy has to do with 
the capacity to examine or appraise ideas, constructs, and moral or truth claims.  
Through disjunctive faith formation it seeks to sustain an imaginative vision of what 
ought to be (i.e. an alternative reality) and to cultivate a critical consciousness that 
enables adherents to discern corrupt ideological values shaping the world around 
them.  That alternative vision is governed by a morality which serves as both a 
compass for organizing social reality and a measuring stick for evaluating 
contemporary culture.   
 The disjunctive process acts as a control against the kind of servility 
Brighouse, Gutmann, and Callan fear, but in the public sphere – on a political level – 
as well as in the private.  At the same time, the prophetic tradition is not oblivious to 
the dangers of uncritical adherence to an ideology (especially that expressed through 
one’s own comprehensive doctrine).  The liturgical process of faith formation is 
disjunctive, intending to impinge upon, assault, and shatter conventional ideas and 
any absolute shaping of social reality: “Israel practices a liturgy that intends to 
develop the capacity to discern modes of oppressive ideology, critique them, and act 
apart from them” (Brueggemann, 1987, 12).  The prophetic tradition implies that 




 Hence, the form of autonomy the prophetic tradition seems to emphasize is 
less concerned with promoting rational choices among competing options.  Instead, 
its substance mirrors the insight that evil corrupts reasoning and erodes freedom.  
Aristotelian Christians have suggested that this view is consonant with Aristotle’s 
view that choices shape habits and character such that certain kinds of choices 
become more difficult as the character is damaged.     
   Nevertheless, the prophetic tradition might be viewed as facilitating choice to 
the degree that it enables adherents to critique provincial ideologies in a way that 
releases their social imagination regarding how they envision society operating.  It 
may follow, then, that a prophetic tradition that stands in judgment of the culture 
might well contribute to autonomy, if in no other way by showing what could count 
as an option.                   
II. Does the stance of the prophetic tradition warrant respect, by those who 
 adhere to it, for the freedom of conscience and religious liberty of those who 
 hold other religious views or who hold none?  In other words, does the 
 prophetic tradition tacitly or directly permit adherents to use the apparatus of 
 the state to either compel others to hold or practice their religion or to compel 
 the state to enforce moral conceptions that cannot be justified apart from 
 their religious convictions?   
 
A very easy assumption to make about the prophetic Christian tradition is that it is 
theocratic.  This is because when it calls people to justice there is a “Thus saith the 
Lord” justification casting a shadow behind the appeal.  It seems as if the prophetic 
Christian tradition assumes that the people it addresses are a covenantal community.  
But, obviously, Americans are not a covenant people called by God and such an 




 Technically, a theocracy amounts to clerical establishment, wherein a 
government is ruled by or subject to the authority of the clergy of a particular faith.  A 
contemporary example might be Iran.  Because America does not represent a 
covenantal community of this sort, devoutly religious citizens may not articulate the 
implications of the prophetic tradition in a theocratic manner.  Therefore, we must 
consider another view of theocracy.   
 A softer view of theocracy might be holding the commands of one’s faith or 
sect as the norms of the political culture.  Right wing religious conservatives like the 
Christian Coalition would seem to view their religious commands in this way.  While 
those who adhere to the prophetic tradition hold religious commands, they do not do 
so in a way that is congruent with this softer view of theocracy.   
 The prophetic tradition is more akin to a set of values and orienting principles 
regarding equality, freedom and social justice.  It expects the political culture of any 
society to operate according to these values, but not for reasons native to any specific 
doctrine.  The core political values and constitutional norms of a liberal democracy 
can be interpreted by those who adhere to the prophetic tradition as an expression of 
the commitments of that tradition.  One might argue that the prophetic tradition has 
shaped the constitutional norms of America.  Therefore, I argue that the prophetic 
tradition warrants respect, by those who adhere to it, for religious freedom and 
freedom of conscience (as political values that fund justice).     
 When adherents of the prophetic tradition speak in modern liberal 
democracies, they do not speak to a covenant community in which the covenant 




responsibilities.  Those who adhere to it perform the prophetic function of calling 
Americans back to their highest political ideals (when these ideals are congruent with 
the prophetic tradition’s core values).  While it cannot be assumed that congruence 
between prophetic and liberal ideals will always be the case in a liberal democracy, it 
is generally the case (considering that liberal political values and constitutional norms 
are congruent82 with the prophetic tradition).   
 Consider the ease with which The Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. 
shifted between appealing to the values of liberal democracy and those of the 
prophetic tradition during his fight against the causes of racism and social injustice.  
In public addresses within secular contexts he employed them as if they were of one 
cloth; but few have ever thought that the Reverend was confusing his audience with a 
church congregation and, hence, violating their conscience.  Even if he considered 
himself allowing the voice of God to speak to the state (about how it is violating its 
own basic norms of justice), he did so in a manner that continues to remind non-
believing citizens that even if they do not hear the call to justice as the voice of God, 
they must nevertheless hear the voice of justice.  “[The legacies of prophetic 
Christianity] marshal religious energies for democratic aims, yet are suspicious of all 
forms of idolatry, including democracy itself as an idol.  They preserve their Christian 
identity and its democratic commitments, without coercing others and conflating 
church and state spheres”(West, 2004, 163).   
                                                 
82 By congruent I am suggesting that the political conception of justice located in the prophetic 
tradition (apart from the “God” language) and the constitutional values of a liberal democracy 
generally (1) have the same content and (2) lead to the same behavioral expectations and courses of 




 This leads back to a discussion about justification (e.g., “Thus saith the Lord”) 
and whether the prophetic Christian tradition can accept liberal democratic norms of 
public speech which require that argument be conducted in a secular language in the 
public square.  There are at least two ways to respond to this question, and they 
reflect two views regarding the use of religious premises in public discourse.  One 
view is adamantly opposed to it and sees the use of anything other than public reason 
as inappropriate.  This view argues that using religious premises in the public square 
shows a lack of respect for the freedom and equality of non-believing citizens.  A 
second view sees the notion of public reason not so much as a constraint on what can 
be said in the political arena as much as it is a constraint on what can be used as 
justification for state power (Rawls & Rawls, 1999; Wolterstorff, 1997).  This view is 
more or less equivalent to the first prong of the Lemon test for establishment claims.83   
 Considering this distinction, it would appear that religious adherents of the 
prophetic tradition would violate the norms of public speech required by the first 
view but not the second.  Yet if the norms of the prophetic tradition are overlapping 
with the constitutional norms of liberal democracy then these norms are also to be 
taken for granted.  In this case, the norm of non-coercion would be honored.   
 In calling the nation back to its higher ideals or “better self” the prophetic 
believer seeks to do so in a manner that does not make non-believers subject to any 
religious authority, so long as, as I have said, the nation’s higher ideals are viewed as 
an acceptable instantiation of God’s call to justice.  The tradition is opposed to 
                                                 
83 In its 1971 decision Lemon v. Kurtzman the Supreme Court pronounced a three-pronged inquiry 
commonly known as the Lemon test for use regarding establishment-clause analysis. To withstand 
Lemon scrutiny, the government conduct (1) must have a secular purpose, (2) must have a principal or 
primary effect that does not advance or inhibit religion, and (3) cannot foster an excessive government 




absolutism – considering it the enemy of imagination – and does not seek to impose a 
way of life.  Again, it is consistent with many forms of pluralism and expresses 
tolerance for alternative yet congruent worldviews and ways of life.  The values of 
the tradition do not prescribe any divinely mandated political model of government.  
Rather they provide a general moral framework from which civic reflection begins 
and against which political policies are measured.   
III. Does the prophetic tradition value the core values of citizenship (reciprocity, 
 tolerance and mutual respect) and accept that religious people should not 
 hold or act on the view that those who hold other convictions are unworthy 
 of fair treatment or equal rights as citizens?   
 
Based upon the discussion above regarding the prophetic tradition’s respect for 
religious liberty, freedom of conscience, reciprocity in public speech, and tolerance 
for pluralism, this question appears to have an obvious answer.  I believe that answer 
is yes.  The religious vocation implicit in the prophetic tradition is congruent with the 
core values and capacities of liberal citizenship.   
 One reason believers who adhere to the prophetic tradition would recognize 
the political freedom and equal rights all human beings share as liberal citizens is 
because of the conception of personhood the tradition affirms.  At the core of the 
prophetic Christian tradition is a metaphysical conception of the person that supports 
an egalitarian political ideal.  The grounding for this view of personhood (imago dei) 
signifies a fundamental commonness humanity shares at the moment of creation and 
affirms the dignity of all persons regardless of their social status.  Therefore, from a 
prophetic stance, the scope of fair treatment (i.e. justice) incorporates everyone, and 




holds precedence over belief; that is, behavior aligned with God’s prophetic values, 
namely justice.             
 The egalitarian impulse within the prophetic tradition in fact ups the ante for 
justice.  In a very real sense, the tradition requires that adherents keep track of the 
humanity of every human being, especially those who would behave inhumanely and 
dehumanize them.  Just because individuals may choose to behave in an oppressive 
manner, this does not void the dignity and freedom they possess as a consequence of 
being created in God’s image.  The prophetic tradition is concerned about justice 
being extended to the oppressor as well as the oppressed because it understands that 
oppressors are victims (of ideology) as well.       
 In a culture where many citizens are also believers the prophetic tradition can 
provide motivational force to the call for justice. It can do so because any 
comprehensive doctrine aligned with the prophetic tradition provides grounding for 
the content of the overlapping consensus.   
 In the next chapter I will discuss an historical example of a prophetic 
community attempting to fulfill the lofty ideals of justice.  My focus will be on the 






Chapter 6:  The Prophetic Tradition within the Black Church 
 
The Black Church 
From the perspective of this author, the Black Church existed prior to the 
emergence of independent religious organizations and institutions during the late 18th 
and 19th centuries.  I believe it was born during private religious meetings among 
slaves, which have come to be called the “invisible institution.”  The Church was 
black in the sense that it was exclusively comprised of enslaved blacks whose 
differing worship style and cultural norms demanded avenues for religious 
expression.  Whether they referred to themselves or thought of themselves as Negroes 
at the time is less significant.  These early black Christians formed a “self-conscious, 
self-assertive, inner-directed institution” in spite of the fact that their self-concept was 
heavily informed by the norms and presuppositions of white Christianity.  I hold this 
view because the core identity of many Christianized slaves remained impervious to 
the pervasive and degrading influence of white theological and racial presuppositions.  
It was this self-consciousness, I assume, that led to the establishment of separate 
worship experiences that were compatible with their self-concept as children of God.  
C. Eric Lincoln seems willing to acknowledge as much when he says, “…the Black 
Church is not the Negro Church reborn, neither is it the white church replicated.  And 
yet in some sense it is both of these” (Frazier & Lincoln, 1974, 110).      
I do not assume that the theological orientation of the adolescent and 
“invisible” Church differed fundamentally from that of its later institutionalized 




Apparently C. Eric Lincoln feels differently in The Black Church Since Frazier 
(1974), for he uses this argument as a yardstick to draw a distinction between the 
“Negro Church” and the “Black Church.”   
Of the former he claims it died in the “savage sixties” when “the call to full 
manhood, to personhood, and the call to Christian responsibility left no room for the 
implications of being a “negro” in contemporary America”(Frazier & Lincoln, 1974, 
106).  Lincoln apparently views the Negro Church as absolutely conditioned by 
proscriptions rooted in the white presuppositions of racial superiority.  While black 
Christians were certainly conditioned by them, this does not mean they were 
psychological captives of such notions.   
Conversely, Lincoln describes the Black Church as “a self-conscious, self-
assertive, inner-directed, self-determined institution” guided by black Christians 
accustomed to a sense of dignity and self-fulfillment.  Yet he acknowledges a 
persistent ambivalence within the Church because of the implications of being both 
Christian and black in America: “At times it has seen itself as a less perfect 
counterpart of the white church, striving for parity in perfection….On the other hand, 
the black church has been much maligned for being Black – a “nigger institution”” 
(Frazier & Lincoln, 1974, 113).  This does not sound like a church unconditioned by 
the presuppositions of traditional white Protestantism.  Neither should one assume 
that slaves lacked some compelling sense that their social status was the product of 
human vice rather than divine will.  The New Testament would have provided blacks 
with sufficient reason to view slavery as an unnatural condition that violates God’s 




I will borrow a subsequent characterization of the Black Church by C. Eric 
Lincoln to establish a working conception of the same for my purposes in this 
chapter.  Due to the nature of the black experience and the centrality of religion in the 
development of that experience, Lincoln suggests that no disjuncture exists between 
the black church and the black community.84   
“The black church is then in some sense a “universal church,” claiming and 
 representing all blacks out of a long tradition that looks back to the time when 
 there was only the black church to bear witness to “who” or “what” a man was 
 as he stood at the bar of his community”(Frazier & Lincoln, 1974, 116).   
 
Cornel West (1999) echoes elements of Lincoln’s conception of the Black Church in 
his description of the same.   
“The black church – a shorthand rubric that refers to black Christian 
 communities of various denominations that came into being when African 
 American slaves decided, often at the risk of life and limb, to “make Jesus 
 their choice” and to share with one another their common Christian sense of 
 purpose and Christian understanding of their circumstances – is unique in 
 American culture.  This is so because it is the major institution created, 
 sustained and controlled by black people themselves; that is, it is the most 
 visible and salient cultural product of black people in the United 
 States….[T]he black church signified and signifies the collective effort of an 
 exploited and oppressed, degraded and despised, dominated and downtrodden 
 people of African descent to come to terms with the absurd in America and 
 the absurd as America.  The black church was a communal response to an 
 existential and political situation…” (West, 1999, 426-427). 
 
Rather than use some historical period that carelessly attempts to designate African-
Americans’ psychological autonomy from white racist theological presuppositions, 
this portrait of the Black Church instead signifies an institution that has continually 
served to validate black humanity and incorporate the black community as a whole.     
                                                 






Evidence of the Prophetic Impulse in the Black Church 
 “A man is not a thing – until he has lost his dignity: until he is no longer the 
image of God.  Violence or non-violence is irrelevant to whoever has already 
been dehumanized by want of compassion in another.  To be human, to be a 
person, that is the principal thing; and to insist on being so regarded, that is the 
minimum responsibility a man owes himself, his aggressor, and his God” (Frazier 
& Lincoln, 1974, 147).   
 
African Americans have had a peculiar existence in the United States.  They 
are the only group in America that achieved their status as full citizens after suffering 
a transition from that of legal property.  Yet, in spite of the hatred and discrimination 
that accompanied this transition, blacks have always held America’s political values 
dearly and at times it seemed as though they were the only ones who did.  
Historically, the Black Church has been the hub of spiritual revitalization and 
political mobilization within the African American community.  Its distinctive socio-
cultural perspective has given birth to a mode of citizenship that generally consists of 
civic action aiming toward social and moral reform in the larger society.  This is done 
primarily through the critique of corrupt state policies and the dominant cultural ethos 
(Paris, 1985, 11). 
The very existence of the Black Church could well be considered the 
outgrowth of a prophetic impulse.  That impulse, or tradition, has had extensive 
expression within the Black Church.  During their enslavement blacks somehow 
derived meaning from the bible that was contrary to what their white Protestant 
masters sought to convey to them when they initially introduced Christianity.  Many 
whites (mis)used the bible as a tool to resign slaves to an inferior status and pacify 
them with a future hope in the eternal, thus advancing a message of predestined 




therefore willingly accept it.”   Blacks, however, discovered that the bible contained 
other notions regarding their status in the human family; and such notions had 
implications on how they internalized their circumstances (Noll, 1992, 79).  A 
prophetic impulse stimulated these early Christians to secure full personhood in a 
society that aggressively refused to recognize it, which is what catapulted the birth of 
what has become the Black Church.     
In the midst of the dehumanizing institution of chattel slavery, spiritually 
desperate, yet hopeful and resilient, slaves established what has come to be known as 
“the invisible institution” (Frazier & Lincoln, 1974, 23).  It consisted of loosely 
assembled groups of slaves that secretly met and nurtured a spiritual consciousness 
rooted in an eschatological religious vision (Paris, 1985, 1).  From this seedbed of 
faith an independent institutional black church eventually emerged.  The church was 
anchored by an anthropological religious principle that nourished a collective identity 
within blacks that exceeded the parameters of the narrow white Christian conception 
of the human family.  This principle affirmed the equality of all persons and it had 
normative implications for the thought and action of the black community as well as 
the dominant racist culture as a whole: “[A]ll of its citizens have the experience of 
freedom and the necessary resources for the full actualization of their 
potentialities”(Paris, 1985, 2). 
In this chapter I will discuss expressions of the prophetic tradition in the Black 
Church by examining three themes: 1) the prophetic birth of the black church through 
conscious departure from corrupt theological presuppositions of traditional white 




liturgy; 3) the Black Church as locus of socio-cultural emancipation and 
transformation of America’s racist social order.        
I. Birth of the black church as prophetic act through conscious departure 
from the racist presuppositions underpinning the theology of the white 
church 
 
The systemic racism that once thoroughly corrupted American society must 
have seemed an indomitable force to blacks, particularly during slavery.  Built upon 
the proposition that blacks were inherently inferior and not fully a part of the human 
race, white supremacy aimed at their total psychological annihilation (Paris, 1985, 4).  
Yet, the spirituality of enslaved blacks proved to be indomitable and epitomized a 
relationship between religion and culture that differed from that of whites.  Blacks’ 
mode of spirituality also illuminated truths about Christianity itself.   
Though many blacks worshiped within white congregations that were, 
presumably, theologically and morally unvexed by the institution of slavery, some 
blacks nevertheless underwent a unique religious experience.  First, their ethnicity 
and social class caused them to experience worship from a distinct sociological 
perspective.  They were primarily spectators of their master’s formal culture and 
customs.  This social perspective likely enabled them to discern the moral incongruity 
between the religiously grounded moral beliefs of whites and their socio-political 
practices.  Second, it is likely that their social status caused them to encounter the 
biblical narratives (either directly or mediated through their masters) from the 
perspective of the oppressed.  Peter Paris provides one example of this when he 
writes, “’It was Richard Allen’s interpretation of the “second great commandment” – 




people” – that caused the organization of Richard Allen’s AME Church’” (Paris, 
1985, 18).  Hence, blacks formed correlations between their own earthly circumstance 
and the possibilities God made available for biblical characters of similar 
circumstance ostensibly because of their unmerited suffering.  Black spirituality 
accentuated an elemental truth within Christianity impervious to the influence or 
control of white Christians.  “That core was as accessible to blacks as it was to 
whites, and it was thereby appropriated” (Noll, 1992, 199).   
 What specifically is this elemental truth in Christian theology?  At the core of 
Christianity is a conception of personhood reflected in the Latin term imago dei.   As 
was mentioned in chapter 4, the idea represents a fundamental commonness humanity 
shares at the moment of creation, insofar as every person is created in the likeness of 
God or in God’s image.  It can also be interpreted as expressing a relationship 
between God and humanity.  Because all are equal under God all are considered 
equally worthy of God’s redemptive grace, meaning no one community or group is 
favored or excluded.  The prophetic Christian orientation endorses this view of 
personhood, which supports an egalitarian social ideal or worldview.  
 Considering the social and legal obstacles to literacy for slaves (Frazier & 
Lincoln, 1974, 17), prohibitions against their unsupervised assembly for religious 
purposes, and the degree to which the Christian gospel was distorted in white 
churches, it was no small effort for enslaved blacks to discern the principle of 
equality at the core of Christianity.  “There was some misgivings and in some 
instances strong opposition to acquainting the Negro with the Bible….[I]t was also 




would incite the Negro to make efforts to free himself”(Frazier & Lincoln, 1974, 18).  
Religious historian Mark Noll acknowledges the irony in the experiment involving 
slavery and Christianity on the part of white Christians when he observes that the 
religion used to support the slave system became a means toward counteracting its 
inhuman influence (Noll, 1992, 205). 
 Slaves, in all probability, appropriated the principle of equality at the core of 
Christianity because it validated some part of themselves that suspected, in spite of 
intractable evidence, that their status and circumstances were not divinely ordained or 
merited by the natural law of the universe.  “With the “death of the African 
gods”…black people creatively appropriated a Christian worldview – mainly from 
such dissenters in the American religious tradition as Baptists and Methodists – and 
thereby transformed a prevailing absurd situation into a persistent and present tragic 
one, yet sustained and empowered by a hope against hope for a potential and possible 
triumphant state of affairs (West, 1999, 427).  The principle of equality under God 
and evidence of God’s concern for the poor and oppressed in the biblical narrative 
energized the slave’s initiative to do more than merely endure their social plight.  
Walter Brueggemann has suggested that “we are energized not by that which we 
already possess but by that which is promised and about to be given” (Brueggemann, 
1987, 14).  Their appropriation of the anthropological principle is consistent with 
Israel’s appropriation of an alternative conception of life and personhood from the 
Exodus narrative.  In as much as its intent is to assault and disorient conventional 
conceptions of reality and truth, this alternative social vision served as an 




 Peter Paris (1985) describes this biblical doctrine of equality as an 
anthropological principle at the heart of what he calls “the black Christian 
tradition.”85 Paris views the black Christian tradition as a normative orientation for 
blacks that should not be interpreted as mere abstract moral principles.  Rather, he 
believes it should be more accurately understood as a constellation of religious and 
moral values preserved in black institutions and expressed in speeches, deeds, and 
actions.  Accordingly, the equality of all persons under God (which Paris uses 
interchangeably with the principle of non-racism) is the most fundamental element of 
the black Christian tradition.  Paris posits that the tradition has been the principal 
criterion by which black Americans assess the conditions affecting their common life.   
“Their basic source of authority has been that to which they have been 
unreservedly committed, namely a biblical anthropology which they believe 
strongly affirms the equality of all persons under God regardless of race or 
any other natural quality.  This doctrine has been the essence of the black 
Christian tradition and the most fundamental requirement of its churches.  Its 
discovery soon revealed to blacks the basic contradiction implicit in the 
religion of white Americans: the contradiction between this biblical 
understanding of humanity and the practices of the white churches” (Paris, 
1985, 11).  
 
Paris suggests that by appropriating an idea that “had only an abstract rhetorical 
appearance in the white churches,”86 blacks had grasped the essence of the Christian 
faith and salvaged it from the clasp of white racism. 
II. Black church as nurturer of prophetic imagination through sermons, hymns 
 and spirituals.   
 
Rather than flee the plantation or devise various ways to revolt, many slaves 
coped with their seemingly fixed predicament by establishing their own clandestine 
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religious associations.  These later became known as the “invisible institution.”  Their 
attempt to create a surrogate world for themselves enabled the preservation of some 
semblance of autonomy and dignity (Paris, 1985, 5). 
Through independent worship, blacks were able to imaginatively envision an 
alternative future reality that differed from their contemporary one in one crucial 
sense: it was governed by a non racist conception of personhood that viewed every 
human being as equal under God.  Notwithstanding a concurrent preoccupation with 
the hereafter, slaves focused on doing more than merely surviving in this world.  Over 
time, a shared affirmation of the anthropological principle enabled blacks to more 
critically evaluate the dissonance between it and the prevailing norms and messages 
that shaped the larger society.   
“[The black Christian worldview] put the pressing and urgent problem of evil 
 at its center.  Furthermore, the major focus of the prophetic black Christian 
 worldview…was on marshaling and garnering resources from fellowship, 
 community and personal strength (meditation, prayer) to cope with 
 overwhelmingly limited options dictated by institutional and personal evil”  
(West, 1999, 427). 
 
Assessing the incongruity between societal and religious values became a normative 
tradition for blacks and this activity influenced the socio-political agenda of the 
institutionalized Black Church.   
How might the Black Church have passed on the prophetic principle of 
equality to its members and continually sustained this new critical consciousness 
within them?  In other words, what might constitute the elements of the “liturgical” 
(to borrow Walter Brueggemann’s term), or sustained, process by which the Black 
Church has nurtured its prophetic worldview over time?  Historically sermons and 




the appropriation of the biblical doctrine of equality.  But before discussing them I 
would like to provide a little sociological context to spirituals and sermons and some 
of their common content. 
 From its earliest to its most contemporary expression, the Black Church has 
provided a structured religious setting in which blacks could give expression to their 
deepest feelings.  The church has given “voice” to the pathology African Americans 
have inherited as a result of having undergone a transition from legal property to the 
status of free citizens.  By pathology I speak of a dilemma stemming from the 
“double-consciousness” once described by W.E.B. Dubois.   
“[T]he negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with second-
sight in this American world – a world which yields him no true self-
consciousness, but only lets him see himself through the revelation of the 
other world.  It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of 
always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s 
soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity.  One 
ever feels his twoness – an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two 
unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged 
strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder”(Washington et al., 1965, 
214-215). 
 
 The pathology concerns the moral and socio-political ambiguity blacks 
experience with respect to their self-understanding, stemming from life in a racist 
society.  This ambiguity constantly impacts their daily existence.  Thus, the tension 
for African Americans has always regarded “How is it possible to be both black and a 
nigger?”; and, “How is it possible to be both Christian and American?”  The former 
question reflects an irreconcilable, yet enduring, dilemma between their appropriation 
of a biblical principle of equality87 that affirms the dignity of their makeup, and their 
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reluctant but often subconscious acceptance of a hegemonic social construction of 
blackness as evil and inferior.  The latter question represents a tension between 
maintaining their fidelity to an egalitarian worldview (a non-racist society) that is 
anchored by a biblical anthropology, and sustaining their commitment to the political 
principles of a nation whose dominant cultural values and norms “helped mold a 
common racial destiny in which they could take no small amount of pride”(Paris, 
1985, 29).   
 As a whole, black Americans, and especially black Christians, have shown a 
high susceptibility to this ‘pathology of identity,’ and in some sense the Black Church 
is a product of it, as well as a retardant to it.  Separate religious worship permitted 
open and honest expression of the pain and ambiguity the American experience 
produced in blacks.  Correspondingly, the Black Church is arguably the only 
institution that has adequately ministered to its symptoms, especially considering that 
they are primarily spiritual in nature.  Coincidentally, singing and preaching have 
been both the primary means through which blacks have voiced and processed this 
pain and also the means through which faith, perseverance, and social imagination 
have been regularly renewed.   
 Two of the most basic liturgical components of Christian worship are sermons 
and music.  The former provide spiritual illumination and guidance, while the latter 
stimulates and sustains a spiritual state of being.  Both have been indispensable in the 
Black Church, particularly during its most rudimentary stages when it merely 
consisted of secretive religious meetings among the enslaved.  Cornel West (1999) 
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identifies three principal African resources in black Christianity,88 and suggests that 
the first, a “kinetic orality,” permeated black prayers, sermons, and hymns.  “Fluid, 
protean, and flexible oral stylizations of language gave black church life a 
distinctively African American stamp – a stamp that flowed from black cultural 
agency in a society that tried to deny and downplay any form of black agency and 
black creativity” (West, 1999, 428).   
 The distinctiveness of African American spirituality is largely expressed 
through the sermons, hymns and spirituals that are such a common feature of their 
worship.  These elements of black Christian worship express a hope in a future to 
come as well as encourage perseverance in the present (Noll, 1992, 205).  Cheryl 
Sanders (1996) discusses the hopeful, future-oriented quality of black sermons and 
black sacred music and their capacity to fund perseverance.  Using Walter 
Brueggemann’s interpretation of the prophetic poetry of Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and 
second Isaiah in his effort to understand themes of exile and homecoming with 
respect to the Hebrews’ experience in Babylon, Sanders examines the exilic 
experience of African American Christians in America.  She asserts that a liturgical 
rehearsal of sacred truths on the part of an exiled faith community both sustains an 
impetus to resist assimilation by imperial values, and also provides a “future-giving 
memory” that invigorates their abiding pursuit of “home.”89  Regarding how black 
sacred music funds perseverance, Sanders refers to William Herbert Brewster’s 
account of why he wrote the gospel song “Move On Up a Little Higher”:   
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 “”Move on up a Little Higher” was not only a Christian climbing the ladder to 
 heaven, but it was an exaltation of Black people to keep moving.  You come 
 out of slavery, you have an opportunity to get on your ladder and keep on 
 climbing.  Don’t stop when you make one; make another”  
 (Sanders, 1996, 149).   
 
With regard to the presence of a future-giving memory in spirituals she notes:    
 
 “The verse in Jesus’ parable of the two lost sons, in which the prodigal son 
 “came to himself” (Luke 15:17), was cited by Brueggemann as a subtext for a 
 fresh proclamation of the gospel to the exiled church in America.  In his view, 
 the “gospel” is that we may go to a home not situated in the “consumer 
 militarism” of  the dominant value system but rather in God’s kingdom of love 
 and justice and peace and freedom” (Sanders, 1996, 149-150). 
 
 Sermons, hyms, and spirituals comprise elements of an unofficial liturgical 
performance that has enabled the Black Church to nurture a prophetic consciousness.  
The sermons and spirituals echo aspects of Israel’s liturgical process of disjunctive 
faith transformation as described by Walter Brueggemann (1987) in chapter 5; 
namely the critique of ideology, the public processing of pain, and the release of 
social imagination.  I will analyze a few exemplary spirituals and one sermon in light 
of how they reflect these three elements and general features of the prophetic 
tradition.   
 
Spirituals:  
1) The Driver90 
 O, de ole nigger-driver! 
  O, gwine away! 
 Fust ting my mammy tell me,  
  O, gwine away! 
 Tell me ‘bout de nigger-driver,  
  O, gwine away! 
 Nigger-driver second devil,  
  O, gwine away! 
 Best ting for do he driver,  
  O, gwine away! 
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 Knock he down and spoil he labor,  
  O, gwine away! 
 
 This spiritual exemplifies a critique of ideology.  Its language presents a 
paradox in the sense that while the ideology of racism and the system of enslavement 
that it supports is critiqued, this is done employing racist language (the term nigger).  
The use of the term on the part of slaves to describe themselves reveals the manner in 
which their identities appropriated their oppressor’s constructs.  On the other hand, 
this appropriation clearly did not eliminate the capacity for slaves to critique the 
system and racist constructs from an alternative perspective (religious/Christian); 
hence the “devil” language.   
    
 
2) Motherless Child91  
 Sometimes I feel like a motherless child,  
 A long ways from home –  
 True believer, a long ways from home.   
 Sometimes I feel like I’m almos’ gone,  
 A long ways from home.   
 Then I get down on my knees an’ pray – 
 Way up in the heavenly land home 
 A long ways from home.   
 
 I believe this spiritual exemplifies a public processing of pain.  As 
Brueggemann claimed, once an oppressed group is capable of critiquing an imperial 
ideology they are then more cognizant of the pain they have felt as a result of it and 
are thereby more willing to articulate that pain.  “The grieving of Israel is the 
beginning of criticism because it means that one acknowledges pain caused by a false 
myth – a broken promise” (Brueggemann, 1987, 12).  The “almos’ gone” phrase 
illuminates the spiritual weariness the enslaved bore.  Yet the singing of this spiritual 
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may have somehow alleviated that pain merely through the releasing of the emotions 
in separate corporate worship.    
 
 
3) We Shall Overcome92   
 We shall overcome,  
 We shall overcome someday;  
 If in our hearts we do believe,  
 We shall overcome someday.   
 We’ll walk hand in hand;  
 We shall all have peace;  
 We are not afraid;  
 God is not through with us yet… 
 We shall overcome someday,  
 Oh, if in our hearts we do believe,  
 We shall overcome someday!   
 
 This spiritual has been used by presidents, persecuted Europeans, and most 
memorably by activists during America’s civil rights movement.  Its declarative voice 
(“We shall”) arouses confidence and faith.  Overcoming is its central theme.  I believe 
it releases social imagination because the song conjures up images of an alternative 
reality: walking hand in hand in peace.  It also reminds of a purpose God has for the 




What Man Lives By, The Reverend Dr. Benjamin Elijah Mays93  
       
“No man can live without faith in himself – a sense of inner security.  A child 
must learn early to believe that he is somebody worthwhile and that he can do 
many praiseworthy things.  Without this hope, there would be nothing for him 
to do but to commit suicide.  Furthermore, man could not live hopefully 
without believing that he counts for something in this world.  The greatest 
damage that the white man did to the black man through slavery and 
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segregation was to beat him down so much that millions of Negroes believed 
that they were nobody.  The hopelessness and despair of so many black youths 
today lie in the fact that they have never believed that they have dignity and 
worth as human beings.  If the emphasis on blackness and black awareness 
today means that black people are beginning to be proud of their heritage and 
proud of being what they are – black –apologizing to no one – not even to 
God – for what they are, it is a good thing.  Man lives best by a belief that he 
is somebody, God’s creature, and that he has status not given to him by man 
but given to him by God.   
 
“Man must believe that however hard the road, however difficult today, 
tomorrow things will be better.  Tomorrow may not be better, but we must 
believe that it will be.  Wars may never cease, but we must continue to strive 
to eliminate them.  We may not abolish poverty, but we must believe that we 
can provide bread enough and to spare for every living creature and that we 
can find the means to distribute it.  We may not exterminate racism, but we 
must believe that different racial groups can live together in peace, and we 
must never cease to try to build a society in which the fatherhood of God and 
the brotherhood of man become realities. 
 
“In other words, man must live by faith in God – faith to believe that God 
sustains good and not evil, peace and not war, truth and not lies, justice and 
not injustice, integrity and not dishonesty…. 
 
“Man shall not live by bread alone, but man must live by his dreams, by the 
goals he strives to reach, and by the ideals which he chooses and chases.  
What is man anyway?  Man is flesh and blood, body and mind, bones and 
muscle, arms and legs, heart and soul, lungs and liver, nerves and veins – all 
these and more make a man.  But man is really what his dreams are.  Man is 
what he aspires to be. He is the ideals that beckon him on.  Man is the 
integrity that keeps him steadfast, honest, true.  If a young man tells me what 
he aspires to be, I can almost predict his future.”   
 
“It must be borne in mind, however, that the tragedy in life does not lie in not 
reaching your goal.  The tragedy lies in having no goal to reach.  It isn’t a 
calamity to die with dreams unfulfilled, but it is a calamity not to dream.  It is 
not a disaster to be unable to capture your ideal, but it is a disaster to have no 
ideal to capture.  It is not a disgrace not to reach the stars, but it is a disgrace 
to have no stars to reach for.  Not failure, but low aim is the sin”(Italics mine) 
(Philpot, 1972, 35-37).  
 
 I have quoted Mays at length because this sermon includes many expressions 
of the prophetic tradition in addition to a few elements of Israel’s liturgical process.  




by and reinforced within the Black Church.  Mays highlights the pathology within 
black Americans as he critiques the ideology of racism that buttressed chattel slavery 
and America’s discriminatory socio-political system.   
 In response, he appeals to the anthropological principle of equality by 
reminding his listeners of their inherent dignity and exalted status as creatures of God.  
One also sees evidence of the persistent effort in the Black Church to replenish hope 
within a dispossessed people despite difficult social circumstances.  But Mays does so 
not by directing attention to an eternal world out yonder, but by encouraging faith in 
one’s ability to accomplish socio-civic – might I say prophetic – objectives: peace, 
caring for the poor, reasonableness or tolerance, and social justice.   
 Lastly, notice the release of social imagination evident in the focus Mays 
places on one’s dreams and goals.  While he does not, by erecting a vision of an 
alternative world, predetermine for his audience what their dreams or goals should be, 
he does challenge a strictly corporeal view of humanity by emphasizing the 
significance of the abstract: ideals, virtues, and the danger of a self-defeating 
psychological paralysis.                             
III. Citizenship as religious vocation: from appropriation of prophetic values to 
 the transformation of America’s racist society.   
 
Christianity had one of two effects on the enslaved: it either served as an opiate (as it 
was intended to do), reconciling Africans to their destiny as laborers and property;94 
or it invigorated their human-ness (as opposed to it-ness), prompting resistance and, 
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ultimately, transformation.  “Religious faith emboldened slaves to disobey masters in 
order to meet together for worship and song, to labor diligently with an eye toward 
freedom, at least for coming generations, and even to escape.  In this determination to 
find freedom – in Christ and in this world – the Southern slaves shared the 
commitments of their free Northern peers, where leaders in the church were often 
leaders in the struggle against slavery as well”(Noll, 1992, 205).  In the many 
instances in which the Christian gospel transformed, rather than stifled, slave 
consciousness, the effects were not merely spiritual but also political.  
 Walter Brueggemann (1987) posits that prophetic texts are themselves acts of 
imagination that propose alternative worlds.  He insists, though, that while these texts 
must be viewed as materials that fund prophetic action through methods rooted in the 
texts, they nevertheless require that efforts to affect social change in contemporary 
contexts be carried out imaginatively and daringly in ways appropriate for concrete 
circumstances.  “The black Christian tradition puts forward a principle of opposition 
to racism that is not merely formal.  The nature of its content must be decided in 
every context and hence must vary – not in its moral quality but in its practical 
relevance” (Paris, 1985, 16).  The Black Church has needed to be strategic, cunning, 
subtle and most importantly prophetic in its efforts to reform the morally corrupt 
aspects of America’s sociopolitical landscape, especially considering the 
disproportionately small amount of economic and social capital blacks have had.  
Blacks’ attempts to overhaul longstanding cultural norms that were economically 




safety, particularly during chattel slavery when political power was monopolized by 
whites.   
 This section will discuss the prophetic efforts of the Black Church to align the 
dominant sociopolitical culture with God’s sacred values (equality, freedom and 
social justice).  In this regard, one might consider the Black Church as promoting a 
vision of citizenship that amounts to a religious vocation.  That vocation being the 
actualization of an egalitarian society grounded in a biblical anthropology that 
establishes the equality of humankind.  First, I will discuss how the appropriation of 
prophetic principles gave rise to a religious vocation with characteristics tantamount 
to a vision of citizenship.  Second, I will discuss two functions of the religious 
vocation of the Black Church: the priestly and the prophetic.   
 When black Christians appropriated the biblical doctrine of human equality 
under God they did not merely endorse an interpretation of the bible that varied from 
that of most white Protestants.  They in essence elected a new God and renounced an 
old one.  Walter Brueggemann notes that “faith formation is a process of choosing 
gods….In choosing this new God…the peasant community always found it had also 
chosen a new mode of social existence along with the new God.  This God may not 
be chosen apart from a particular social existence” (Brueggemann, 1987, 26).  The 
sense of superiority most white Americans felt corrupted their understanding of 
Christian doctrine and thereby justified a racist conception of personhood which 
made non-whites inferior and exploitable.  The god of their religious worldview 
therefore co-signed the oppression of blacks, not only during slavery but up through 




were created and who played an active role in liberating the poor and oppressed – 
provoked a consciousness in blacks which roused their expectations for an altogether 
different social existence.  When blacks appropriated the god of equality and 
denounced the god underwriting their persecution, in some sense they also accepted 
responsibility for the interests this new god held for all humanity, particularly the 
poorest and oppressed.   
 The Christianized slaves most likely derived their sense of religious vocation 
from Old and New Testament accounts of God’s liberating acts directed towards the 
physically and spiritually oppressed.  And like the prophets, from Moses to Jesus, 
whose missions were issued directly from Yahweh, the Black Church has understood 
that in order to “overcome social injustice and thus bring about a society in which all 
people are equally respected as bearers of God’s image”95 it too would bear the 
responsibility of leveling an ongoing prophetic critique against the racist social 
system that legitimated their domination and dehumanization.   
 The black Christian tradition’s rooting in the anthropological principle 
establishes its normative orientation and preoccupation with sociopolitical concerns.  
Peter Paris suggests that the black Christian tradition naturally integrates morality, 
religion, and politics.  
“[I]n our view, the theological grounding of this anthropological principle 
established its religious character while the anthropological focus specified its 
social relatedness.  In other words, the black Christian tradition represents a 
form union of the eschatological and the sociopolitical realms, never the one 
apart from the other.  In summation, morality, religion, and politics are united 
whenever this formal principle is actualized in the thought and practice of 
those persons or institutions wherein racism has no reality” (Paris, 1985, 18).   
 
                                                 




The biblical doctrine of equality constitutes the foundation of the ethical claims and 
political initiatives of the Black Church.  Conceptually, then, the Black Church views 
many aspects of political action and civic engagement related to citizenship as a 
religious vocation.  However, it should be understood that the religious vocation the 
Black Church considers a requirement of faith is not an effort to prepare liberal 
democratic citizens.  Such requirements flow from a commitment to a biblical 
worldview that compels regardless of the kind of government they live in.   
 Peter Paris notes that the black Christian tradition exercised both “priestly” 
and “prophetic” functions: “the former aiding and abetting the race in its capacity to 
endure the effects of racism, the latter utilizing all available means to effect religious 
and moral reform in the society at large”(Paris, 1985, 11).  These two functions are 
representative of the energizing and dismantling functions Walter Brueggemann 
(2001) asserts are the focus of the alternative consciousness prophetic ministries must 
cultivate and nourish.  “The criticizing function attempts to dismantle the dominant 
consciousness by delegitimizing and rejecting the present ordering of social reality; 
while the energizing function serves to stimulate hope and fervent anticipation for 
God’s promise of the newness of another time and situation toward which the faith 
community can move….I should urge that either by itself is not faithful to our best 
tradition” (Brueggemann, 2001, 3).           
 Representative of its priestly function, the late 18th and 19th century 
independence movement of the Black Church was an effort on the part of black 
Christians to institutionalize the egalitarian and prophetic aspects of the Christian 




purchasing their freedom, black denominations arose in the North like the African 
Methodist Episcopals founded by Richard Allen and Absalom Jones, self-taught 
former slaves disenchanted with the discrimination they faced in white Methodist 
churches.  Black Baptist congregations were also created (again, largely in the north 
and post-Civil War in the southern US), but at a much slower rate because they were 
largely independent and lacked the organizational structure of Methodists.  Other 
black Christians separated from white denominations and founded the Colored 
Methodist Episcopal Church as well as the Colored Cumberland Presbyterian Church.  
Around 1890 the National Baptist Convention was established96 in an attempt to 
reduce the influence of white national Baptist organizations and maintain more of a 
separate social and cultural existence from them.   
 One of the most significant consequences of the development of 
denominational churches was the role black Christian institutions began to play with 
respect to serving as a welfare agency within the black community by rendering 
social services as well as spiritual outreach.  “After the Civil War, the black churches 
rapidly became the center for black culture generally as well as for black religious 
life” (Noll, 1992, 341).  Learning how to minister to themselves and become more 
autonomous necessitated that blacks become more concerned about formal education.    
 The involvement of the Black Church in initiatives like the Underground 
Railroad, abolitionism, and the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950’s and 1960’s are 
indicative of its prophetic functions.  These initiatives were in large part efforts to 
address the incongruity between America’s dominant cultural values and its own 
biblical understanding of equality, freedom and social justice.   
                                                 




 The problem of racism has been a particular focus of the religious vocation of 
the Black Church.  This is because racism has been the dominant cause of inequality 
and oppression for blacks, and thus the central obstacle to the egalitarian social ideal 
endorsed by the prophetic tradition.  Peter Paris summarizes the Black Church’s 
prophetic understanding of citizenship as religious vocation in the following way:  
“Clearly, those black churches which have been faithful to the black Christian 
tradition are moral institutions.  Their raison d’etre is inextricably tied to the 
function of opposing the beliefs and practices of racism by proclaiming the 
biblical view of humanity as they have appropriated it, that is, the equality of 
all persons under God.  Thus their moral aim is theologically grounded.  The 
doctrine of human equality under God is, for them, the final authority for all 
matters pertaining to faith, thought, and practice.  In short, its function in the 
black experience is categorical, that is, it is unconditional, absolute, and 
universally applicable” (Paris, 1985, 14).  
 
Because the political values that legitimate America’s liberal democracy are basically 
consistent with those of the black Christian tradition, the Black Church has 
considered its religious vocation as contributing positively to the civic health and 
functioning of American society.  The Church has no history of attempting to impose 
Christian doctrine on the larger society by endorsing a specific social structure or 
some supposedly divinely mandated political model of government.  Rather, like the 
2nd century ekklesia it has sought to liberate “the least” in society by critiquing 
socially acceptable, yet in some sense morally decadent, practices that actually cause 
America to fall short of her own constitutional values and norms of justice. 
 This mission represents the prophetic vocation of the Black Church: calling a 
community back to its better nature.   Historically black Christians have viewed that 
“community” as the American republic, and understood its political principles as 




America’s more harmful cultural values – apartheid, nationalism, materialism – have 
often distorted the true meaning of those principles.  Black Christians have not 
attempted to make America Israel and enforce Christian doctrine as secular law.  
They have mainly wished to prompt America to uphold its constitutional promises to 
every citizen, which began with demanding that that their full humanity and 
citizenship be affirmed, socially and politically, by a nation that has never really done 
so.  Considering that the Black Church has a long track record of confronting social 
and political forces that abet oppression by fostering discrimination, inequality, and 
physical and psychological bondage – that essentially frustrate the fulfillment of 
America’s political values (and more importantly, their own religious convictions) – 
it is clear to see how the prophetic tradition has influenced its religious worldview.   
 Few have embodied the aims of the black Christian tradition – calling 
America back to its better self – than the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.:  
 “In a sense we have come to our nation's capital to cash a check. When the 
 architects of our republic wrote the magnificent words of the Constitution and 
 the Declaration of Independence, they were signing a promissory note to 
 which every American was to fall heir. This note was a promise that all men, 
 yes, black men as well as white men, would be guaranteed the unalienable 
 rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. 
 
 It is obvious today that America has defaulted on this promissory note insofar 
as her citizens of color are concerned. Instead of honoring this sacred 
obligation, America has given the Negro people a bad check, a check which 
has come back marked "insufficient funds." But we refuse to believe that the 
bank of justice is bankrupt. We refuse to believe that there are insufficient 
funds in the great vaults of opportunity of this nation. So we have come to 
cash this check — a check that will give us upon demand the riches of 
freedom and the security of justice. We have also come to this hallowed spot 
to remind America of the fierce urgency of now. This is no time to engage in 
the luxury of cooling off or to take the tranquilizing drug of gradualism. Now 




day this nation will rise up and live out the true meaning of its creed: "We 
hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal.”97 
   
 
                                                 




Chapter 7: Conclusions 
 
 In the early days of the American republic it was assumed that religion was a 
primary course of civic virtue.  However, that view was to some respect rendered 
suspect, especially since World War II, because it was expressed via a kind of 
Protestant establishment in state supported schools.   
 Of late a literature has developed with a more negative view of the role of 
religion in promoting citizenship.  This literature notes three main themes.  First, 
concern about the spillover of illiberal values into public life due to socialization 
infused with patriarchy (the correspondence principle).  Second, a concern for 
individual autonomy due to uncritical adherence to inherited beliefs and minimal 
exposure to alternative views.  Third, a concern for the cultivation of democratic 
values due to a kind of radical sectarianism that places them at risk.   
 Here arguments have focused on religious groups that are anti-intellectual and 
isolationist.  Yoder v Wisconsin (1972) and Mozert v Hawkins County Board of 
Education (1987) are two Supreme Court cases that have played a central role in 
shaping these arguments.  While most authors at least note that not all groups are like 
this, the overall effect of this literature has been to permit these groups to stand for 
religion generally via assumptions that they differ from other groups only in being 
more extreme (that all are the same, but some differ in degree although not in kind) 
and via the failure to seriously consider the educational implication of other religious 
traditions.             
 In this dissertation I have argued the following claims regarding this more 




does not provide a convincing account of the relationships between private 
associations and civic virtue.  John Rawls’s (1972) view of the development of a 
sense of justice and his idea of an overlapping consensus (with the provision that in 
fact the notion of an overlapping consensus is well served if it is well supported by 
one’s comprehensive doctrine), along with the civil society argument advanced by 
Robert Putnam (1993; 2000), suggest it is very likely that religious associations are a 
significant means for cultivating civic virtue and preparing liberal citizens.   
 Second, any view of liberal democracy that shows religion to be broadly 
incompatible with autonomy and democratic character faces certain objections.  One, 
it is inconsistent with freedom of conscience.  Any state policy enacted for the 
purpose of regulating the affairs of religious associations would place freedom of 
conscience at risk and perhaps unjustly undermine the ability of religious groups to 
impart their beliefs and fulfill their unique function in the lives of adherents.  Two, it 
ignores the broad acceptance of “free faith” by most religions (a commitment related 
to autonomy).  Three, it ignores major religious traditions that emphasize civic 
responsibility and social justice (commitments related to democratic character and 
democratic governance).  Arguments that are able to show that religious education is 
inherently inconsistent with the development of democratic character and autonomy 
tend to assert “hard” interpretations of these values.  However, according to “softer” 
views of democracy and autonomy it is far less clear that democratic character and 
autonomy are inconsistent with any but the most radical religious orientations. 
 Arguments that do not allow Yoder and Mozert to represent all religion must 




implications for citizenship.  This dissertation has explored one such religious 
tradition: the prophetic tradition.  The prophetic tradition has been prominent in 
Judaism and Christianity.  The core features of this tradition are: it expresses a 
paramount concern for equality, freedom and social justice; it is undergirded by a 
conception of personhood that views every human as created in the image of God; its 
conception of personhood supports an egalitarian social ideal that seeks to affirm the 
dignity of all persons regardless of social status; the establishment of a covenantal 
relationship between God – who serves as an active agent in liberating the oppressed 
– and humanity form its roots in the Old Testament; it promotes responsibility for the 
moral health of society by advancing a religious vocation aimed at eliminating the 
gap between social conditions and covenantal standards of humaneness, but in a 
manner sensitive to social and historical context (e.g. proclaiming that a concrete 
community or society operate in a particular way).   
 I have shown how most of these features are represented in the Protestant 
Black Church in the United States.  I have also defended this tradition against the 
charge that it is theocratic, and that it risks autonomy and democratic character.  
Hence, in the prophetic tradition there exists a religious orientation whose educational 
implications for civic virtue differ quite significantly from the Yoder and Mozert 
analyses.  I assert that the strand of faith encountered within the prophetic Christian 
tradition necessarily implicates involvement within the political dimension of life in 
all its aspects – cultural, economic, and governmental.  I also assert that this strand of 




qua citizens that is broadly compatible with and supportive of central liberal 
democratic values – namely reciprocity, mutual respect, tolerance, and justice.   
 While the cultivation of civic virtue is the special responsibility of the state, its 
development does not fall within the exclusive domain of state institutions.  Religious 
associations can be effective sites because for the development of civic virtue because 
of the experience of association they provide as well as the particular beliefs and 
values they are able to promote (not necessarily citizenship focused, but conducive to 
developing civic virtues).  This study should be interpreted as concerning itself with 
the socialization received through religious education broadly speaking, and not just 
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